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Abstract
The thesis is split into two parts. The first part examines the principle of insurable 
interest in property insurance as a test which distinguishes insurance contracts from 
wagering. Throughout the study, the principle of insurable interest will be explored 
and analyzed under English and Canadian Laws as models of the common law, on the 
one hand, and Saudi Law which is based upon Islamic Law, i.e. Sharia, on the other.
The second part deals with the Saudi conception of insurance contracts. Insurance 
contracts have been rejected by Sharia on the ground that they contain elements of 
Riba, (usury); Gharar, (uncertainty) and Maysir (gambling). Muslim scholars believe 
that where one of those elements is found in an insurance contract, it will be vitiated 
by virtue of Sharia principles. The principal object of this study is not only to make a 
critical study of the common law approach to insurable interest but to suggest a model 
of insurance that complies with the general principles of Sharia.
The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides a brief outline of the 
requirement of insurable interest under the common law models and Saudi law. It will 
outline the objectives, significance, methodology, scope and the structure of the 
thesis. The second chapter will be devoted to a historical examination of the contract 
of insurance together with the requirement of insurable interest. The third chapter will 
consider the nature of the requirement of insurable interest and the principle of 
indemnity. The fourth chapter will discuss the consequences of lack of insurable 
interest.
The fifth chapter outlines the conception of contract in Saudi law and outlines the 
importance and the influence of Islamic law upon Saudi law. It also explores the 
elements of Riba, usury; Maysir, gambling and Gharar, uncertainty.
The sixth chapter will discuss the distinction between what Muslim scholars call 
’commercial insurance’, the original form of insurance that is understood by the 
common law and which is forbidden under Sharia, and 'co-operative insurance,' 
which, it will be argued is acceptable to Sharia. The seventh chapter will propose an 
alternative form of insurance that accommodates Sharia, i.e. 'solidary insurance.' The 
final chapter, eight, will evaluate the outcomes and will compare and contrast the 
contract of insurance in its original form, co-operative insurance and the suggested 
form of insurance, so-called 'solidary insurance.'
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1. Introduction
Insurable interest is one of the most significant principles of insurance law and it is 
a fundamental requirement to the validity of an insurance contract. That is to say, an 
insured must possess some relationship to the subject-matter insured in order to claim 
indemnity from an insurer. Nevertheless, the nature of such relationship differs from 
one jurisdiction to another.
Many jurisdictions, including England, seek to strike down gaming and wagering 
from insurance contracts.1 That was decided by English courts during the 18th century 
and it has been adopted up to the present. Accordingly, Parliament passed Life 
Assurance Act 1774 to make illegal insuring a person's life without insurable interest 
at the time of concluding a contract of insurance.3 In addition, Marine Insurance Act 
1906 renders insurance policies without insurable interest void and Marine Insurance 
(Gambling Policies) Act 1909 prohibits gambling on loss by maritime peril.4
1 Section 1 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that the contract o f marine insurance is a contract of 
indemnity. Note, however, the effect of the Gambling Act 2005 on the requirement of insurable interest 
in chapter 4, infra. See, also, the operation of the principle o f indemnity in chapter 3, infra.
2 Le Crasv Hughes (1782) 3 Doug. 81, 99 ER. 549; Da Costa v Jones, (1778) 2 Cowp. 729, ER. 98.
3 It is important to note that this study in focussing upon the requirement of insurable interest in 
property insurance and will exclude life assurance. See, section, 1.6, infra.
4 See, section 2.3.2, infra.
1
Therefore, where a person wants to insure a property, he/she must have an insurable 
interest, otherwise, the insurance contract will be null and void. The requirement and 
meaning, however, of insurable interest have been introduced by Marine Insurance 
Act 19065 in section 5. Section 5(1)6 provides that:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person has an insurable interest 
who is interested in a marine adventure."
Section 5(2) goes on to state that:
"In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in 
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at 
risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due 
arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or by damage 
thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof"7
As a matter of fact, common law jurisdictions applied the requirement of insurable 
interest in order to safeguard insurance contracts form gambling and wagering. In 
English law, for example, there were several statutes that were passed by Parliament 
for the purpose of protecting the public policy from wagering as it was viewed as an
5 Hereafter, MIA 1906 [UK].
6 This definition was drafted with accordance to Lord Eldon's view, the legal interest test, in Lucena v 
Craufurd, (1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, 127 ER, 630. It is important to note that the requirement of 
insurable interest applies to the other types of insurances.
7 The Marine insurance Act 1745 enforced the requirement of insurable interest on insurance contracts 
as well as the Life Assurance Act 1774. None of them, however, defined the concept of "insurable 
interest" which the insured is obliged to possess at the time of the risk insured against. Furthermore, it 
seems that the definition of insurable interest in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 was the first statutory 
definition has ever appeared. See Nicolas Legh-Jones, J. Birds & D. Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance 
Law, (10th) ed. 2003, 1-48, p.24. However, the definition has been criticized as being a restrictive view 
of insurable interest and not being exhaustive. Therefore, it was abandoned by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. See, C. Brown & J. Menezes, Insurance Law in Canada, 2nd ed. 1991, p. 69; R. Colinvaux, 
Arnould's Law ofMarine Insurance and Average, 16th ed. 1981,para. 332,p.218.
2
inherently evil practice. As for insurance, the legislation was directed towards 
prohibiting wagering agreements by requiring an insurable interest and, also, to defeat 
the occurrence of ’’moral hazard” in insurance market.8 That is where an insured is 
tempted to bring the loss to his/her property in order to benefit from the insurance 
money.9
In respect of Canadian Law, the judgment of Kosmopoulos,]0 imposed its 
significance upon the general view of Canadian Courts with respect to insurable 
interest. It rejected the English view as confirmed by the House of Lords in Macaura 
v. Northern Assurance Company Ltd,u that an insured must have any legal or 
equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property in order to be able to 
bring a successful claim against his insurer. Thus, the thesis will survey this judgment 
and evaluate its effect in the common law.
As far as Saudi Arabian Law is concerned, Commercial Court Law 193112 has also 
imposed the requirement of insurable interest in the field of marine insurance. Article 
327 mentions the things which are insurable or what could be a subject-matter of 
insurance. It states that:
"Items which are insurable are..., (7) anything of value which may encounter 
marine perils."13
8 J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (Oxford: Hart, 2004), p. 262.
9 See chapter two, infra, for more details.
10 Constitution Insurance Co. o f  Cannada v Kosmopoulos, 1987, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208.
11 [1925] A. C. 619.
12 Hereafter, CCL 1931 [SA]. It is noteworthy that, this is, currently, the only statute which regulates 
property insurance in Saudi Arabia.
3 The things which article 327 mentioned as subject-matter o f insurance, apart from the above 
mentioned, included ships and their machinery, equipment and provisions, hulls under construction and 
all other types of cargos, money borrowed under the marine procedure.
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Moreover, the Implementation Regulations of the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law 200314 has imposed the requirement of insurable interest to be taken into 
consideration by insurance companies when issuing insurance policies. Article fifty- 
five of the Regulations states that:
"The basis of the information provided in the policy shall be the application 
submitted by the policyholder. When completing the insurance application, the 
following must be taken into consideration: 1- Insurable interest..."
However, insurance has been regulated by CCL 1931 in the field of marine 
insurance. The CCL 1931 has been criticised for being outdated and it does not serve 
its purpose at the present time. Therefore, the Saudi regulator is willing to pass a new 
statute in order to regulate insurance generally, i.e. non-marine.
Therefore, it is hoped that, this comparative study will present useful 
recommendations to develop and reform the regulation of insurance law in Saudi 
Arabia, especially, in relation to the doctrine of insurable interest by comparing the 
models of the common law, i.e. English and Canadian laws.
Furthermore, Islamic law, Sharia, is the sole source of the Saudi regulations on the 
basis that article (1) of the Saudi Basic Law 199215 provides:
14 By Royal Decree M/32, 01 Aug. 2003.
15 Royal Order No. (A/91). 27/8/1412 H., 1/3/1992.
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"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as 
its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God’s prayers and 
peace be upon him, are its constitution, ..."
Article (7) provides:
"Government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran and the 
Prophet's tradition."
However, the CCL 1931 [SA] has non-religious origins. In fact, the CCL 1931 [SA] 
is a mere translation of the Ottoman Commercial Code 1850, and the latter was a 
translation of Part 2 of the French Code de Commerce of 1807.16
This thesis will explore the definition, the nature and the influence of the doctrine of 
insurable interest as a criterion which distinguishes an insurance contract from 
gambling and wagering under English and Canadian Laws, as models of the common 
law and Saudi Law. It will, also, explore the definition of cooperative insurance and 
find out how far it differs from commercial insurance, i.e., insurance contract in its 
original form. Furthermore, the thesis will discuss and examine the reasoning behind 
not accepting commercial insurance, in its original form, under Islamic Law, Sharia, 
as the basis of Saudi Law. This will encompass a discussion of Riba, usury or 
unlawful advantage by way of excess or deferment; May sir, gambling; Gharar,
16 Ba-Naser, Khaled, Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Contracts, (PhD Thesis), University of 
Southampton, 1999, p 3.
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uncertainty, risk, speculation 17and unjustifiable gain of people’s money. Quran 
provides that,
([29] O you who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in 
unjustly except it be a trade amongst you by mutual consent...)18
The thesis is in eight parts and will discuss and examine the following questions:
I) What constitutes insurable interest under the common law and Saudi Law?
II) Has the requirement o f  insurable interest rescued insurance contracts from  
gaming, gambling and wagering and how could the Gambling Act 2005 influences the 
requirement o f  insurable interest?
III) Whether English Courts are willing to reject the defence o f  lack o f  insurable 
interest which could be arisen by insurers?
IV) How fa r  could cooperative insurance provide security to commercial activities in 
Saudi Arabia in order to improve the Saudi economy?
V) Does cooperative insurance constitute a sufficient substitute fo r  commercial 
insurance in the guise o f  commerce?
17 The translation o f Riba and Gharar is cited from N. A. Saleh, Unlawful gain and legitimate profit in 
Islamic law, 2nd ed., 1992, pp. 11, 62.
18 M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f  THE NOBLE QURAN, (1417 A.H), (1996- 
1997), Surat An-Nisa, verse 29.
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VI) Whether the form o f  insurance can be reformed to conform to Islamic Law?
VII) To what extent the requirement o f  insurable interest is complied with under the 
two legal systems, namely, common law and Saudi legal systems?
VIII) Finally, whether there is a substitute insurance form complies with Sharia that 
could be used in commercial activities?
1
1.2. The Objectives of the Thesis:
The objectives of the thesis are as followed:
1- To examine the origins of the contract of insurance, generally, and the requirement 
of insurable interest, in particular, and how it operates under the selected legal 
systems, namely, common law and Sharia. It examines how the requirement of 
insurable interest provides the desired protection for interests of the parties under 
insurance and reinsurance contracts.
2- To examine how the requirement of insurable interest works under Saudi Law.
3- To discuss and analyse the Islamic view about insurance contracts and illustrate the 
views of the modem Muslim scholars.
4- To critically examine and discuss the modem view of Islamic religious scholars 
concerning, so-called, "cooperative insurance." Also, to find out how this form 
operates and whether it is commercially practical?
5- To discuss how the Saudi economy could benefit from this form of insurance?
6- To suggest a form of insurance contract that complies with the principles of Islamic 
law, Sharia to be, hopefully, considered when the Saudi regulation, in respect of 
insurance, is reformed.
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7- To identify strengths and defects of the interpretation and the fulfillment of the 
application of insurable interest and, also, to recognize and try to provide workable 
solution for any problems that may appear.
8- To conclude by formulating a model of insurance that can be accommodated by 
orthodox Islamic Law.
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1.3. The Significance of the Thesis
The significance of this thesis does not appear in its nature as being a comparative 
evaluation and analysis of the doctrine of insurable interest under each law of the 
selected legal systems. Nor, does it seek to justify the rejection of life insurance and 
commercial insurance by Islamic Law as being "Hararri\ but rather to benefit from 
the developed selected laws in order to develop the CCL 1931 [SA.] in respect of 
marine insurance and to formulate a model of insurance which complies with the 
Islamic principles.
Therefore, the thesis will introduce a hypothesis, as a substitute formulation of the 
insurance contract in its original form, and will try to examine it, evaluate it and 
justify it in a separate chapter. But this will be preceded by exploring how the doctrine 
of insurable interest, as a criterion which distinguishes insurance from gambling and 
wagering, currently operates since its emergence in the 18th century in the UK up to 
the present time.
The hypothesis of this thesis is intended to be a form of solidarity between members 
of a certain group to cooperate with and guarantee each other where one of them 
suffers a pecuniary loss that may threaten his/her economic status in the sphere of the 
Islamic rules and that is based on an order in Quran which sets out,
10
([2] ... Help you one another in Al-Birr and At-Taqwa (virtue, 
righteousness and piety); but do not help one another in sin and 
transgression. And fear Allah. Verily, Allah is Severe in punishment).19
Furthermore, it will establish a formulation of insurance that based on the principles 
of the Islamic law, and it is the following:
A group of people share a common or similar interest such as owning ships, 
importing/exporting goods, car drivers or any other society, join a club, union or any 
association through a contractual relationship, where a joined person pays a sum of 
money or premium, annually or in any other mode of payment, to the association for 
the purpose of being indemnified for a particular loss(es) by the latter at the time of 
the occurrence of the loss(es) and the indemnified member will be obliged to pay back 
what exceeds his/her total payment by either increasing the subsequent premiums or 
by monthly payment subject to the status of the member, the duration of the contract 
and other conditions set out in the contract. The member of such association aims to 
avoid any liability or pecuniary loss immediately after the proof of the liability 
upon the member's shoulders. In other words, the member aims to shift the loss to 
all other members' shoulders.
In order to crystallise the idea, the following scenario, hopefully, clarifies it:
*)(\Suppose, A is a car driver and he joins B, a club . A pays £400 a year and he has 
not made a claim for last five years. In the sixth year, A had a car accident and he
19 Surat Al-Maibah, VI, verse 2.
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suffered (£1000) of damage to be paid to a third party. According to the contractual 
relationship, B indemnified A for his loss and paid the third party £1000 in full. Now, 
A has paid six premiums, which totals £2400. However, due to the indemnity, B owes 
A £1400.
Six months after the first claim, A suffered another loss and had to pay £3400 to 
another third party. Under such circumstances, B indemnified A for the second loss. 
Therefore, A owes B £2000. In this case, A has to pay back £2000 to B either by 
increasing the subsequent premiums, that A pays £600 a year, or more, instead of 
£400, or the premium remains £400, but A pays £100 every month, subject to his/her 
income, the duration of his/her membership and the conditions of the contract.
If A decides to leave the club or the association, he has the right to get his money 
back if B, by the time of his decision, still owes A sum of money. Likewise, if the 
latter dies, his heirs or legatees have right to get the sum of money remains with the 
club or association for the testator or legator. The club or the association, on the other 
hand, has right of lien.
In respect of commercial transactions such as carriage of goods by sea or air, since 
the capital sums of such transactions are usually large, the position needs special 
arrangements and that could be arranged by specialised people in this field.
As far as the establishment of such association is concerned, there are different 
ways to achieve it, either by being considered by a government, by members of a
20 B is not an individual character. It is, nevertheless, a representative o f the members.
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particular field such as traders or by a company which practices insurances. In 
contrast to the other ways, the company can charge an annual fee on a member who 
wishes to join its membership as an administration fee. That fee will constitute a non- 
refundable premium. In other wards, the company will play the same role as the said 
club or association or even the government does. Thus, if one member pays £400 
premium, which is refundable, per annual and £50 annual fee to the company the fee 
will not be refundable as it is an equitable right of the company.21 The total payments 
of the premiums, however, will be still refundable if the member does not want to 
renew his membership so long as he has fulfilled his duty to pay the applied annual 
fee to the company and he is not required to pay any sum of money that exceeds his 
total amount of the paid premiums where he has been indemnified for his loss(es) to 
the company, but the paid fees will not be refundable.
So, if the total number of the members is 10,000, the company will earn £500,000 
every year and as many members will join its membership as much it will earn and 
that will allow a strong competition to take a place between wide range of companies 
which practice insurance or indemnity and will encourage each company to present as 
much improved services as it could to customers.
21 The company could provide facilities for those fees such as providing an insured a car while his car 
is being fixed or provide an accommodation for an insured who suffers fire loss to his house for some 
time or providing legal consultancy services. In other words, the company will provide special services, 
apart from selling its membership and its administration. In addition, the contract between the company 
and one member could be described as a contract o f lucrative bailment under Sharia. Therefore, the 
company will be the bailee and the member will be the bailor. The relationship between the members 
with each other could be regarded as guarantee. Also, where a member is indemnified more than the 
total of his payment of premiums, the exceeded amount could be considered as loan. Therefore, this 
form of insurance is a combination of lucrative bailment, guarantee and loan contracts. So, all those 
contracts are absolutely lawful under Sharia. More discussion about the nature of this legal relationship 
will be analyzed in Chapter Seven.
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Therefore, the target of this relationship is to be insurer and insured at the same time 
without taking any illegal advantage of other members and not, therefore, violating 
the Islamic rules.
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1.4. The Methodology of the Thesis:
It will examine the doctrine of insurable interest and its development through the 
case law and the relative legislation under each legal system separately. Common law, 
i.e. English and Canadian laws, firstly, and, secondly, Saudi law. It has been thought 
that this exercise will be useful to fully understand the origins and the role of the 
insurance contract generally, and the principle of insurable interest, in particular, 
before examining insurance under Islamic Law. Under each law, the requirement will 
be evaluated discussed and examined amongst relevant Codes, Regulations and Cases. 
The thesis will, also, evaluate the opinions of some contemporary Islamic scholars in 
Saudi Arabia in relation to the legality of insurance under Sharia. In addition,
99previous studies and legal opinions and theories regarding insurable interest will be 
discussed analyzed and, where it is appropriate, criticized. The topics, moreover, of 
the thesis will be divided into several chapters and will be discussed individually.
22 Such as books, articles and reports, etc.
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1.5. The Scope of the Thesis:
For English Law, the history of the doctrine of insurable interest is derived from 
decisions of the Courts during several centuries up to the present together with the 
relative statutes, i.e. Life Assurance Act 1774 [UK],24 and Marine Insurance Act 1906 
[UK]. Therefore, focusing on English Law will provide insight by giving an extensive 
and detailed presentation about the emergence of the doctrine of insurable interest. 
Further, the thesis will examine the influence of Canadian Law, i.e., Kosmopoulos, 
in the common law.
In respect of Saudi Law, the Saudi legal system is based on the Islamic Law of 
Sunni Hanbali school and since the main target of this thesis is trying to present 
recommendations, by a comparative study, to the Saudi regulator to develop insurance 
regulations and suggest a form of insurance that complies with Sharia, this study will 
tackle the Islamic view from the Sunni Hanbali point of view, with references to other 
Sunni schools, namely, Hanafi, Shafiy and Maliki schools, and that for two main 
reasons. Firstly, to concentrate on how the application of insurable interest operates 
under the Saudi jurisdiction and try to work out how to develop the CCL 1931 [SA] 
by studying the other developed jurisdictions with regard to the doctrine of insurable 
interest, which are included in this study, in order to achieve as best development as 
possible. Secondly, the time of this study will not be sufficient to view, analyze and 
discuss in details the views of other Islamic law schools in respect of Riba, Gharar, 
and other concepts which make insurance contracts unacceptable under Sharia. In
23 Taking into consideration, Life insurance Act 1774, Gaming Act 1845, Marine Insurance Act 1906 
and Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909.
24 Hearafter, LAA 1774 [UK].
25 Constitution Insurance Co. o f  Cannadav Kosmopoulos, 1987, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208.
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addition, life insurance will be excluded from this study because there is no 
regulation, at the present time, in Saudi Arabia regulates this type of insurance and it 
is not adopted or practiced by the Saudi jurisdiction.
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1.6. The Structure of the Thesis:
The thesis is split into two parts and divided into eight chapters as the following:
Part One will be on the doctrine of insurable interest under the common law models 
and the Saudi law. Therefore, this part will contain chapters: Two, Three and Four.
Part Two will be on the Saudi conception of the contract of insurance and how 
Muslim scholars understand insurance contracts. Thus, this part will contain chapters: 
Five, Six and Seven. Accordingly, the structure of the thesis will be as the following:
Chapter One gives an introduction and goes on to illustrate the objectives, the 
significance, the scope and the structure of the thesis. It, also, gives a brief 
explanation of how Sharia operates as a constitutional law and a general idea about 
the opinions of Islamic scholars about insurance contracts. This is because it has been 
thought that including this chapter will present to the reader the position in Saudi 
Arabia about insurance contracts to understand and try to justify the reason behind 
suggesting a new form of insurance which is thought it will be a suitable form that 
complies with Sharia.
Chapter Two is devoted to considering the historical background of origins of the 
contract of insurance, generally, and the application of insurable interest in the field of 
property insurance under common law and to give a critical and detailed analysis of
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the development of the requirement of Insurable Interest since its establishment up to 
the present time.
Chapter Three will discuss the definition and the nature of insurable interest and the 
principle of indemnity under the common law models and Saudi Law and how the 
requirement of insurable interest operates under each law.
Chapter Four will examine and evaluate the requirement of insurable interest as a 
defence and discuss the consequences of the lack of insurable interest and the effect of 
the Gambling Act 2005.
Chapter Five will outline understanding the law of contract in Saudi Arabian law 
and will explore how Islamic law, Sharia, influences Saudi regulations. Furthermore, 
it will explore three elements that turn a contract to be void or unlawful. Those 
elements are, namely, Riba, usury; Maysir, gambling and Gharar, uncertainty.
Chapter Six will be divided to explore cooperative insurance, analyze it and 
evaluate it. This is because it has been thought, that it is very necessary and essential 
for the achievement of this study to devote a separate chapter to fully understand this 
form of insurance and compare it with commercial insurance to work out whether it is 
a useful substitute of the latter form of insurance. This discussion will take a place 
after fully understanding the operation of commercial insurance and will give a clear 
view where the comparison with the cooperative insurance operates. Besides, it will 
explore how the forbidden elements that are Riba, Maysir and Gharar manifest in the 
contract of insurance, which are the reasons of not accepting the insurance contract in
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its original form under Sharia, although the CCL 1931 [SA] regulates insurance in the 
field of Marine Insurance. It will also explore how the Saudi jurisdiction treats the 
contract of insurance.
Chapter Seven will evaluate and analyze the hypothesis of the thesis. It has been 
thought that tackling the suggested form of insurance that complies with Sharia at this 
stage will give a clearer understanding how this model operates, especially after 
analyzing and understanding the contract of insurance, in general, and the concept of 
insurable interest, in particular, under the selected laws, on the one hand, and 
understanding how cooperative insurance operates, on the other hand. It will, 
thereafter, try to justify the suggested form of insurance as an ideal solution, under 
Islamic law.
Finally, Chapter Eight will evaluate the outcomes, identify possible defects and 
work out a framework for future reforms, where it is possible, under the said laws. In 
addition, it will compare and contrast the contract of insurance in its original form, 
cooperative insurance contract and the suggested form of insurance, i.e. solidary 
insurance.
26 See section 1.3, supra.
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PART ONE: THE DOCTRINE OF 
INSURABLE INTEREST
21
Chapter Two: The Historical Development of 
the Doctrine of Insurable Interest
2.1. Introduction
Generally speaking, insurable interest is a fundamental principle underlying 
insurance law. It distinguishes a contract of insurance from wagering. It is, also, a 
legal requirement in order to enable an insured to claim on a policy of insurance when 
the risk insured against has occurred.1 Therefore, it is significant, at the beginning, to 
outline the origins of the contract of insurance to workout how insurance contracts 
started to be used in commerce and how European ancients treated these species of 
contracts. In addition, to explore other forms of contracts that were used as a security 
and find out how similar they were to insurance contracts. Also, to find out whether 
there was any difficulty to practice insurance and, then, outline the origins of 
insurable interest and analyse its effect upon parties’ duties which are arisen from 
insurance contracts they conclude.
Accordingly, section 2.2 will outline the origins and the historical development of 
the contract of insurance and explore some other forms of contracts that were used as
1 That is because of the nature o f insurance contracts as being contracts of indemnity. More discussion 
about the principle o f  Indemnity will be analyzed in Chapter Three of this work at a later stage. See Le 
Cras v Hughes (1782) 3 Dougl 81, 99 ER 549, at 550; R. E. Keeton & A. I. Widiss, Insurance Law, 
Student Edition, 1988, at p. 134; Merkin, Insurance Contract Law, Vol.I, 2002, para. A-0389. It is 
significant, nevertheless, to emphasise that not all insurance policies are contract o f indemnity. See, J. 
Lowry and P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (1999), pp. 14 & 15.
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a security. Section 2.3 will discuss the origins of the doctrine of insurable interest. 
Section 2.4 contains concluding comment.
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2.2. The Origins of the Contract of Insurance
The emergence of insurance contract goes back to the beginning of the 13 century 
in Italy. It was said, that insurance was invented by the Jews when they were 
banished from France by Philip Augustus in the year 1182 and they found Italy a 
suitable and safe refuge. They resorted to this expedient of insurance to secure their 
properties and themselves from losses because of the likelihood of banishment.3 The 
merchants of north Italy perceived the success of insurance, "struck with its utility, 
were prompt to adopt and extend its use."4 Although it was said that this narrative had 
a little chance of likelihood,5 Duer had the wisdom, in his introduction, of accepting it 
on the ground that, in his words, "the sagacity of the Jews, in matter of finance is well 
known, and they were placed in circumstances of difficulty and distress that were well 
calculated to sharpen their invention. That they would resort to some expedient for 
averting or diminishing the losses to which they were exposed, we may certainly 
believe, and the expedients of insurance and bills of exchange which they are said to 
have invented, at the same time, admirable suited to accomplish their object."6
2 Duer, Marine Insurance, (1845), Vol. I, p. 29. The author presented factual evidence. "The Italian," 
he said, "alone explains its meaning and propriety. The word "Polizza," in Italian, signifies any note or 
memorandum in writing, creating, or evidence of a legal obligation; and hence the name is applied, 
with the same propriety, to a bill of exchange, a promissory note, and even to a receipt for money as to 
the written agreement of insurance. It seems a safe conclusion that insurance originated in the country, 
the language of which, has given to the agreement of the parties its distinctive appellation."
3 The Jews were also banished by Dagobert and Philip the Long. See, Marshall, A Treatise on the Law 
o f  Insurance, (1805), p. 4; F. Hildyard, J. A. Park, A System o f the Law o f  Marine Insurance (1842), 
(1987), Vol. I, lxviii.
4 Duer, supra, n. 2, p. 30.
5 Marshall, supra, n. 3, p. 4. The author stated that, "..., according to Cleirac, bills of exchange and 
policies of insurance are of Jewish birth and invention, and have nearly the same name, Polizza di 
cambio, Polizza di sicuranza. He adds that the Italians and Lombards, who were spectators o f this 
Jewish intrigue, and the instruments employed in conducting it, preserved the forms of these 
instruments, which they afterwards well knew how to avail themselves of, in conveying out of Italy the 
effects of the Guelphs, when driven from thence by the Gibbelines." However, Marshall, did not 
support that narrative.
6 Duer, supra, n. 2, pp. 30, 31.
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In the thirteenth century, a group of Italian merchants were known as Lombards/  
which had a colony in England thereafter, adopted insurance and considerably 
improved it and it was agreed that the Lombards were at least the first who introduced 
the contract of insurance to the world and brought it to perfection.8 In fact, the earliest 
form of the contract of insurance was the contract of marine insurance.9
However, Macpherson observed that insurance was invented even earlier than the 
13th century. He claimed that Claudius, the Roman emperor, was the first who 
invented insurance upon ships in the middle of the first century, about the year 51, 
when he intended to encourage merchants to import com to his country. In his words, 
"The importation of com being the branch of trade, which engaged the most general 
attention among the Romans, Claudius, during a time of scarcity, did every thing in 
his power to persuade the merchants to import it even in the winter, when it was 
customary lay up the ship. He took", he said, "upon him self all losses and accidents 
which might arise from the inclemency of the season, and he also made the importers 
sure of a certain rate of profit"10
7 In fact, the Lombards played an important role in the Europe. According to Marshall, during the 12th 
and 13th centuries, the commerce of Europe was almost entirely in the hands o f Lombards, who were 
Italians, and their companies or factories settled themselves in almost every State in Europe. From 
thence, they became the only considerable merchants and bankers, "and in those times rivalled even the 
Jews themselves in the art o f  usury", supra, n. 3, p. 10.
8 Park, supra, n. 3, lxviii. Park adheres to the idea that the Lombards were the inventors of insurance.
9 Holdsworth, A History o f  English Law, (1925), Vol. 8, p. 274. The author observed, "...that as a 
separate and independent contract it dates from the early years of the fourteenth century ; and that it 
was evolved, like many other of our modem mercantile institutions, in the commercial cities of Italy."
It seems that the author depended heavily, in the part of his work on the Origins of the Contract of 
Marine Insurance, on Mr Bensa's researches, particularly, Histoire du Contrat dAssurance au Moyen 
Age (French tr.).
10 David Macpherson, Annals o f  Commerce, 1805, Vol. I, at p. 151. See also the footnote in that page. 
Although Macpherson thinks that this event is the only foundation o f insurance, I disagree, however, 
with him in this point. It seems that the support was provided by the emperor was a mere 
encouragement from a government, represented by Claudius, to its merchants during an extraordinary 
occasion to rescue the economy of its country from national losses. In addition, this scenario does not 
seem to be an agreement between two parties where on party undertakes, in consideration of a 
premium, to indemnify the other for a loss or losses that caused by a certain event or events . Therefore, 
I think insurance was not yet invented by that period o f time. Nevertheless, it can be considered as a 
governmental insurance which is not a commercial transaction.
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Park, nevertheless, in the introduction of his work, indicated that insurances were 
unknown to the ancient world. He observed that, "...it will appear, that insurances 
were in those days wholly unknown; or, if they were known, that the smallest proofs 
of the existence of such a custom have not come down to the present times."11 
Furthermore, Park traced the origin of insurances and he observed that no proof that 
the laws of RhodesJ2 RomansJ3 AmalfiJ4 Oleron15 and Wisbuy16 had the smallest idea 
of the contract of insurance.
Holdsworth, presented, in his history of English Law,17some contracts which 
modelled on insurances. For instance, there were stipulations to be incorporated in 
contracts of carriage among both Greeks and Romans which were designed to shift
11 Park, supra, n. 3, xlvi.
12 Ibid, pp. xlvi, xlix. Rhodian Law is "the earliest known system or code o f maritime law, supposedly 
dating from 900 B.C. Furthermore, Rhodian law was purportedly developed by people of the island 
Rhodes, located in the Aegean Sea and now belonging to Greece. The ancient inhabitants o f Rhodes are 
said to have controlled the seas because of their commercial prosperity and naval superiority. Despite 
the uncertainties about its history, Rhodian law has often been cited as a source of admiralty and 
maritime law." B. A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., (1999), 1322.
13 Ibid. lxiii. Rowman law is "the legal system of the ancient Rowmans, forming the basis of the 
modem civil law." Gamer, ibid, 1329. Duer argued that "It is not then a necessary conclusion from the 
silence of the Roman law, that marine insurance was unknown.", supra, n. 2, at p. 23.
14 Ibid, lxix, lxx, also termed Amalphitan Code which is "A code of maritime law compiled late in the
11th century at the port of Amalfi near Naples. The Code was regarded as a primary source o f maritime 
law throughout the Mediterranean to the end of the 16th century." Gamer, ibid, 79.
15 Ibid, lxxiii. Park argued that "Anderson in his history of commerce has expressly stated that the laws 
of Olemo treat o f insurances." However, he conjectured that, Anderson "does not adduce any authority 
in support of his opinion." He went on to make his comment about Anderson's statement that, "I have 
read them repeatedly with the direct view of discovering whether insurances were of so ancient a date: 
but I have not found a single word which could induce me to subscribe to such an assertion.", The laws 
of Oleron are "The oldest collection of modem maritime laws, thought to be a code existing at Oleron 
(an island off the coast of France) during the 12th century. It was introduce into England, with certain 
additions, in the reign of Richard 1(1189-99). Gamer, ibid, 894.
16 Marshall, supra, n. 3, 8. Park, however, observed that the laws o f Wisbuy, in article 66, "expressly 
mentioned insurances, and provided, that if the merchant obliged the master to insure the ship, the 
merchant shall be obliged to insure the master's life against the hazards o f the sea." Laws of Wisbuy is 
"A code of maritime customs and decisions adopted on the island of Gothland (in the Baltic Sea), 
where Wisby was the principal port. The code was influential throughout northern Europe." Gamer, 
ibid, 895. For more discussion on the laws of Wisbuy, see, Duer, supra. 2, p.40.
17 Supra, n. 9.
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the risks of, or damage to, the goods carried on either the carrier or the consignee.18 
The maritime loan, also, played the role of security. That, the lender pays a sum of 
money to the borrower, usually a maritime carrier, to continue his voyage with 
security. However, should the goods be lost by a peril of the Sea, the lender will not 
be repaid, but in the case where the goods arrives safely or are damaged by the 
carrier's negligence, the lender will be repaid with a higher interest paid by the 
borrower and that interest represents a premium.19
9fiFurthermore, it seems that insurance was not legally acceptable and it used to be 
disguised under other contract forms such as a sale, an exchange or a maritime loan to 
avoid any question about the insurance legitimacy "on the ground that it infringed the 
laws against usury"21, with incorporation of stipulations regarding risks that could
thbefall lenders. For instance, in the 13 century there were some contracts, such as sale 
or loan contracts, concluded with intention of being insurances. Thus, the contract of
99 9 -3"commenda" and "mutuum" , for example, contained a kind of insurance. That in 
the contract of commenda, as Holdsworth explained, "...under which A advances 
money or other property to B to trade with, there is usually a stipulation as to the party
18 Ibid, 274.
19 Ibid, 275. See also, B. A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., (1999), pp. 12, 947.
20 Holdsworh, ibid, p. 106.
21 Ibid, 274. For more discussion on the history of usury laws, see, Holdsworh, ibid, p. 100. He 
mentioned that usury was a crime and usurers used to be heavily punished, that".. .usury was both a sin 
and crime. In the usurer's lifetime he was dealt with by the ecclesiastical courts as a sinner; but, if he 
died unrepentant, the king asserted a claim to his goods". In 1341 a statute passed enacted that, "The 
king and his heirs should have the cognisance o f the usurers dead; and that the Ordinaries of Holy 
Church have the cognisance o f the usurers in life, as to them appertaineth, to make compulsion by the 
censures of Holy Church for the sin, and to make restitution of the usuries taken against the laws of 
Holy Church.", ibid, 102. It seems that insurance was treated in this manner and, perhaps, that was the 
reason behind disguising insurance under other, legal, contracts.
22 "A business association in which one person has responsibility for managing all business property" 
Gamer, supra, n 12, at 262.
23 "A transaction (sometimes referred to as a bailment) in which goods are delivered, but instead of 
being returned, are replaced by other goods of the same kind. At the common law such a transaction is 
regarded as a sale or exchange, and not as a bailment, because the particular goods are not returned." 
Gamer, supra, n 12, at 1041.
27
on whom the risk of accidental loss is to fall."24 In respect of the contract of mutuum, 
the lender pays over the money advanced with a deduction, bearing in mind that the 
borrower will not repay if the money was lost by the accident; it was considered that 
such a deduction was a true premium of insurance. Correspondingly, contracts of sale 
or exchange were frequently used as a loan at sufficient interest to compensate the 
lender for the use of his money and the provision that nothing was payable if the 
money was lost accidentally. In this manner, a contract of sale was, as Holdsworth 
exemplified, in the following form: "Instead of B buying goods with money lent by A, 
A buys the goods himself and sells them to B, and the price which B agrees to pay 
will be (a) payable at a future date; (b) contingent upon the safe arrival at the place of 
payment , either of the original goods or the goods into which they have been 
converted; and (c) sufficient to meet the sum paid by A with maritime interest."26 
Likewise in the case of exchange, "B received coins from A on the terms of paying 
different coins (which would be of a different value) at another time or place; and 
according as the coins were at the risk of the borrower or lender, the value of the coins 
to be returned would differ. The difference between the rates of exchange, according 
as the money was repayable in any event, or only on the prosperous termination of the 
voyage, represents again a premium of insurance."
More importantly, in order to crystallize the foundation and the development of the 
form of insurance, Holdsworth argued that in the 14th century, insurance was 
modelled on the maritime loan, which was developed into the contract of bottomry,
24Supra, n 9, 275.
25 Ibid, 276.
26 Ibid. According to Holdsworth, in a later stage of that period, insurance was modelled on a sale that 
the property insured was considered to be sold to the insurer, the shipowner, subject to a resolutive 
condition, in the event of its safe arrival. Therefore, the goods were in the insurer's risk during the 
voyage, so he could sue for their recovery during that period. See, p. 277
21 Ibid.
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that "In the maritime loan the debtor, who has borrowed the money declares that he 
has received the sum advanced, and promises to restore an equivalent sum on the safe 
arrival of the ship or goods: in the insurance the insurer plays the part of the debtor, 
states that he has received the amount for which the ship or goods are insured, and 
promises to repay it in the event of the ship or goods not arriving safely." He carried 
on saying that, "It was only natural that the earliest insurers should be shipowners, 
they could charge a smaller premium because they could more easily guarantee a safe 
arrival." Therefore, he concluded that, ".. .it was inevitable that those who drew up the 
earliest contracts of insurance should be the same persons who as those who were in 
the habit of drawing up contracts of loan on bottomry. Hence" he said, "it was from 
the latter contract that some of the most important of the technical terms applicable to 
insurance at the present day (such, for instance, as "policy" and "premium") were 
originally taken."28
Thus, Holdsworth deduced two principles of insurance law flowed from this 
conception. The first principle was the principle of insurable interest, that "the insured 
must be the owner, or at least have some interest in the property insured." He said, "A 
man cannot transfer to another what he does not own." Therefore, he inferred that, 
"from the first the contract was a true contract of indemnity and not a mere wager on 
the safe arrival of ship or merchandise." The second principle was that, "if the ship or 
goods did not arrive safely, and the resolutive condition failed to operate, the insurers 
were entitled to so much of the property insured as could be recovered."
28 Ibid, 277.
29 Ibid, 278. Resolutive condition is, in civil law, a condition that upon fulfilment terminates an already 
enforceable obligation and entitles the parties to be resorted to their original position. B. A. Gamer, 
Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., (1999), p. 290.
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However, insurance business grew and flourished during the 14th century. Genoa, 
moreover, seemed to be the centre of that business which started to be popular day 
after day so quickly and "it came to be regarded as a distinct species of the large 
genus innominate contract" Consequently, the contract of insurance separated from 
the contract of loan on bottomry and the contract of sale, ceased to be disguised under 
any of them and its legality became fully recognized. As Holdsworth pictured that 
time, he observed that "Shipowners,..., ceased to act as insurers; and the magnitude of 
the sums assured led to the practice of several persons joining in the contract, by 
writing their names under the police, with the proportion of the sum assured for which
'X 1they were prepared to answer."
Hence, the above said leads to the outlook of Marshall that, "The law of insurance is 
considered as a branch of marine law...It is also a branch of the law of merchants, 
being found in the practice of merchants, which is nearly the same in all the countries 
where insurance is in use...", thus, "The law of merchants not being founded in the 
particular institutions, of local customs of any particular country, but consisting of 
certain principles which general convenience has established to regulate the dealings 
of merchants with each other in all countries, may be considered as a branch of public 
law."32
It is noteworthy that, the first recorded insurance policy was drafted in Genoa, Italy,
| L
on 13 of October 1347. And the earliest statute about insurance, according to
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Marshall, A Treatise on the Law o f  Insurance, (1805), pp. 18,19.
33 Ibid, 276; Siddeeg Al-Mesrati, Mabda At-Taweedh Fe At-Tameen Al-Bahri, (Arabic), Principle o f  
Indemnity in Marine Insurance, 1986, p. 245; Another recorded insurance policy was claimed to be the
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Macpherson was the statutes of Barcelona in 143334 which was finally codified in 
1484.35 Macpherson observed that on November 21st, "The citizens of Barcelona 
claim the honour of having made ordinance for regulating the important business of 
maritime insurance before any other community in Europe."36 The statute prohibited 
insuring any vessel for more than three quarters of her real ascertained value; it 
prohibited insuring foreigner merchandize in Barcelona, unless it belongs to a subject 
of the king o f  Aragon and if the merchandize is freighted onboard a foreigner vessel it 
should not be insured for more than half of its real value and no merchandize 
whatever, except com and wine, should be insured for more than three quarters of its 
real value. It made, moreover, unlawful and prohibited the words "value more or less" 
or similar to be inserted in policies; a vessel should be considered as certain lost if it 
was not heard of for six months; it identified the amount of commissions of insurance 
brokers and it regulated insurance brokerage business.
In relation to fire insurance, its emergence goes back to the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Holdswoth noted that a system of fire insurance was in operation in 1591 and this 
kind of insurance was proposed to be established in England in 1635 and 1638, but it 
did not take a place until the occurrence of a great fire in London in 1666.38
first policy was drafted in Palermo, Italy, on 13th March 1350, all risks policy. See, Andreas Haberbeck 
& Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, 1990, p. 212.
34 Holdsworth, nonetheless, claims that the earliest legislation was the statute of Barcelona 1435. See, 
ibid. p282; Marshall, A Treatise on the Law o f Insurance, (1805), p. 20; Duer, Marine Insurance, 
(1845), vol. I, p. 34, he claimed that the statute was enacted in 1436.
35 The statue consisted of four statutes o f 1435,1458, 1461 and finally 1484.
36 David Macpherson, Annals o f  Commerce, 1805, Vol. I, at p. 648. It seems that England and 
European countries benefited from this statute when the formed their statutes in order to regulate 
insurance contracts.
37 Ibid.
38 Holdsworth, supra, n. 9, p. 294. By that time, several fire insurance companies were established. In 
addition, other kind of insurances such as insurances against risks to persons and life insurance were 
known during that period. Life insurance was introduced in England by Italian merchants in the middle 
of the 16th century. For detailed discussion on the history of Life Insurance, see, Geoffrey Clark, 
Betting on lives: The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999).
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As far as the regulation of insurance in England is concerned, due to the growth of 
foreign trade in the 16th century and, therefore, the increase of the importance of 
insurance, the Council began to consider regulating the business of insurance and 
several actions were taken in order to achieve such a purpose. However, no statute 
was passed during that period to formally regulate insurance. Yet, in the beginning of 
17th century, according to Clark, the insurance business was not still known by many 
local merchants in England. He observed that, "Insurance in the early seventeenth 
century was still an arcane business transacted mainly by overseas merchants and 
large-scale moneylenders, and the range of insured contingencies remained within a 
tight commercial orbit."40
It is interesting to note, at this stage that Lord Mansfield’s influence, during the 18 
century, shaped much of insurance law generally. He established principles relating 
to, inter alia, utmost good faith, warranties and insurable interest41
39 In 1574,".. .an order was sen t.. .to the Lord Mayor of London to collect and certify the orders made 
and the rules applied by the merchants in matters o f insurance." Also in the same year, "a grant was 
made to Richard Candler, giving to him and his deputies the sole right of making and registering 
insurances and policies and other instruments belonging to merchants." In the following year, The 
London Mayor was directed to fix prices making and registering insurance policies. In addition, he was 
directed to summon some expert civilians and merchants and to collect the information they provide 
and reduce it to writing. Holdsworth, supra, n 9, p. 285.
40 Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999), p. 1. 
Prior to the 18th century, the idea o f insurance was unfamiliar to the general English public. See p. 4.
41 See, James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth o f English Law in the Eighteenth 
Century, Vol. I, (Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 450. The author 
observed that, "Lord Mansfield established the principle that an insurance contract is an agreement 
requiring the utmost fidelity between parties. Fraud, concealment of a material fact that would alter the 
risk, breach of implied or express warranties, or deviation from the route implied by the terms o f the 
contract would invalidate the contract. Furthermore, by consistently characterizing the contract as one 
of indemnification, Lord Mansfield applied the principle that the risk insured against must be 
commensurate with the risk actually run. This was related to the broader principle that the insured must 
have an "insurable interest" in the thing or person insured. Necessarily, one cannot be indemnified, held 
harmless, if one cannot be harmed. The requirement of an insurable interest became invalidating test. 
Life and fire insurance were developed by analogy to the principles o f marine insurance; cases in which 
the insured lacked an insurable interest were deemed wagering and fell under statutory proscription."
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2.3. The History of the Doctrine of Insurable Interest
Insurance was, as it has already been mentioned, introduced in England by 
Lombards?2 English courts started to deal with insurance contracts in the sixteenth 
century by the court of Admiralty. The first insurance policy that was dealt with by an 
English court is to be found in Broke v Maynard (1547).43 Holdsworth observed that 
the latter case, "...shows that at this date the practice of insurance was well known in 
England; and that this was the fact was specifically stated in the case of Ridolphye v. 
Nunze (1562)."44
As the matter of fact, Marshall claimed that insurance grew along with the maritime 
commerce.45 Yet, almost all disputes in relation to insurance contracts used to be dealt 
with by arbitration,46 until the first Act of Parliament was passed in (1601), for the 
purpose of creating a special tribunal for the determination of insurance cases.47
42 See, Alex L. Parks, The Law and Practice o f Marine Insurance and Average, 1988, Vol. I, pp. 4, 5. 
The author claims that the Hansa merchants introduced marine insurance into England. He claims that: 
"As the Lombards extended their interests northward, they came into contact with the Hansa merchants 
of northern Europe who by then were organized into the Hanseatic League, probably one o f the most 
powerful cartels which ever existed."
43 Holdsworth, supra, n. 9, p 283. Where an action was brought by the insured on a policy written in 
Italian, and subscribed by two insurers. The insurers had paid the insured part of the sum and they had 
received no part of goods which had been salved and there had been a deviation. The action, therefore, 
was defended.
44Ibid.
45 Marshall, A Treatise on the Law o f  Insurance, (1805), p. 8.
46 Joseph A. Joyce, A Treatise on Marine, Fire, Life, Accident and Other Insurances, Vol. I, 1897, p. 6.
47 Duer, Marine Insurance, (1845), Vol. I, p. 33; F. Hildyard, J. A. Park, A System o f  the Law o f  Marine 
Insurance (1842), (1987), Vol. I, lxxxvi. See also, Holdsworth, A History o f  English Law, 1925, Vol. 8, 
p. 282; Alex L. Parks, The Law and Practice o f Marine Insurance and Average, 1988, Vol. I, p. 10.
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2.3.1. The Doctrine of Insurable Interest Prior to Legislation
The nature of insurance contract, in its original status, is that an insured pays an 
insurer a sum of the money to hold him self harmless from any loss caused by a peril 
of the sea while his ship is performing her voyage. In other words, "a particular 
voyage should be free from perils."48 As time passed, especially in the reign of 
Charles II,49 new forms of policies of insurance, by expressed agreements, started to 
spread and were discharging a merchant from having an interest in the subject matter 
insured. In addition, the insurer was promising to pay the insured at the occurrence of 
the risk regardless the presence of any interest in the insured thing. That kind of 
policy incorporated such terms as "interest or no interest" or "without further proof of 
interest than the policy" or "without benefit of salvage to the underwriter" or Policy 
Proof of Interest, (p.p.i). In the time of Queen Anne,50 policies of that kind were valid 
and legal.51 By that time, according to Clark, "Much insurance...was indeed 
underwriting on purely speculative contingencies such as the outcome of siege, the
c<y
timing of birth, and especially the longevity of individuals." As a matter of fact, 
English courts were accepting wagering agreements in the guise of marine insurance 
as long as they did not give rise to questions regarding being against the public 
interest,53 but parties had to have a mutual intention of wagering when they conclude 
an insurance policy or include a term like "interest or no interest". Otherwise, the 
courts would interpret the policy as a contract of indemnity which the insurer would
48 F. Hildyard, Park, A System o f  The Law o f  Marine Insurance, Vol. II, 8th ed., 1987. p.551.
49 That was during the second half of the 17th century.
50 In the beginning of the 18th century.
51 Colinvaux, Amould's Law o f Marine Insurance and Average, Vol. I, 1981, para.331.
52 Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999), p. 3.
53 See the argument o f Lord Mansfield in Da Costa v Jones, (1778) 2 Cowp. 729, 735, ER. 98, 1331; 
Good v Elliott (1790) 3 T.R. 693, ER. 100, 808; Allen v Hearn (1785) 1 T. R. 56, ER. 99, 969; Jones v 
Randall (1774) 1 Cowp. 37, 39, ER. 98, 954.
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indemnify the insured for a real loss, therefore, the latter has to show his interest in 
subject matter of insurance in order to be insured.
However, although wagering contracts were enforceable, the courts started to reject 
that kind of insurance policies. For instance, in Goddart v Garrett,54 the defendant had 
lent money on a bottomry bond, the sum was £300. Although he insured the ship for 
£450, he had no insurable interest in the ship; the plaintiffs bill was to be delivered 
up, by reason the defendant was not concerned in point of interest, as to the ship or 
cargo.
The defendant was obliged to declare his interest in the thing he had insured in order 
to bring a successful claim. "Per Curiam. Take it that the law is settled, that if a man 
has no interest, and insures, the insurance is void, although it be expressed in the 
policy interested or not interested."55 The court went on to explain that,
"...the reason the law goes upon, is that these insurances are made for the 
encouragement of trade, and not that persons unconcerned in trade, nor 
interested in the ship, should profit by it; and where one would have benefit of 
insurance, he must renounce all interest in the ship. And the reason why the 
law allows that a man having some interest in the ship or cargo, may insure 
more, of five times as much, is that merchant cannot tell how little, his factor 
may have in readiness to lade on board his ship."56
Therefore, it was held that,
54 Goddart v Garrett,(\692) 2 Vem. 269, Trin. Term., ER. 23,11  A.
55 Ibid.
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"... the policy o f insurance to be delivered up to be cancelled."57
Likewise, and in the same manner of Goddart v Garrett, in Le Pypre v Farr,ss the 
defendant had insured goods at the value of £600; under the policy, he was not 
obliged to prove any interest. The Lord Chancellor, ordered the defendant to discover 
what goods he put on board; for although the defendant offered to renounce all 
interest to the insurer; yet referred it to the Master to examine the value of the goods 
saved ...., and to deduct it out of the value or sum of £600 at which the goods were 
valued by the agreement.59
Thus, because of that the number of issuing that kind of policies was in increasing 
and that was considered as a harmful issue to the public policy, the Legislature had 
taken care of protecting the branch of trade and the public interest.60 Therefore, that 
was a sufficient reason to regulate Marine insurance generally.
57 Ibid. It has to be noted that, the validity o f an insurance contract that made without an insurable 
interest in the Court o f Chancery, which invalidated insurance policies without an insurable interest, 
differs from the position in the law courts which had taken the opposite view, i.e. validate an insurance 
contract without an insurable interest. See, Holdsworth, supra, n. 9, p. 292; James Oldham, The 
Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth o f  English Law in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I, (Chapel Hill; 
London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 469.
58 Le Pypre v Farr,(1716) 2 Vem. 716, ER. 23, 1070; Assievedor v Cambridge, 10 Mod., 11, ER. 88, 
634. See also, Sadler’s Co. vBadcock, (1743) 2 Atk. 554, ER. 26, 733, where the court rejected the 
insured’s claim, on a fire policy, on the ground that no insurable interest had been shown at the time of 
the risk.
59 F. Hildyard, Park, A System o f  The Law o f  Marine Insurance, n. 3, supra, p.554; N. Legh-Jons, J. 
Birds & Others, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed., 2003), para. 1-19.
60 See, R. S. Pinzur, "Insurable Interest: A Search for Consistency", Ins. C. J., 1979, 109, 110; R. 
Merkin, "Gambling by Insurance- A Study o f The Life Assurance Act 1774", Anglo-American LR 
[1980], p. 331,334-5.
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2.3.2. Insurable Interest under Legislation and Practice
During the 18th century, a number of statutes were passed by Parliament to regulate 
insurance contracts in order to protect the public interest. Therefore, first is the Marine 
Insurance Act 1745.61 The preamble of the Act set out the reasons of the enforcement 
of it, with some ambiguity. It provided that:
"Whereas it hath been found by experience, that the making assurance interest 
or no interest, or without proof of interest than the policy, hath been 
productive of many pernicious practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with 
their cargoes, have been fraudulently lost and destroyed .... and by introducing 
a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering, under the pretence of assuring the 
risk on shipping and fair trade, the institution and laudable design of making 
assurances hath been perverted; and that, which was intended for the 
encouragement of trade and navigation, has, in many instances become hurtful 
of, and destructive to the same."
The Act was passed for the purpose of controlling the issuance of insurance polices 
without interest, "or which provided that the policy itself was to be conclusive proof 
of interest ("ppi" policies) or made "interest or no interest)."63 The Act prohibited
61 19 Geo. 2, c. 37. See, Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on 
Insurance Law, (10th ed., 2003), parag. 1-21.
62 See, J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial Law 
and Commercial Practice, (2003), 335, at p.336.
63 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Meritin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. 1,2002, parag. A-0387. Note 
that, the mere appearance o f "interest or no interest, or without further proof o f interest than the policy, 
or by way of gaming or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the assurer, or free of average" on a 
policy makes it 'null and void' even if the insured has an insurable interest. See, J. Lowry & P. 
Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial Law and Commercial 
Practice, (2003), 335, at p.337.
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issuing insurance policies by way of wagering, i.e., without interest in of the subject 
matter insured. It provided:
"..., that no assurance or assurances shall be made by any person or persons, 
bodies corporate politic, on any ship or ships belonging to his Majesty, or any 
of his subjects or on any goods, merchandises, or effects, laden or to be laden 
on board of any such ship or ships interest or no interest, or without further 
proof of interest than the policy, or by way of gaming, or wagering, or without 
benefit of salvage to the assurer; and that every such insurance shall be null 
and void to all intents and purposes."64
The second statute is Life Assurance Act 177465 which prohibited making 
insurances without an insurable interest. Merkin observed that "The paramount 
purpose of the 1774 Act was to stamp out gambling hidden by a notional insurance"66. 
It was stated in the preamble that:
".. .no insurance shall be made ... on the life or lives of any person or persons, 
or on any other event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for
64 Section (1). It is to be noted that, s 4 o f the MIA 1906 [UK], is a mere copy o f s 10 of the 1745 Act 
in respect of (Avoidance o f wagering and gaming contracts). The 1745 Act is repealed by s. 92 MIA 
1906.
6514 Geo. 3, c. 48. It is also called the Gambling Act 1774. The Act is still in force at the present time. 
It is very important to note that, since the scope of this thesis tackles Insurable Interest in Property 
Insurance, it excludes types of Insurances other than Indemnity Insurance. It will not, nonetheless, 
exclude the other relevant issues arise from the 1774 Act. See R. Merkin, "Gambling by Insurance- A 
Study of The Life Assurance Act 1774", Anglo-American LR [1980], p. 331; W. R. Vance & B. M. 
Anderson, Handbook on Law o f  Insurance, (3rd ed., 1951), Sec. 15; Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: 
The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999).
66 R. Merkin, "Gambling by Insurance- A Study of The Life Assurance Act 1774", Anglo-American LR 
[1980], p. 331; Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, 
(1999), p. 9.
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whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, 
shall have no interest.. .".67
It is of significance to note that, the LAA 1774 does not apply to real property 
insurance. That has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Mark Rowlands Ltd. v 
Berni Inns Ltd™ where the issue was that whether the tenant of the insured building, 
who had paid the premium, had an insurable interest in it, although his name was not 
inserted in the policy. The insurer's argument was that the tenant was not insured 
because he was not named in the policy pursuant to s. 2 of the LAA 1774 which 
provides that,
"it shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies on the life or lives of any 
person or persons, or other event or events, without inserting in such policy or 
policies the person or persons name or names interested therein, or for whose 
use, benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or underwrote."
The Court, however, rejected the claim on the ground that the LAA 1774 does not 
apply to indemnity insurances. In his words, Kerr LJ expressed his view about the 
application of LAA 1774 on indemnity insurances that,
"Although obviously directed primarily to life insurance, the words "or other 
event or events" admittedly widen its scope. A literal application of the 
language of section 2 would create havoc in much of our modem insurance 
law,.... In my view... this ancient statute was not intended to apply, and does
67 Ibid.
68 [1986] Q.B. 211. This judgment was approved, in relation to this issue, in Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [1994] 2 A.C. 199.
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not apply, to indemnity insurance, but only to insurances which provide for the 
payment of a specified sum upon the happening of an insured event."69
Furthermore, for the purpose of abolishing wagering contracts in the guise of 
insurance policies, the Marine Insurance Act 1788?0was passed to prohibit issuing 
insurance policies without indicating the insured’s name. It provided:
"...it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to make of effect, or cause 
to be made or effected, any policy or policies of assurance upon any ship or 
ships, vessel or vessels, or upon any goods, merchandises, effects or other 
property whatsoever, without first inserting or causing to be inserted in such 
policy or policies of assurance the name or names of the usual stile and firm of 
dealing of one or more of persons inserted in such assurance; or without 
instead thereof first inserting or causing to be inserted in such policy or 
policies of assurance the name or names or the usual stile and firm or dealing 
of the consignor or consignors, consignee or consignees, of the goods, 
merchandises, effects or property so to be insured; or the name or names, or 
the usual stile and firm of dealing of the person or persons residing in Great 
Britain, who shall receive the order for the effect such policy or policies of 
assurance, or of the person or persons who shall give the order or direction to
69 Ibid, at p. 227. For more discussion, see John Birds and Norma Hird, Birds' Modern Insurance Law, 
6th ed., (2004), pp. 49-52; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 
(2nd ed., 2005), p. 150; Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), 
parag. A-0502; N. Legh-Jons, J. Birds & Others, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 10th ed., (2003), 
parag. 1-162; Andrew McGee, The Modem Law o f  Insurance, (2001), parag. 4.15, p. 43; Malcolm 
Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (4th ed., 2002), parag. 4-4A.
70 28 Geo. 3, c. 56. This Act repealed another mischievous Act had been passed in 1785 "for regulating 
insurances, on ships and on goods, merchandises or effects" and for ending up the practice o f issuing 
policies in blank. See, Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, Vol. 1 ,2002, 
parag. A-0387. Nevertheless, this Act is repealed by s.92 MIA 1906 in the relation o f Marine 
Insurance. However, the 1788 Act still technically applies to land policies on goods. See, John Lowry 
& Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, 2004, p. 265.
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the agent or agents immediately employed to negotiate or effect such policy or 
policies of assurance."71
The requirement of insurable interest, however, was more crystallised by decisions
77of courts. In Le Cras v Hughes, the decision was given by Lord Mansfield. The Court 
considered the question, inter alia, of, "whether the assureds had an insurable interest 
in the subject-matter insured." It has been said that Lord Mansfield's judgment 
"established the foundation upon with almost all contemporary analysis of insurable 
interests rests."73 The facts of this case were that, a Spanish ship, "St. Domingo", was 
captured by a British squadron at the harbour of St. Fernando de Omoa. A policy of 
insurance was obtained on the ship and its cargo. Subsequently, the ship and its cargo 
were lost by perils of the seas while was performing its voyage to a British port. The 
assureds, who were the officers and crews of the squadron, sought to recover under 
the policy, nevertheless, they had their claim rejected by the insurer on the ground that 
they were lack of insurable interest to comply with the requirement under the Marine 
Insurance Act 1745. Before the Court, in answering the question whether the assureds 
had insurable interest in the ship and its cargo, Lord Mansfield said that, it depended 
"...first on the Prize Act and the proclamation and, second, on the possession and on 
the expectation warranted by almost universal practice."74 Lord Mansfield concluded
71 Section 29. This section gives the same effect o f s 23 of the MIA 1906. The significance o f this Act 
is to identify the person who is interested in the subject-matter o f insurance.
72 (1782) 3 Doug. 81, 99 ER. 549. See also, Lowry v Bourdieu, (1780) 2 Dougl 468. ER 99,299, where 
the claimants who had lent money to a captain of a ship on the security of his bond, insured the ship 
and its cargo. Lord Mansfield rejected the claim on the ground that the policy was a wager, therefore, it 
was void. He held that "it was a hedge. But they had no interest; for, if the ship had been lost and the 
underwriters had paid, still the plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover the amount o f the bond". 
He also observed that: "There are two sort of polices of insurance; mercantile and gaming polices. The 
first sort are contracts of indemnity, and of indemnity only... The second sort may be the same in form, 
but in them there is no contract of indemnity, because there is no interest upon which a loss can accure. 
They are mere games of hazard; like the cast of a die", at p. 470.
73 Keeton & Widiss, n 1, supra, s. 3.2(c) at p. 144.
74 See, (1782) 3 Doug ,at p. 85, ER 99, 549, at 551.
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that the Prize Act and the proclamation of the Crown was "the strongest ground"75 and 
was sufficient to constitute an insurable interest.
Thus, the assureds did not own the subject-matter of insurance. Their rights, 
however, were based upon what they had been granted by law, i.e. the Prize Act and 
the royal proclamation and that was a mere expectation.76
However, although the law enforced the requirement of insurable interest in order to 
satisfy the court that the contract of insurance was not wagering, it did not identify the 
meaning of insurable interest. Thus, the law needed a precise definition for insurable
77interest and that was, in fact, formulated in Lucena v Craufurd, which is a 
fundamental precedent in the common law in respect of crystallizing the concept of 
insurable interest.78
75 Ibid.
16Ibid., in answering the question, whether the expectation is a sufficient interest, Lords Mansfield had 
no doubt that, yes. Also, he believed that the contingency of the ship's coming home was a risk for the 
captor entitles him to possess a sufficient interest in order to insure the ship.
77 (1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269,127 ER, 630.
78 Lord Mansfield in Le Cras case stated that
".. .since the Statute of Geo.2, insurance is a contract o f indemnity. An interest is necessary, but no 
particular kind of interest is required." (1782) 3 Doug, at 86, 99 ER, 549, at 552.
It seems that the definition of insurable interest was left to the Courts' interpretation. See, Boehm v Bell 
(1799) 8 TR 154, ER. 101,1318, where the court took the view of Lord Mansfield in Le Cras and held 
that the crew who had captured a ship had had an insurable interest in it as a prize. Lord Kenyon, held 
that:
"This ship was captured by the captains of the ships .. .who were acting in the service o f their country, 
and on whose conduct there is not the smallest imputation; they had the possession o f the property 
insured, and from that possession, certain rights and duties resulted." He carried on saying that: "If it 
were a legal capture, the captors were entitled; if  the capture were improper made, they were liable to 
be called to an account in the Court o f Admiralty, where they might be amerced in damages and costs. 
They had therefore a right to insure themselves, against the decision that might have loaded them with 
damages and costs."
Grose J. discussed the general requirement of insurable interest, that:
"the whole difficulty has arisen from confound an absolute indefeasible interest with an insurable 
interest. It is not pretended that the assured had the absolute property in the subject o f insurance; 
neither need they have such property to make the policy legal; it is sufficient if they had an insurable 
interest.", p. 161, ER 101,1322; J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable interest", Sarah 
Worthington, Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), 335, at p.338.
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2.5.2./. Lucena v Craufurd
70In Lucena v Craufurd , the action was on an insurance policy on Dutch ships and 
their cargos that where lost by a peril of the sea while performing their voyage to 
England.
A statute80 authorized commissioners for the care, sale and management of, inter 
alia, Dutch ships and cargos and goods on board them where they are brought to a 
British port. James Craufurd and others were appointed as the Commissioners. They 
obtained an insurance policy on the said ships and cargos, nonetheless, they were lost 
during the voyage to England. The insurers, who were the plaintiffs, sought to escape 
liability and rejected the defendants' claim on the grounds, that at the time of the loss 
occurrence the Commissioners, the assureds, were lack of an insurable interest. The 
Court of King's Bench81 found for the defendant, that Commissioners had insurable 
interest in the Dutch ships and their cargos at the time of the loss.
In contrast, the House of Lords revised the judgment of the Court of King's Bench 
and Exchequer-chamber. In fact, The House of Lords upheld the insurers' defence that 
the Commissioners' duty, according to the statute, should have been in effect after the 
arrival of the ships into a British port but not before then.
79(1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269,127 ER, 630.
80 35 Geo. 3, c. 80.
81 (1802) 3 B. & P. 75.
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More importantly, the judgment has framed the definition of insurable interest by 
the wording of Lawrence J. and Lord Eldon, which are respectively known as the 
expectancy test, or factual expectation test and the legal interest test.
Giving his judgment, Lawrence J. argued that:
"...It is first to be considered what that interest is, the protection of which is 
the proper object of a policy of assurance. And this is to be collected from 
considering what is the nature of such contract."83
He went on to define the contract of insurance, that:
"...insurance is a contract by which the one party in consideration of a price 
paid to him adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that he shall not 
suffer loss, damage, or prejudice by the happening of the perils specified to 
certain things which may be exposed to them." 84
Then, he emphasised on the requirement of insurable interest, that:
"...a man must somehow or other be interested in the preservation of the 
subject matter exposed to perils, follows from the nature of this contract, when 
not used as a mode of wager, but as applicable to the purposes for which it was 
originally introduced; but to confine it to the protection of the interest which
82 More discussion about the definition and the nature of insurable interest will be analysed in Chapter 
Three, infra.
83 (1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, 127 ER, 630, p. 300.
84 Ibid, 301.
44
arises out of property, is adding a restriction to the contract which does not 
arise out of its nature.. .A man is interested in a thing to whom advantage may 
arise or prejudice happen from the circumstances which may attend it... "85
Furthermore, Lawrence J. defined the insurable interest as the following:
"To be interest in the preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with 
respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its 
destruction. The property of a thing and the interest deviseable from it may be 
very different: of the first the price is generally the measure, but by interest in 
a thing every benefit and advantage arising out of or depending on such thing, 
may be considered as being as comprehended."86
Lord Eldon, however, presented the leading speech. In his view, the insurable 
interest is that,
"...a right in the property, or derivable out of some contract about the 
property, which in either case may be lost upon some contingency affecting 
the possession or enjoyment of the party."87
In fact, Lord Eldon criticized the view of Lord Mansfield in Le Cras, that a mere 
expectation of a grant by the Crown constitutes a sufficient interest. In his words:
85 Ibid. p. 302.
86 Ibid, p. 301-2.
87 Ibid, p. 321.
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"... that expectation, though found upon the highest probability, was not 
interest, and it was equally not interest, whatever might have been the chances 
in favour of the expectation."88
He justified his view by observing that:
"...If a moral certainty be a ground of insurable interest, there are hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, who would be entitled to insure. First, the dock company, 
then the dock master, then the warehouse keeper, then the porter, then every 
other person who to a moral certainty would have anything to do with the 
property, and of course get something by it."89
2.J.2.2. Prohibition o f Wagering in Insurance
A further Act was passed by Parliament is the Gaming Act 1845.90 It is relevant to 
insurance because it made all contracts which are made by way of gaming or 
wagering null and void by s.18.91 Therefore, a contract of insurance without an 
insurable interest is, simply, considered a wager contract and it is, therefore, void. 
Section 18 of the Act provides that:
88 Ibid. 323.
89 Ibid, p. 324. For a critical discussion on this issue, see, John Lowry, "The Quickening of Insurable 
Interest in Property Insurance: A Return to Strict Orthodoxy in English Courts", [2002] 7/17225.
90 (8 & 9 Viet. c. 109). The Act is still enforced at the present time.
91 Note, however, the effect o f the Gambling Act 2005. Further discussion on this will take a place in 
chapter 4, infra.
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"All contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of 
gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or 
maintained in any court of law and or equity for recovering any sum of money
or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager..
As a consequence of long period of practice of endeavouring to strike down 
wagering in the guise of insurance policies and regulating marine insurance, 
particularly, and non-marine insurance, generally, Parliament passed the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906,92 which repealed the previous Acts 1745 in toto and 1788.93 The 
latter Act, however, was repealed in the relation of marine insurance.
Section 4(1) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 made void every contract of insurance 
by way of gaming or wagering. It states that:
"Every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void."
Accordingly, the "ppi" policies are void, but are not prohibited.
Section 4(2) addresses the shape of a contract which is deemed to be gaming or
wagering:
"(a) Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, 
and the contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring such an 
interest; or
92 (6 Edw. 7, c. 41).
93 Nevertheless, there are sections in MIA 1745 were copied in MIA 1906. See, Nicholas Legh-Jones 
Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, parag. 1-25.
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(b) Where the policy is made ’interest or no interest,’ or ’without further proof 
of interest than the policy itself.' or 'without benefit of salvage to the insurer,' 
or subject to any other like term:
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be 
effected without benefit of salvage to the insurer."
The MIA 1906 [UK], moreover, took the view of Lord Eldon in defining insurable 
interest. Section 5(2) provides:
"In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in 
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at 
risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due 
arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or by damage 
thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof"
In addition to the latter Act, Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 
prohibited gambling on loss by maritime perils. Section 1 states that:
"If.
(a) any person effects a contract of marine insurance without having any bona 
fide interest, direct or indirect, either in the safe arrival of the ship in 
relation on which the contract is made or in the safety or preservation of 
the subject matter insured, or a bona fide expectation of acquiring such an 
interest; or
(b) any person in the employment of the owner of a ship, not being a part 
owner of the ship, effects a contract of marine insurance in relation to the
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ship, and the contract is made 'interest or no interest', or 'without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself, or 'without benefit of salvage to the 
insurer', or subject to any other like term, 
the contract shall be deemed to be a contract by way of gambling on loss by 
maritime perils, and the person effecting it shall be guilty of an offence, and shall 
be liable, on summary convection, to imprisonment,..., for a term not exceeding 
six months or a fine not exceeding,..., and in either case to forfeit to the Crown 
any money he may receive under the contract."
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2.4. General Comments
It seems, from what has been mentioned, that insurance contract has been affected 
by three factors they are, namely, religious, political and social factors. In the first 
place, during the middle ages insurance was in a doubtful place of being lawful. That 
is to say, may be, it was infringing the law of usury and due to the wide and powerful 
authority of the Church,94 its decision was very important to practice a transaction 
away from breaking the law. That appears in the existence of the ecclesiastical court 
which has the authority to punish any person accused to be a sinner. Therefore, 
insurance was considered, perhaps, to be a kind of those expedients which contain 
usury. It was seen that insurance was disguised under different forms of contracts 
such as a maritime loan, a sale or an exchange and those contracts contained high 
interests.95 Holdsworh traced the development of commerce in Europe, generally, and 
in England, particularly, and he explained the picture in that period as that, "The 
money was borrowed,..., not for productive but for consumptive expenditure. There 
was therefore some justification, both for Aristotle’s view that all interest was 
unlawful because money did not breed money, and for the literal acceptance of the 
Scriptural prohibitions of usury."96 Thus, on this ground, he deduced that, "If we 
remember these facts, we shall not be surprised that the church and the canon law 
condemned all lending of money as a sin; that the civil law and the laws of the states 
of Western Europe endorsed and sanctioned this condemnation; that all transaction 
were carefully sifted to see whether they were tainted with its presence; and that the
94 Holdsworh, supra, n. 9, p. 107.
95 Ibid, p. 106.
96 Ibid, p. 101. This explains the reason behind passing two statutes in 1487. The first statute, made 
void all bargains grounded in usury, subject to a penalty of £100, in addition to any punishment which 
might be inflicted by the ecclesiastical court. The second inflicted penalties on brokers who made these 
usuries contracts. At pp. 102- 103.
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prohibition of usury thus became,..., the keystone of the political economy of the 
Middle Age."97
tVi t hIn the second place, due to the growth of trade in the 15 and 16 centuries, 
economic conditions were changing. The general rule of prohibition of usury was in 
effect, but it was found out that, making a productive use of borrowed money and a 
payment for the use of borrowed money might be advantageous both to the parties of 
the contract and to the state. Therefore, a large number of rules were in effect "which 
were designed to distinguish between those payments for the use of money which 
were usurious and illegal, from those which were permissible."98 Those rules were 
based upon the distinction between a mere payment for the use of money, and a 
payment made to compensate the lender for some loss caused by non-payment 
(<damnum emergens)?9 or for failure to realize some expected gain as a result of not 
having the money available (lucrum cessans).100 However, the loss must have been 
proved and the loan must have been gratuitous.101 Holdsworh pointed out that, 
"Technically, the payment was made, not for the loan, but for non-payment of a 
gratuitous loan at the date promised. Gradually, however," he continued, "in the case 
of traders, the loss came to be presumed; and, with the shortening of the period of the 
gratuitous loan, the making of it gratuitously for a short period came to be a mere 
formality."102 Thus, the risk run by the lender entitled him to be paid for the use of his 
money.
91 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 [Latin "damage arising"]. Roman law. An actual realize loss (such as the decline in the value of 
property) as opposed to an expected future loss (such as loss of profit), Gamer, supra, n 12, at p. 398.
100 [Latin "ceasing gain"]. Roman law. Interest or damages awarded for an expected future loss (such as 
anticipated loss of profit) as opposed to an actual realizable loss, Gamer, supra, n 12, at p. 960. 
,01Holdsworh, supra, n. 9, p. 103.
]02Ibid.
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It seems that, the English economic policy took that manner. Accordingly, as 
Holdsworth observed, "The London ordinance of 1391 makes it quite clear that such 
lending for gain, if accompanied by risk, was not punishable as usury." Therefore, this 
principle applied to loans on bottomry and the contract of commenda that "The lender 
risked the loss of his money if the ship did not arrive safely and for this risk he was 
entitled to be paid. Insurance", he said, "also could be similarly justified." 
Consequently, "In all these cases payment was made, not for the loan of money, but 
for the loss or risk of loss run by the lender. It was only if the lender contracted to 
receive payment for his money in any event that he fell under the ban of the law."104
In this manner, Clark pointed out that, in "...England never arrived at wholesale 
bans on the insurance trade, in part because -  given its unprecedented wartime 
expenditures after 1688 -  a more attractive strategy lay in keeping as much of the 
insurance business as possible legal in order to broaden the tax base. So", he said, 
"from 1694 small stamp duties were periodically imposed on insurance policies, and 
under Anne duties placed upon insurance policies even helped fund the national 
lotteries, themselves devised to help finance the war."105
In the third place, it could be noticed that, merchants had found insurance very 
essential in commercial life that could provide the confidence to trade abroad. 
Therefore, insurance has been recognized as a need in society that could not be 
disregarded and as a crucial instrument which provides a guaranteed security and a
103 Ibid, p. 104.
104 Ibid.
105 Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: The cultural o f  life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999), p.
21 .
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protection against misfortune. Thus, people started to widely use insurance and take 
advantage of its utilities, especially in the field of life insurance.106 Consequently, 
insurance industry became one of the essential aspects of materiality.
m  Ibid, p. 5.
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Chapter Three: The Definition and The 
Nature of Insurable Interest
3.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the definition of insurable interest and surveys its nature. 
Although the definition of insurable interest has been mentioned at the first chapter of 
this work,1 it has been thought that the definition needs to be, for the purpose of this 
study, elaborated upon. This is important due to the fact that the principle of insurable 
interest has been a fundamental requirement that distinguishes insurance from 
wagering under common law.
Professor Ivamy said that, the interest that is insurable, "must, however, be a real 
interest, since the mere expectation of acquiring an interest, however probable, does
1 See, supra, p. 1. Article 5 of the MIA 1906 provides:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person has an insurable interest who is interested in a 
marine adventure.
(2) In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in any legal or equitable 
relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at risk therein, in consequence o f which he may 
benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or by 
damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof."
2 A wagering contract has been defined by Hawkins J in Carlill v. The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company 
[1892] 2 QB 484, att pp. 490-91, as,
" one by which two persons, professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain 
event, mutually agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the 
other, and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither of the 
contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or stake he will so win or 
lose, there being no other real consideration for the making of such contract by either of the parties. It 
is essential to a wagering contract that each party may under it either win or lose, whether he will win 
or lose being dependent on the issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining uncertain until that issue is 
known. If either of the parties may win but cannot lose, or may lose but cannot win, it is not a wagering 
contract." See, also, Ellesmere v Wallace [1929] 2 Ch 1, at pp. 24, 36, 48-49; Newbury International 
Ltd  v Reliance National Insurance Co Ltd and Tyser Special Risks Ltd [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 83.
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not give the right to insure the property out of which the expectation arises."3 It is 
interesting to find out how accurate this passage is, especially after the repeal of 
section 18 of the Gaming Act 18454 by the Gambling Act 2005.5 The effect of the 
Gambling Act 2005 regarding the requirement of insurable interest and the 
consequence of the lack of insurable interest will be considered in chapter four of the 
thesis. In addition, it has been mentioned earlier that the majority of contemporary 
Muslim scholars are of the opinion that insurance does not comply with Sharia 
because it contains, inter alia, gambling, or wagering.6 Therefore, it is the purpose of 
this chapter to explore the principle of insurable interest as a criterion that 
differentiates insurance from wagering. Accordingly, section 3.2 below will explore 
the definition of insurable interest and analyze its nature within two tests. They are, 
namely, the legal interest test and the factual expectation interest test; theses will be 
dealt with in section 3.2.1. This will necessarily lead to an examination of the 
principle of indemnity and its relation to the doctrine of insurable interest which will 
be surveyed in section 3.2.2. In addition, section 3.3 will explore the definition of 
insurance and insurable interest under Saudi law, i.e. Commercial Court Law 1931 
and Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law 2003 and its Implementing 
Regulations. Finally, section 3.4 contains concluding comments.
3 E. R. Hardy Ivamy, General Principles o f  Insurance Law, (London, Butterworths, 6th ed.,1993), p. 22.
4 Section 18 provides that,
" All contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be 
null and void; and no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law and or equity for 
recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager..." This section has 
been repealed by section 334 of the Gambling Act 2005 which provides that,
"(1) The following shall cease to have effect-...
(c) section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 (c. 109) (voiding of gaming contracts)..."
5 J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 2nd ed., (2005), p. 150. See, 
Robert Merkin, "Insurable Interest: The repeal of the prohibition on gambling", Insurance Law 
Monthly [2005], 4.
6 See, supra, section 1.3.1. at p. 9.
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3.2. Definition of Insurable Interest under common law
The concept of insurable interest consists of two words, 'insurable' and 'interest'. 
Therefore, it will be more appropriate and sensible to define each word in turn and 
then explore insurable interest as one concept.
Insurable: adjective, means, able to be insured. In other words, it is the ability to 
conclude a contract of insurance about the subject matter of insurance; or shift a risk 
from an insured to an insurer. In fact, none of the UK legislation has defined the
o
contract of insurance. The Courts, however, have made attempts to define or describe 
the contract of insurance.9 For instance, Lawrence J. in Lucena v Craufurd,10 defined 
insurance as,
"...a contract by which one party in consideration of a price paid ... 
adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that be shall not suffer loss,
7 B. A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, (St. Paul, Minn. West Group, 7th ed., 1999), p. 802.
8 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (London, Lloyd's of London Press, 4th ed., 
2002), p. 1; Andrew McGee, The Modern Law o f  Insurance, (London : Butterworths 2001), parag. 1.3; 
Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on Insurance, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed., 2003), parag. 
1-1; J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (Oxford, Hart, 2nd ed., 2005), 
p. 2. J. Lowry and P. Rawlings observed, at p. 3, that, "Legislation provides some guidance for the 
purpose of regulation. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 
(as amended) does not define 'contract of insurance', but does set out a list of indicative activities that 
required authorisation by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Furthermore, the FSA has recognised 
that in view of both the general prohibition against unauthorised persons engaging in insurance 
business and the importance attached to clear and accountable regulation, there is a need for clear 
guidelines as to how it will exercise its discretion. The FSA has, therefore, issued its own criteria based 
on the judgment o f Chanell J in Prudential Insurance Company v. Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue 
[1904] 2 KB 658, (see below), which concerned the application of stamp duty to insurance policies." 
The reason why the contract o f insurance has not been defined by legislation in the UK is to be found 
in Department o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists’ Association Ltd, [1974] Lloyd's Rep. 
17, 18. See below.
9 R. W. Hodgin, "Problems in defining insurance contracts", LMCLQ [1980], 15; J. Lowry & P. 
Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 1999, p. 3. It is true that there are numerous 
attempts to form a definition for insurance in both cases and textbooks. See, R. L. Purves, "The 
Expanding (or Shrinking) Scope of "Insurance" in FSA Regulation", [2001] J. B. L., 623; E. R. Hardy 
Ivamy, Dictionary o f  Insurance Law, (London, Butterworths, 1981), at p. 33.
10 (1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.) 269, 127, ER 630.
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damage, or prejudice by the happening of the perils specified to certain things 
which may be exposed to them. If this be the general nature of the contract of 
insurance, it follows that it is applicable to protect men against uncertain 
events which may in any wise be of disadvantage to them.. .,,n
In answering the question 'what is insurance', Templeman J., in Department o f
10Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd, argued that,
"... one looks first of all to the statutes to see if they define insurance, and for 
reasons which are understandable the result is a blank."13
It seems that the reasons behind not having a particular definition of insurance are 
due to the fact that,
"There are various types of insurance business on which the Acts 
concentrate, and no difficulty has ever arisen in practice, and therefore there 
has been no all-embracing definition, and the probability is that it is 
undesirable that there should be, because definitions tend sometimes to 
obscure and occasionally to exclude that which ought to be included."14
11 Ibid, at 301, 127 ER, at 642.
12 Department o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd, [1974] Lloyd's Rep. 
17.
13 Ibid, 18.
14 Ibid. Similarly, it has been stated that, "It rarely occurs, in cases determinable on common law 
principles, that any question to the exact meaning of insurance is really material, for, other than the 
doctrine of uberrima fides, the law of insurance has few significant principles of its own.", Merkin, 
Colinvaux's Law o f Insurance, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., 1997), p. 1; John Birds & Norma J. 
Hird, Bird's Modern Insurance Law, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed., 2004), p. 12 to p. 19.
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In the same manner, Megarry V.-C. was of the opinion that a contract of insurance is 
"a concept which it is better to describe than to attempt to define.,."15
Thus, the attitude of courts towards insurance contracts is to look at the contract as a 
whole and to consider the features which might be expected to be found in an 
insurance contract.16 In Prudential Insurance Company v. Commissioners o f Inland
i nRevenue, Channell J. sought a description for insurance by considering its features
and he observed that:
"Where you insure a ship or a house you cannot insure that the ship shall not
be lost or the house burnt, but what you do insure is that a sum of money shall
be paid upon the happening of a certain event. That I think is the first
requirement in a contract of insurance. It must be a contract whereby for some
consideration, usually but not necessarily for periodical payments called
premiums, you secure to yourself some benefit, usually but not necessarily the
payment of a sum of money, upon the happening of some event. Then the next
thing that is necessary is that the event should be one which involves some
amount of uncertainty. There must be either uncertainty whether the event will
ever happen or not, or if the event is one which must happen at some time
there must be uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen. The remaining
essential is that which was referred to by the Attorney-General when he said
18the insurance must be against something."
15 Medical Defence Union Ltd. v. Department o f Trade [1980] Ch. 82 at 95.
16 J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (Oxford, Hart, 1999), p. 4.
17 Prudential Insurance Company v. Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue [1904] 2 KB 658.
18 Ibid, at 663. According to J. Lowry and P. Rawlings, this description has enjoyed general approval in 
the English courts. The authors also added one more characteristic of insurance that had not been 
mentioned by Channel J, that the parties must be under a duty of utmost good faith. See, John Lowry & 
Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (Oxford, Hart, 2004), p. 18; see Joseph v. Law 
Integrity Insurance Co. Ltd. [1912] 2 Ch 581; Flood v Irish Provident Assurance Co Ltd  [1912] 2 Ch 
597; Gould v Curtis [1913] 3 KB 84; Fuji Finance Inc v Aetna Life Insurance Co Ltd  [1997] Ch 173.
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He, then, threw light on a crucial element that must be attached to a contract of 
insurance, i.e. interest, which constitutes a distinction between such contract and 
wagering, in his words,
"A contract which would otherwise be a mere wager may become an 
insurance by reason of the assured having an interest in the subject-matter— 
that is to say, the uncertain event which is necessary to make the contract 
amount to an insurance must be an event which is prima facie adverse to the 
interest of the assured. The insurance is to provide for the payment of a sum of 
money to meet a loss or detriment which will or may be suffered upon the 
happening of the event.'"9
More recently, there has been an attempt to define insurance in broad terms. Sir 
Peter Webster defined insurance as,
"an agreement by the insurer to confer on the insured a contractual right 
which, prima facie, comes into existence immediately when loss is suffered by 
the happening of an event insured against, to be put by the insurer into the 
same position in which the insured would have been had the event not 
occurred, but in no better position."20
As far as Canadian law in concerned, insurance is defined as,
19 Ibid. See, R. W. Hodgin, "Problems in defining insurance contracts", LMCLQ [1980], 15. The author 
concluded that, "In none of.. .pieces of legislation was a contract of insurance defined and each 
judgment, expressly depending as it must on the facts before the court, fails to give a comprehensive 
definition. Such failure is intentional.", at p. 20. See also, Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance 
Contracts, (London, Lloyd's of London Press 4th ed., 2002), pp. 1 & 8.
20 Callaghan and Another v. Dominion Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 541, at 
544. See, Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (Looseleaf), (London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2002), para. A-0031.
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"the undertaking by one person to indemnify another person against loss or 
liability for loss in respect of a certain risk or peril to which the object of 
insurance may be exposed, or to pay a sum of money or other thing of value
91upon the happening of a certain event."
99 •In addition, in Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. v. Greba, Hrabinsky J
presented a definition of insurance, in his words,
"A contract of insurance is a contract whereby the insurer promises in return 
for payment of a premium by the insured to pay the insured a sum of money 
upon the occurrence of one or more specified events, the occurrence of which 
is uncertain. To obtain insurance the insured must have an insurable interest in 
the property insured."23
It must be stressed that there are two essential elements of insurance. Firstly, risk 
shifting, or transferring of risk, and, secondly, risk distributing, or spreading of risk.24
21 Insurance Act, RSO Ont. 1980, c. 218, section 1, para. 30; see also, Insurance Act, RSA 1980, c. 1-5 
(Alberta), section 1 (kl). This is an example of Canadian uniform legislation on defining insurance. 
Clarke also presented a definition of insurance in the US legislation, for example, section 22 of the 
California Insurance Code (2000) which defined insurance as, a "contract whereby one undertakes to 
indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event."
Clarke commented that, the above definitions do not much differ from the way of English courts in 
defining insurance, which is preferred to be called "description of insurance". Thus, he observed that,
".. .these 'definitions' have proved to be too bland to be useful without further elaboration. For example, 
if an insurance promise is an undertaking to indemnify against loss or damage (California) or to 
indemnify another person against loss (Canada), how is that distinguished from other kinds of 
commercial contracts, in which the primary obligation is quite different but a secondary obligation, that 
one party undertakes to indemnify the other in the event of non-performance of the primary obligation, 
looms large. The need to make such a distinction is no less pressing because some courts in England 
have described the insurer's obligation to pay indemnity as an obligation to pay damages for having 
failed to prevent the insured loss." See, Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (London, 
LLP, 4th ed., 2002), p. 5; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, 
(Oxford, Hart, 2004), pp. 16 & 17.
22 Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. v. Greba (1997) 154 Sask. R. 289.
23 Ibid, parag. 143, at p. 312.
24 See, Peter Cane, Atiya's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, (London, Butterworths, 6th ed.,
1999), p. 353-56. The author surveys the notion of compensation, shifting of losses and the tort system 
and he observes that, "The effect of the tort system is not, in general, merely to shift a loss from one 
person to another; the loss is normally distributed over a large number of people, and over some period
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That is to say, by the contract of insurance, the risk is shifted from the insured to the 
insurer and risk is spread between numbers of people, i.e. policyholders or insureds. 
Williams is of the opinion that in order to understand the reason that shifting of risk 
and risk distribution are significant features of insurance, it is important to consider 
the benefit that insurance provides for an insured, on the one hand, and for society, on 
the other hand. From the insured party's point of view, he/she will benefit from 
insurance, as a devise for transferring to another party, i.e. the insurer, the risk which 
in the event of its occurrence will result a financial loss, in two ways. Firstly, in the 
event of the actual loss due to the occurrence of the risk insured against, the insured 
will be at least closer to his economic position as it was before the risk has occurred. 
Secondly, even if the insured suffers no loss he enjoys the benefit of security.
From the standpoint of society, Williams observed that, "insurance...reduces 
uncertainty for society as a whole though risk "distribution." The insurer", he said, 
"accomplishes this by combining fairly homogenous risks in a common "pool", in 
numbers large enough that the actual losses of the entire group can be expected to fall 
within statistical norms. It then collects from each insured a premium set at a level 
sufficient to ensure that the amounts paid in by the "winners", those who do not incur 
a loss, can be expected to cover the losses of the "losers." He carried on to say that, 
"Rather than simply bearing the insured's risk, the insurer distributes that risk among 
the pool of policyholders, each of whom has now replaced a potentially large,
of time." He adds that, ".. .there are many ways in which losses can be distributed which are namely, 
the law of tort, interwoven as it is with liability insurance, first party insurance and social security that 
is financed as it is by a mixture of insurance and taxation." Further, the author observes that those ways 
were not the only ways to distribute losses and gave some examples for that, compensation for road 
accident could be financed by flat-rate contributions that solely paid by motorists instead of by variable 
insurance premiums; or could be financed by special tax on petrol, so motorists who used the roads 
more would pay more. Thus, he is of the opinion that, "Because there are so many ways of distribution 
losses, it cannot be said that loss distribution as such is a rational and desirable goal of the law. Any 
loss distribution system must be judged according to the way it distributes particular losses.", at p. 355. 
25 S. Williams, "Crafting a Rule of Decision", Col L. Rep. (1998) 98, p. 1996, at p.2014.
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uncertain financial loss with a small, certain cost, i.e. the premium."26 Furthermore, 
since collecting premiums from each insured creates capital, Williams thinks it could 
be invested elsewhere. He said, "...by permitting individuals to distribute their risk of 
loss due to fortuitous events among others, insurance encourages new investments by
97entrepreneurs, thereby promoting the accumulation of a new capital." In this regard, 
Clarke observed that, "By calculation and collection of appropriate premiums from 
each member of the pool, the insurer sees that each shifting of risk, together with 
associated individual benefits, is effectively and securely achieved."28
Interest: Advantage or profit, especially of a financial nature; or, a legal share in 
something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in a property.29
As noted above, generally speaking, insurable interest has been shaped into two 
forms, namely, the legal interest test and the factual expectation test in Lucena v 
Craufurd. Further, Harnett and Thornton described insurable interest as, "that kind 
of relationship to an occurrence, or, ..., that kind of interest in the property insured, 
which a claimant must show in order to have a legally enforceable claim to 
recovery."31 They observed that the requirement of insurable interest has been 
underlain by three policies; they are namely, the policy against wagering, the policy
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. at pp. 2014-15.
28 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (London, LLP, 4th ed., 2002), p. 6. See 
Hampton v Toxteth Co-operation Provident Sy Ltd  [1915] 1 Ch 721 a non-property insurance case 
(life), tackled shifting of risk as being an essential feature of insurance. See also, the judgment of Lord 
Write in Wooding v Monmouthshire [1939] 4 All ER 570, at pp 595-96.
29 B. A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, (St. Paul, Minn., West Group, 7th ed., 1999), p. 816. Insurable 
interest has been defined as, "A term to describe the legal or equitable relation in which the insured 
stands to the subject-matter insured in consequence of which he may benefit by its safety and be 
prejudiced by its loss." See, E. R. Hardy Ivamy, Dictionary o f  Insurance Law, (London, Butterworths, 
1981), at p. 65.
30 (1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, 127 ER, 630. For facts, see, supra, p. 37. See below 3.2.1.
31 Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation 
of a Legal Concept", Col. L. R. (1948) 48, p. 1162, at 1164.
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against rewarding and thereby tempting the destruction of property and the policy of 
confining insurance contracts to indemnity.32 In addition, Merkin observes that 
"permitting a person to insure a subject matter which he has no interest in preserving, 
and in which he has no interest other than the policy itself, gives rise of two dangers. 
First, there is possibility that the assured is doing no more than wagering with the 
insurer on continued safety of the insured subject matter... A second," he continues, 
"and probably more fundamental, objection to insurance without interest is that an 
assured who stands to benefit from the early destruction of what has been insured will 
be tempted to take steps to bring about such early destruction."
According to the above views, it seems that reaching to a clear definition for 
insurance contract has been a difficult matter. Therefore, it can be agreed with 
Templeman J.34 that the contract of insurance should not be defined in particular 
words "because definitions tend sometimes to obscure and occasionally to exclude 
that which ought to be included." Further, concluding a precise definition for 
insurable interest is, also, of difficulty. Accordingly, Waller LJ observed that
"...it is difficult to define insurable interest in words which will apply in all 
situations. The context and the terms of a policy with which the court is 
concerned will be all-important. The words used to define insurable interest in, 
for example, a property context, should not be slavishly followed in different 
contexts, and words used in a life insurance context where one identified life is
32 Ibid, at 1165.
33 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002). parag. A-0385.
34 Department o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd, [1974] Lloyd's Rep. 
17.
35 Ibid, at p. 18.
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the subject of the insurance may not be totally apposite where the subject is
*3 £
many lives and many events."
Word LJ, however, did not accept that the concept of insurable interest was elusive. 
He observed that,
"I reluctantly conclude that such differences as exist between life insurance, 
on the one hand, and marine/non-marine insurance, on the other hand, do not 
justify different concepts of insurable interest applying to those groups. If 
statute and binding House of Lords authority compel for the latter category the 
need for a legal or beneficial interest in the subject matter of the insurance and 
eschew the adequacy of an expectation of harm or benefit, then I consider it 
wrong to allow a looser concept to prevail for the former. I cannot accept that 
any interest in anything is a sufficient insurable interest."37
Therefore, it is appropriate, at this stage, to explore the scope of the nature of 
insurable interest within two identified tests, i.e. the legal interest test and the factual
38expectation test.
36 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Company o f Canada [2003] EWCA Civ 885, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 
587, parag. [71].
37 Ibid, parag. [191].
38 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335.
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3.2.1. Legal interest test v. factual expectation test
The conventional description of insurable interest under the legal interest test is that 
an insured must have a proprietary interest, i.e. legal, equitable or contractual interest, 
in the subject matter of insurance.
It has been said that, Lord Eldon took a restrictive view in defining insurable 
interest to avoid illusory insurance,40 and to control the number of those persons who 
could insure 41 Lord Eldon thought that,
"If moral certainty be a ground of insurable interest, there are hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, who would be entitled to insure. First the dock company, 
then the dock-master, then the warehouse-keeper, then the porter, then every 
other person who to a moral certainty would have ally thing to do with the 
property, and of course get something by it."42
Accordingly, an enforceable right whether is legal or equitable right in a property or 
a right is derivable out of a contract about the property must be possessed by an 
insured at the time of the occurrence of the risk insured against, "which in either case 
may be lost upon some contingency affecting the possession or enjoyment of the
39 See, John Birds, "Insurable Interest", in N. Palmer & E. McKendrick, Interests in Goods, (1998), p. 
91; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (2004), parag. 6.2.
40 Constitution Insurance Co o f Canada v Kosmopoulos (1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208, at p. 217; John 
Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (1999), p. 51.
41 R. A. Hasson, "Reform of the Law Regulating to Insurable Interest in Property -  Some Thoughts on 
Chadwick v Gibralter General Insurance" (1983-84) 8 Can Bus L J 114, 115.
42 Lucena v Craufurd, (1806) 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, at 324.
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party.",43 to say the insured is interested in the property and, therefore, he could be 
insured.
According to Lowry and Rawlings, "the legal interest test has attracted substantial 
criticism by both judges and commentators in major common law jurisdiction."44
This view, i.e. the criticism, has been starkly illustrated by the House of Lords in 
Macaura v. Northern Assurance Company Ltd.45
3.2.1.1. Macaura46
Macaura was a sole shareholder in a company which owned timber and he affected 
a policy insurance to insure the company's asset, i.e., the timber against fire by his 
own name. Subsequently, the greater part of the timber was destroyed by fire only two 
weeks after affecting the insurance and the insured claimed on the policy to recover 
the loss from his insurer. The latter, however, rejected the claim on the ground that the 
insured did not, actually, have an insurable interest in the timber, notwithstanding that 
he was an unsecured creditor and the sole shareholder. A company has been held to be
43Ibid, at 321 ;Routh v Thompson (1809) 11 East 428, particularly, 433.
44 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (2004), p. 276. See for 
example, Moran, Galloway & Co. v Uzielli [1905] 2 K.B. 555, that Walton J. observed that, "The 
definition of insurable interest has been continuously expanding, and dicta in some of the older cases, 
which would tend to narrow it, must be accepted with caution.", at 563; Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's 
Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, 2002. parag. A-0397.
45 [1925] A. C. 619; See also, a Canadian case that adopted Macaura principle, Zimmerman v St Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co (1967) 63 DLR (2nd) 282, in particular, 285; Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law 
o f  Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), p. 162; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: 
Doctrines and Principles, (1999), pp. 51, 52.
46 [1925] A. C. 619.
66
an entity distinct and separate from its shareholders.47 Indeed, the House of Lords 
dealt with two cases of insurable interest in two characters; they are, namely, an 
insurable interest of a creditor in a debtor’s property and an insurable interest of a 
shareholder in a company's assets.
In the first case, Lord Buckmaster adopted the view that a creditor is incapable to
4 o
insure his debtor's property, that,
"As a creditor his position appears to me quite incapable of supporting the 
claim. If his contention were right it would follow that any person would be at 
liberty to insure the furniture of his debtor, and no such claim has ever been 
recognized by the Courts."49
This finding is convincing because if the creditor is allowed to insure his debtor's 
property, the creditor will either be tempted to destroy the insured property to gain the 
insurance money, or gain the insurance money where the property is lost due to the 
occurrence of an insured risk which infringes the principle of indemnity.
As far as the second case is concerned, Lord Buckmaster was of the opinion that, a 
shareholder is entitled to insure only up to the extent of his share but not the 
company's assets.50
47 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22.
48 Moran, Galloway & Co. v. Uzielli [1905] 2 KB 555.
49 [1925] A. C. 619, p. 626.
50 Ibid, pp. 626, 627. His Lordship held that,
"Turning now to his position as shareholder, this must be independent of the extent of his share 
interest. If he were entitled to insure holding all the shares in the company, each shareholder would be 
equally entitled, if  the shares were all in separate hands. Now," he continued, "no shareholder has any 
right to any item of property owned by the company, for he has no legal or equitable interest therein. 
He is entitled to a share in the profits while the company continues to carry on business and a share in 
the distribution of the surplus assets when the company is wound up. If he were at liberty to effect an 
insurance against loss by fire of any item of the company's property, the extent o f his insurable interest
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Lord Buckmaster adopted the legal interest test and he, again, avoided Lawrence J 
view, i.e. the factual expectation test, he said,
"I find ... a difficulty in understanding how a moral certainty can be so 
defined as to render it an essential part of a definite legal proposition. In the 
present case, though it might be regarded as a moral certainty that the 
appellant would suffer loss if the timber which constituted the sole asset of the 
company were destroyed by fire, this moral certainty becomes dissipated and 
lost if the asset be regarded as only one in an innumerable number of items in 
a company’s assets and the shareholding interest be spread over a large 
number of individual shareholders."51
Not only did Lord Buckmaster deny an insurable interest of a creditor or a 
shareholder in a debtor's property or a company's assets, but also he denied the 
insurable interest of the insured as a bailee in the timber. He concluded that,
"Neither a simple creditor nor a shareholder in a company has any insurable 
interest in a particular asset which the company holds. Nor can his claim to 
insure be supported on the ground that he was a bailee of the timber, for in fact 
he owed no duty whatever to the company in respect of the safe custody of the 
goods; he had merely permitted their remaining upon his land."52
could only be measured by determining the extent to which his share in the ultimate distribution would 
be diminished by the loss of the asset - a calculation almost impossible to make. There is no means by 
which such an interest can be definitely measured and no standard which can be fixed of the loss 
against which the contract of insurance could be regarded as an indemnity."
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid, 628.
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In the same manner, Lord Sumner was of the opinion that, Mr Macaura had no 
insurable interest in the company's asset because he did not own it or had legal or 
equitable relationship to it.
It should be emphasized that, while Macaur, as a House of Lords decision, remains 
a good law in English courts in relation to insurable interest, it has been dropped in 
other common law jurisdictions.54 Thus, the legal interest test has been criticized by 
many legal authors as "less relevant in the context of modem commercial practice."55
Basically, Lord Eldon's approach represented the orthodox throughout most Anglo- 
Commonwealth jurisdictions until 1987 when the legal interest test was rejected by 
the Canadian Supreme Court, particularly in Constitution Insurance Co o f  Canada v 
Kosmopoulos.5() The significance of Kosmopoulos is that the case followed the factual 
expectation test which is led by Lawrence J.57
53 Ibid, 630. His Lordship observed that,
"It is clear that the appellant had no insurable interest in the timber described. It was not his. It 
belonged to the Irish Canadian Sawmills, Ltd., of Skibbereen, co. Cork. He had no lien or security over 
it and, though it lay on his land by his permission, he had no responsibility to its owner for its safety, 
nor was it there under any contract that enabled him to hold it for his debt. He owned almost all the 
shares in the company, and the company owed him a good deal of money, but, neither as creditor nor 
as shareholder, could he insure the company's assets. The debt was not exposed to fire, nor were the 
shares, and the fact that he was virtually the company's only creditor, while the timber was its only 
asset, seems to me to make no difference. He stood in no "legal or equitable relation to" the timber at 
all. He had no "concern in" the subject insured. His relation was to the company, not to its goods, and 
after the fire he was directly prejudiced by the paucity of the company's assets, not by the fire. 
No authority has been produced for the proposition that the appellant had any insurable interest in the 
timber in any capacity, and the books are lull of decisions and dicta that he had none." The House of 
Lords also ruled that Mcaura's interest could not even based on bailment as he had not been liable for 
the timber.
54 The requirement on insurable interest in the sphere of the legal interest test is no longer acceptable in 
Australia by Insurance Contracts Act 1984, Part III; in Canada by Kosmopoulos (1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 
208; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, see below; in the USA by Hays v Milford Mutual Fire Ins. Co, 48 NE 754 (Sup 
Ct, Mass, 1898). See, Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, (Oxford, 2005), p. 32.
55 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, 361. For more discussion on this, see below.
56 (1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2. See, John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: 
Cases and Materials, (2004), p. 284.
57 Lucena v Craufurd, (1806) 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, at 302.
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3.2.1.2. Kosmopoulos58
Kosmopoulos entered into a commercial lease for premises in the City of Toronto. 
Subsequently, he ran a business of manufacturing and selling leather goods. As a 
result of the advice of Kosmopoulos' solicitor, he incorporated Kosmopoulos Leather 
Goods Limited "the company" in order to protect his personal assets. The insured was 
the sole shareholder and director of the company. Nevertheless, although the business 
was technically carried on through the limited company, the insured always thought 
that he owned the store and its assets. In fact, nearly all the documentation required in 
the business, including bank accounts, sales tax permits and hydro and telephone 
accounts, made no Kosmopoulos’ own name.
Furthermore, Kosmopoulos' solicitor tried to obtain the approval of the landlord to 
an assignment of the lease of the premises from Kosmopoulos to the company. 
However, this approval was never obtained. The lessee, during the policy duration, 
was not the company, but Kosmopoulos.
Accordingly, Kosmopoulos took out an insurance policy to insure the company's 
assets but in his own name. Then, a fire broke out in the adjoining premises and 
caused fire, water and smoke damage to the assets of the company and to the rented 
premises. Consequently, the insured claimed on the policy but the insurer rejected the 
claim on the ground that the insured was lack of insurable interest in the company's 
assets.
58 (1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2.
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Wilson J in the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue which was "whether a 
sole shareholder of a corporation has an insurable interest in the assets of that 
corporation."
Indeed, Wilson J did not accept the rule in Macaura59 case that a sole shareholder 
has no insurable interest in the assets of the company. Nor she supported Lord Eldon's 
view or the legal interest test. Instead, she criticized Lord Eldon's view in favour of 
Lawrence J's view or the factual expectation test,60 that,
"Lawrence J.'s view of insurable interest..., in my view, provides a readily 
ascertainable standard. Lord Eldon's concern that a broader definition of 
insurable interest would lead to too much insurance may also be illusory. 
Insureds will still have to disclose all material circumstances ... and declare 
the nature of their interests ... to the insurer in order to enable it to judge the 
risk to be taken. If the insurer cannot estimate the likelihood of the loss 
occurring (because, for example, the information is in the hands of third 
parties) then it does not have to write the policy. It can also protect itself by 
limiting its liability or it can charge larger premiums."61
59 [1925] A.C. 619.
60 In order to support her criticism, moreover, Wilson J cited, at p. 218, from Brown and Menezes, 
Insurance Law in Canada, (1982), at p. 84, that,
"After Macaura, it is no longer possible to claim merely that one would be adversely affected by the 
loss; the insured must assert that he owned an interest in the objects destroyed. This provides the 
illusion of great certainty. Property law is among the most technical and certain segments of the law. 
This certainty is totally illusory because the new formulation makes no concessions either to the 
reasons for which insurable interest is a component of insurance law or for commonplace business 
transactions.... Assuming that an insurable interest in "things" must mean property, among the simple 
questions raised are matters such as how does one own a direct interest in property which is not in 
existence at the time of the contract? Can next season's crops or fluctuating inventory be insured? Are 
warehousing and other bailee policies subject to the law as set out in Macaura so as to limit the right to 
insure to the bailee's liability to the bailor?"
61 Ibid, pp. 217, 218.
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Furthermore, Wilson J was of the opinion that, adopting the factual expectation test 
would provide better security and beneficial insurance to a society and that Lord 
Eldon's approach would, she thought, be abandoned in favour of the broader concept 
of insurable interest, i.e. Lawrence J's approach. In her words,
"A broadening of the concept of insurable interest would, it seems to me, 
allow for the creation of more socially beneficial insurance policies than is the 
case at present with no increase in risk to the insurer. I therefore find both of 
Lord Eldon's reasons for adopting a restrictive approach to insurable interest 
unpersuasive.
It seemed for a time as if Lord Eldon's view was going to be abandoned and 
that of Lawrence J. upheld."62
Furthermore, Wilson J turned, then, to critically deal with Macaura case in more 
details, that,
"Quite apart from the fact that Lord Buckmaster's rationale for a restrictive 
concept of insurable interest seems somewhat less than convincing, the 
Macaura case is in itself a rather odd case. The case originally went to 
arbitration on the question of fraud. The arbitrator held that there was no fraud 
but that the insured had no insurable interest. Professor Robert Keeton, Basic 
Text on Insurance Law (1971), has noted that "it is difficult to reject the 
inference that, though not proved [the charges of fraud] influenced the court to
62 Ibid, pp. 218, 219. Wilson J reviewed some authorities in favour of Lawrence J's view, that 
"In Patterson v. Harris (1861), 1 B. & S. 336,121 E.R. 740, and in Wilson v. Jones (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 
139, courts allowed two shareholders of a company established for the purpose o f laying down a trans- 
Atlantic submarine cable to recover on an insurance policy once the cable had been destroyed even 
although neither had a legally enforceable right in the cable. In Blascheck v. Bussell (1916), 33 T.L.R. 
51 (Eng. K.B.), there was no challenge to the insurable interest o f the plaintiff who had insured the 
health of an actor he had engaged for a performance. That interest was a purely pecuniary, non-legal 
one concerned with the consequences of the actor's non-performance on account of injury."
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reach a theory of insurable interest that is nothing short of pernicious" (p. 
117)... In my view, this inference, if legitimate, further weakens the authority 
of Macaura as a precedent.
Another curious thing about Macaura is that it has not been strictly applied 
in later cases. An attempt has been made to offset the arbitrariness and 
harshness of the Macaura principle by the use of a presumption of sorts."
More significantly, she evaluated the three policies that have been outlined as 
underlying the requirement of an insurable interest, by Harnett and Thornton; which 
are, namely, (1) the policy against wagering under the guise of insurance; (2) the 
policy favouring limitation of indemnity; and (3) the policy to prevent temptation to 
destroy the insured property,64 under Macaura principle.
In the first place, Wilson J highlighted the statutory requirement of insurable interest 
and emphasized the possibility of practicing wagering in the guise of insurance and 
that the restrictive definition of insurable interest was not an ideal mechanism to 
combat such an illness. She said that,
"I think it is probably easy to overestimate the risk of insurance contracts 
being used in today's world to create a wagering transaction. There seem to be 
many more convenient devices available to the serious wagerer.
If wagering should be a major concern in the context of insurance contracts, 
the current definition of insurable interest is not an ideal mechanism to combat
63 Ibid, p. 220.
64 Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation 
o f a Legal Concept", Col. L. R. (1948) 48, p. 1162, at 1178-83; John Birds, "A Shareholder's Insurable 
Interest in his Company's Propery", J. B. L. (1987) 309, at 310-11. It seems that, Wilson J had relied 
heavily on Harnett and Thornton's article in dealing with this issue as well as C. Brown & J. Menezes, 
Insurance Law in Canada, (1982).
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this ill. The insurer alone can raise the defence of lack of insurable interest; no 
public watchdog can raise it. The insurer is free not to invoke the defence in a 
particular case or it can invoke it for reasons completely extraneous to and 
perhaps inconsistent with those underlying the definition." She continued that, 
"The Macaura principle, in my view, is an imperfect tool to further the public 
policy against wagering. By focusing merely on the type of interest held by an 
insured the current definition gives rise to the possibility that an insured with 
the "correct" type of interest, but no pecuniary interest, will be able to receive 
a pure enrichment unrelated to any pecuniary loss whatsoever. Such an insured 
is, in effect, receiving a "gambling windfall". But this same approach excludes 
insureds with a pecuniary interest, but not the type of interest required by 
Macaura. Such insureds purchase insurance policies to indemnify themselves 
against a real possibility of pecuniary loss, not to gain the possibility of an 
enrichment from the occurrence of an event that is of no concern to them. "65
In the second place, it has been said that, "Insurances on property are prima facie to 
be construed as contracts of indemnity.",66 Therefore, Wilson J was of the view that 
the extension of the insurable interest definition, under the legal interest test in 
Macaura case, was not consistent with the principle of indemnity. In her words,
65(1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208, pp. 222, 223. She, thereafter, cited from Harnett and Thornton at p. 
1181,65 that:
"While some form of valuable relationship to the occurrence is necessary to avoid the wagering 
aspect, the policy against wagering is satisfied by any valuable relationship which equals the pecuniary 
value of the insurance, regardless o f the legal nature of that relationship.
I agree with their conclusion and find, therefore, that the restrictive definition of insurable interest set 
out in Macaura is not required for the implementation of the policy against wagering."
66 Lonsdale & Thompson Ltd. v. Black Arrow Group Pic [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 428, at 432 per J 
Sumption QC; s 1 MIA 1906; Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), 
parag. 4-2B; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (1999), p. 14. 
Note that, the principle of Indemnity will be dealt with, at a later stage of this Chapter, in more details.
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"The public policy restricting the insured to full indemnity for his loss is not 
consistent with the restrictive definition of insurable interest set out in 
Macaura. Indeed, an extension of that definition may better implement the 
principles of indemnity. At present, insureds such as Mr. Kosmopoulos who 
have suffered genuine pecuniary loss cannot obtain indemnification because of 
the restrictive definition. The Macaura case itself shows how the indemnity 
principle is poorly implemented by the current definition of insurable interest. 
Had Macaura named the corporation as the insured, or had he taken a lien on 
the timber to secure the debt, he would have been held to have had an 
adequate interest. But without these formal steps Macaura’s interest satisfied 
the principle of indemnity."67
In the third place Wilson J assessed the restrictive definition of insurable interest 
where the insured does not have insurable interest in the insured property and the 
possibility of the temptation of destroying the subject matter of insurance in the case 
that or, what is called, the moral hazard. She observed that,
"It has also been said that if the insured has no interest at all in the subject- 
matter of the insurance, he is likely to destroy the subject-matter in order to 
obtain the insurance moneys. Thus, the requirement of an insurable interest is 
said to be designed to minimize the incentive to destroy the insured property. 
But it is clear that the restrictive definition of insurable interest does not 
necessarily have this result. Frequently an insured with a legal or equitable 
interest in the subject-matter of the insurance has intimate access to it and is in 
a position to destroy it without detection. If Lawrence J.'s definition of
67 (1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208, p. 223.
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insurable interest in Lucena v. Craufurd were adopted, this moral hazard 
would not be increased. Indeed, the moral hazard may well be decreased 
because the subject-matter of the insurance is not usually in the possession or 
control of those included within Lawrence J.'s definition of insurable interest, 
i.e., those with a pecuniary interest only. It seems to me, therefore, that the 
objective of minimizing the insured's incentive to destroy the insured property 
cannot be seriously advanced in support of the Macaura principle.
It is no doubt true that if in fact the proceeds of insurance could be paid to a 
sole shareholder free of the corporation's creditors, the sole shareholder would 
have a greater incentive to destroy the business assets than if the proceeds 
were paid into the insolvent corporation subject to the claims of its 
creditors."68
Therefore, her conclusion was that,
"... it seems to me that the policies underlying the requirement of an 
insurable interest do not support the restrictive definition: if anything, they 
support a broader definition than that set out in Macaura."69 She, then 
continued to say that, "... there is little to commend the restrictive definition of 
insurable interest. As Brett M.R. has noted over a century ago in Stock v. 
Inglis... it is merely "a technical objection ... which has no real merit ... as 
between the assured and the insurer". The reasons advanced in its favour are 
not persuasive and the policies alleged to underlie it do not appear to require
68 Ibid, p. 224. Wilson J emphasized that American courts had dispensed with the narrow insurable 
interest definition. John Birds observed that, "Wilson J . .. pointed out how many American courts have 
dispensed with a narrow insurable interest requirement with no evidence of insoluble problems of 
calculation, difficulties in ascertaining insurable interests, wagering, over-insurance or willful 
destruction of property. In addition, commentators generally favoured a wide test."; in, John Birds, "A 
Shareholder's Insurable Interest in his Company's Property.", J. B. L. (1987) 309, at 311.
69 Ibid, p. 226.
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it. They would be just as well served by the factual expectancy test. I think 
Macaura should no longer be followed. Instead, if an insured can demonstrate, 
in Lawrence J.'s words, "some relation to, or concern in the subject of the 
insurance, which relation or concern by the happening of the perils insured 
against may be so affected as to produce a damage, detriment, or prejudice to 
the person insuring", that insured should be held to have a sufficient interest. 
To "have a moral certainty of advantage or benefit, but for those risks or 
dangers", or "to be so circumstanced with respect to [the subject-matter of the 
insurance] as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction" 
is to have an insurable interest in it."70
Lowry and Rawlings point out that, "Wilson J's analysis reflects a shift in emphasis 
from Lord Eldon's concern, which led him to define insurable interest narrowly, to a 
view that recognizes the economic and social benefit of insurance and, therefore, a 
broader conception of insurable interest. In the modem commercial world", they said, 
"property insurance is generally sought to secure indemnification, and, as Wilson J 
points out, it is more socially beneficial to encourage widespread insurance than to 
restrict it. That seems, therefore, no convincing reason in this context for interfering 
with freedom of contract and, in particular, for not requiring insurers to meet 
liabilities under contracts which they have freely entered into and for which they have
71received premiums."
70 Ibid, p. 227; See, further, John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah 
Worthington, Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 347-350.
71 Ibid, at 350.
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As the matter of fact, Macaura, as a House of Lords decision, still represents the 
orthodox approach of English courts. That is because there are few cases that have
79been arisen before English court which concerned insurable interest as an issue.
Birds, in his comment on the requirement of insurable interest in Kosmopoulos, 
observed that, "Such a lengthy consideration of insurable interest, and in particular of 
the policy issues underlying the requirement, cannot be found in any reported modem 
English case, principally no doubt because the issue has not arisen for consideration 
since Macaura. This hardly be because a relevant factual situation has not presented 
itself."73 He remarked the reasons why the issue of insurable interest has not been 
litigated and he presented two reasons behind that. He said: "The first is that there are 
some ways around the strictness of the Macaura rule. A shareholder can insure his 
shares against loss of value owing to the failure of an adventure upon which the 
company has embarked. An unsecured creditor may insure against his debtor's 
insolvency. Such an insurance against pecuniary loss is widespread, although it is 
based upon an existing proprietary or contractual right, namely ownership or the 
shares or of the chose in action that is the debt in the respect of the two cases cited, 
i.e. [Macaura and Kosmopoulos].. .The second reason", he added, "is that the courts 
have been prepared to recognize, where an insurer might be able to successfully plead 
lack of insurable interest as a defence, that the insured can show that the requirement 
has been properly waived. The essential requirement is that the true construction of
72 Ibid, at 354.
73 See, John Birds, "Insurable Interest", in N. Palmer & E. McKendrick, Interests in Goods, (1998), p. 
91, at 94. In this context, in a Scottish case, Cowan v Jeffrey Associates 1999 SLT 757, the issue arose 
before the court was whether the director and sole shareholder of a company possessed an interest.
Lord Hamilton, sitting in the Outer House, followed the Macaura principle and he ruled that to a 
change of the kind of insurable interest, as the one mentioned in Kosmopoulos, needed to be affected 
either by the legislature or the House of Lords, at p. 761; in the same manner, see, Mitchell v Scottish 
Eagle Insurance Co Ltd  1997 SLT 793. See also, Lowry & Rawlings, ibid.
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the insurance policy provides for the insurer to pay notwithstanding that the insured 
has no insurable interest"74
Clarke, moreover, declares that, for an insured to have an insurable interest in the 
subject-matter of insurance, he is required to satisfy, under English law, two 
requirements; firstly, a relation to the subject-matter of insurance giving rise to an 
economic interest; secondly, a proprietary interest in it, or a legal or equitable relation 
to the subject-matter insured. However, Canadian law requires only the firs 
requirement, i.e. a relation to the property insured that provides an economic 
interest.75 Additionally, he explains, in this context, that, "The property must be such 
that the insured may reasonably expect to benefit by the safety or due arrival of the 
property or to be prejudiced by its loss, damage or detention ... If, however, the 
subject-matter is not in fact at risk in this sense, or will not be when the cover purports 
to commence, there is no economic interest and thus no insurable interest."
It is an essence to note that, the ownership constitutes an absolute insurable interest 
in the property owned. That is to say, a car owner or a landlord, for instance, has an 
absolute insurable interest in the car or the house so long as the insured could prove, 
at the time of the occurrence of the event insured against, that the ownership has been 
actually in effect and, consequently, a pecuniary or economic loss took place thereby.
74 Ibid.
75 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), parag. 4-3. According to the 
author, the Canadian case applies in both Australia and the UCA. Further, the expression of economic 
interest, comes from the United Stares. See, for example, the New York Insurance Law, section 158; 
used by the Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 20. Insurance Contracts, parag. 120.
76 Ibid, parag. 4-3A. See, Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio- 
Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept", Col. L. R. (1948) 48, p. 1162, at 1171. The authors 
observed that, "The factual expectation is the simplest expressed, yet most all-inclusive of insurable 
interest concept; it is the expectation of economic advantage if the insured property continues to exist, 
or, stated negatively, the expectation of economic disadvantage accruing upon damage to the insured 
property."
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According to Harnett and Thornton, "Absolute ownership is the solid predictable 
foundation of this unsteady insurable interest structure that has been constructed with 
the mortar of property concepts."77
However, insurable interest in property is not confined to absolute legal 
ownership. Instead, where an insured possess a right which is recognized by law on 
the property insured, such right constitutes an insurable interest. Accordingly, in 
Lloyd v Fleming?9 for example, an assignee of an insurance policy had an insurable 
interest in the subject-matter of insurance because the assignment transferred all rights 
accrued under the policy and, therefore, the assignee was entitled to sue upon it in his 
own name, even though the assignment was done after the occurrence of the loss.
Blackburn J. concluded that,
"A policy of marine insurance is a contract of indemnity against all losses 
accruing to the subject-matter of the policy from certain perils during the 
adventure. This subject-matter need not be strictly a property, in either the 
ship, goods, or freight; for, as has been long said, if a man is so situated with 
respect to them that he will receive benefit from their arriving safely at the end 
of the adventure, or sustain loss in consequence of their not arriving safely, he 
has an insurable interest."80
77 Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, ibid, at 1166.
78 Ibid', Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on Insurance, 10th ed., (2003), parag. 1-120; R. A. Hasson, 
"The Supreme Court in Flames: Fire Insurance Decisions After Kosmopoulos" [1995] Osgoode Hall U  
679, at 681.
79 (1872) LR 7 QB 299.
80 Ibid, p. 302.
80
Furthermore, the tenant who is likely to benefit from an insurance policy taken by 
his landlord has an insurable interest, even though his interest in the property insured 
may be limited.81 Thus, in Mark Rowlands Ltd  v Berni Inns Ltd?2 a fire insurance 
policy was taken out by the plaintiff landlord on a building. The landlord let the 
basement and part of the ground floor of the building to the defendant tenant. Due to 
the defendant's negligence, a serious fire broke out at the premises and effectively 
destroyed the whole building. The fire originated in the ceiling void of the basement 
part of the premises in which a quantity of flammable material had been stored or 
deposited. However, although the plaintiff was fully indemnified by his insurers, the 
latter sought by virtue of their right of subrogation to recover the damages from the 
defendant tenant on the grounds that the fire had been caused by the defendant's 
negligence. Kerr U  held that,
"Provided that a person with a limited interest has an insurable interest in the 
subject-matter of the insurance ... there is no principle of law which precludes 
him from asserting that an insurance effected by another person was intended 
to enure for his benefit to the extent of his interest in the subject-matter..."
81 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), p. 133; Bertram Harnett and 
John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept", 
Col. L. R. (1948) 48, p. 1162, at 1167.
82 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 437.
83 Ibid, 442. Clarke observed that, "If the tenants could enforce the insurance directly, or indirectly by 
compelling the landlords to enforce it, their position would be like that of an insured who must have an 
insurable interest. Where, however, they have a contractual right to have the landlords insure the 
property (and damages if they do not), and a contractual right to have insurance money used to 
reinstate the property (and to damages if it is not), they are at one step removed from the position of an 
insured; nonetheless, it appears from the proviso in this statement in the Court of Appeal that they must 
satisfy the requirement of interest. Be that as it may, it is clear that persons such as tenants of property 
do have an insurable interest." Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), p. 
28.
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It must be stressed that, there are various cases where persons who are entitled to 
insure properties that they do not own,84 so long as the destruction of the properties 
makes those persons suffer losses or results liabilities. Thus, a bailee, such as a carrier 
or a warehouseman, is entitled to insure the goods bailed with him. In Tomlinson v 
Hepburn,85 the insured carrier insured a consignment of tobacco with the defendant 
underwriter. The consignment was stolen before it was unloaded, but without the fault 
or the negligence of the carrier. The insurer rejected the claim of the insured under the 
policy on the ground that, inter alia, the insurance was a contract of indemnity and, 
therefore, the policy covered only the carrier’s liability for negligence, not the owners' 
proprietary interest, and the carrier had no insurable interest in the goods as opposed 
to his own charges. As a matter of fact, the House of Lords found for the insured 
carrier as a bailee. In his words, Lord Reid concluded that,
"A bailee can if he chooses merely insure to cover his own loss or personal 
liability, to the owner of the goods either at common law or under contract and 
if he does that of course he can recover no more under the policy than
84 For more details on this, see, Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on Insurance, 10th ed., (2003),
Sect. 6, p. 55-92; Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), Sect. 4-5, p. 
148-167; Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's andMerkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002). parag. A- 
0484 to parag. A-0487 and parag. A-0508 to parag. A-0539; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, 
Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (1999), parag. 4.4., at pp. 57-60; Andrew McGee, The 
Modem Law o f  Insurance, (2001), parag. 4.29 to 4.33.
85 [1966] AC 451. [HL]. See also, Waters v Monarch (1856) 5 El & B1 870; Ramco (U.K.) Ltd. v. 
International Insurance Company o f  Hannover Ltd  [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 595; [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 
606, where Waller LJ commented on Waters, in parag. [32], that,
" The principles established by Waters were highly convenient principles, but constituted an exception 
to the equally ancient common law principle that normally a claimant cannot sue for loss which he has 
not himself suffered; this was particularly striking where the cause of action was contractual (as a claim 
on an insurance policy always will be) since it appears inconsistent with the doctrine of privity of 
contract to enable a goods-owner to recover his loss when he is not a party to the contract. There is thus 
something of an anomaly in allowing a bailee to recover for a loss he has not suffered... The anomaly 
is much less striking now that the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999 is on the statute book. 
But enabling a party to a contract to recover for a loss he has not suffered or enabling a goods-owner to 
recover pursuant to a contract to which he is not a party is still the exception rather than the rule; the 
"exception" established in Waters should not itself be extended beyond its proper limits without good 
reason and no such reason exists in the present case."
Hill v Scott [1895] 2 QB 713; Transcontinental Underwriting Agency SRL v Grand Union Ins. Co Ltd 
[1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 409; Maurice v Goldsbrough Mort & Co [1939] AC 452; Malcolm A. Clarke, 
The Law o f Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002), p. 157; Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on 
Insurance, 10th ed., (2003), parag. 1-137.
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sufficient to make good his own personal loss or liability. But equally he can if 
he chooses insure up to his full insurable interest - up to the full value of the 
goods entrusted to him and if he does that he can recover the value of the 
goods though he has suffered no personal loss at all. But in that case the law 
will require him to account to the owner of the goods who has suffered the 
loss o r , . . he will be trustee for the owners."86
Lord Pearce, from his point of view, justified this conclusion, that,
".. .commercial convenience makes it reasonable for him to insure the whole 
property in the goods and to recover the whole of the moneys, holding the 
balance in trust for those whose loss it represents. In such a case he is not 
gaming and there is no reason why he should not so act."87
As a result of what has been mentioned, Lowry and Rawlings perceive that, "...the 
judiciary has displayed tentative signs of a willingness to sidestep the force of 
Macaura."88 Thus, in Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance, The Moonacre,89 the assured, 
for tax purposes, bought a yacht, Moonacre, in a company's name and he took out an 
insurance policy in his own name. A fire broke out on board the yacht and, therefore, 
it sank and was constructive total loss. The insured claimed on the policy but the 
insurer, rejected the claim on the ground that, inter alia, the policy was in Sharp's 
name and not in the company's name which had been, in fact, the registered owner. 
Subsequently, the insurer contended that, the insured had no legal or equitable relation
86 Ibid, p. 467. See, also, Ramco (U.K.) Ltd. v. International Insurance Company o f  Hannover Ltd 
[2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 595; [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 606.
87 Ibid, p. 477.
88 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 354. Also, Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's and Merkin’s 
Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002). parag. A-0397.
89 [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501.
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to the yacht and, therefore, he lacked insurable interest. Before the court, Colman 
Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, distinguished this case from 
Macaura, and he held that:
"The legal relation in which he, [the insured], stood to the vessel was that for 
as long as the powers of attorney remained he was entitled to use it for his own 
purposes and to exercise over it such control as he saw fit. His powers were 
such that he could even abandon it to the insurers in the event of a constructive 
total loss; a relation to the goods sometimes considered decisive on the issue 
of title to sue ... Mr. Sharp's relation to the vessel was therefore materially 
different from that of Mr. Macaura to the timber. The latter had neither 
beneficial rights over or in respect of the timber nor obligations in respect of 
it. Although he might or indeed probably would be unable to recover his debt 
from the company if the timber were destroyed and although the asset value of 
the company in which he was the sole shareholder would thereby be reduced, 
the detriment that he would thus sustain would not be in consequence of any 
relation in which he stood to the timber but by reason of the relation in which 
he stood to the company which owned the timber. In my judgment Mr. Sharp 
by reason of the powers of attorney stood in a legal relationship to the vessel 
in consequence of which he would benefit from the preservation of the vessel 
and, if the vessel were lost or damaged, he would suffer loss of a valuable 
benefit. I therefore hold that he had an insurable interest in the vessel."90
90 Ibid, p. 512.
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3.2.1.3. Co-insurance Policies on Construction Contracts
It seems in several cases that, English Courts are following the factual expectation 
test. That appears in construction contracts insurance cases where the head contractor 
is required by the contract to insure the project for his benefit as well as the sub­
contractors'. Then, the essential issue that will, herein, be arisen is that whether the 
sub-contractor has an insurable interest in a policy which is taken out by the head 
contractor.91 Thus, the courts distinguish between joint, composite and pervasive 
interests.92
91 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335. See also, Birds, John, "Interest - Orthodox and 
Unorthodox Approaches" [2006] J.B.L. 224-231.
92 Ibid', General Accident Fire & Life Ass. Corp. v Midland Bank Ltd. [1940] 2 K.B. 388; Central Bank 
o f India v Guardian Ass. Co. Ltd (1936) 54 Ll.L.Rep. 247, in particular, p. 260; Samuel v Dumas
[ 1924] AC 431; Sir M. J. Mustill and J. C. Gilman, Arnould’s Law o f Marine Insurance and Average, 
16th ed., (1981), Vol. I, parag. 341. Joint and composite insurances, therein, are described as that,
".. .when two or more interests are insured under the same policy will be construed as a composite 
insurance, insuring each person interested severally in respect of his own interest. There can only be a 
joint insurance in the strict sense when the assureds have a joint interest in the insured property, as 
where they are joint owners. If the policy is joint, each assured must be joint in any proceedings, and 
defences arising from the conduct of any of them are available against them all. Payment to one joint 
assured operates as a good discharge under the policy."; Also, Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on 
Insurance, 9th ed., (1997), parag. 1-187. "There cannot be a joint insurance policy unless the interest of 
the several persons who are interested in the property insured is a joint interest. Where, therefore, the 
interests of different people in the same insured property are diverse interests, a policy purporting to 
insure all the persons interested must be construed as a composite policy insuring each one severally of 
his own interest. Where, in such policy, payment in case o f loss is expressed to be payable to the 
insured, any payment, although made by a cheque drawn in favour of all the insured jointly, must be 
regarded as in essence a payment in discharge o f the several loss or losses in respect of which the 
indemnity has been operative, and those of the insured who are entitled to be indemnified are entitled 
to insist on payment of that money over to them from the other or others who, having suffered no loss 
in respect of his or their interest, are not entitled to receive it otherwise than as mere payees on behalf 
of those who have suffered a loss. Where such a joint payment was made in respect of the loss suffered 
by one only of the three persons insured by a composite policy, each in respect of his own several 
interest in the property covered by the policy and after such payment it was discovered that the claim 
made by the person in respect of whose interest and alleged loss the payment was made was a 
fraudulent claim, it was held that the insurers could not recover the money form the other payees 
named on the cheque who in fact had never received the money but had merely indorsed the cheque 
over to the fraudulent claimant who alone had received it."; more recently, see, State o f  the Netherlands 
v Youell and Hayward [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 440 in particular, p. 448, where Rix J illustrated pervasive 
interest, that: " A pervasive interest in this sense partakes of certain characteristics of both a separate interest 
and a joint interest for the very good reason that in such a case the claimant is entitled to claim not only for 
himself but also for the benefit of his co-assureds in the full amount of the loss."
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In Petroflna (U.K.) Ltd. v. Magnaload Ltd,93 the sub-contractors on a construction 
site had, besides the owner and the head contractors, an insurable interest in the entire 
works event though they were working on a part of the site and they were lacked 
property interest in the work. In fact, their interest was based upon that, should any 
part of the works be damaged or destroyed, each sub-contractor could, in the event of 
negligence, suffer loss. Therefore, the sub-contractors' insurable interest appears in 
the continued existence of the work. Drawing the analogy of the insurable interest 
possessed by a bailee in goods, Lloyd J. held that,
"... frequently mentioned in connection with a bailee’s right to insure the full 
value of the goods. From a commercial point of view it was always regarded 
as highly convenient. "94
In support of his proposition, he, subsequently, referred to Lord Pearce's judgment in 
Tomlinson v. Hepburn that,
93 [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 91; Noted by John Birds [1983] JBL 479; Ahmed Tolu Olubajo, "Pervasive 
Insurable Interest: A Reappraisal" Const. L.J. (2004), 20(2), 45-57; Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray 
on Insurance, 10th ed., (2003), parag. 1-155; Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, 4th 
ed., (2002), p. 158; John Birds, "Insurable Interest", in N. Palmer & E. McKendrick, Interests in 
Goods, (1998), p. 91, at 102. See, further, Stone Vickers Ltd v Appledore Ferguson Shipbuilders Ltd 
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 288, a marine insurance case where the sub-contractors were suppliers of 
component parts to a ship that was under construction and off-shore oil production facility. The Court 
dealt with the issue that, "whether the supplier of a part to be installed into the vessel or contract works 
under construction might be materially adversely affected by loss of or damage to the vessel or other 
works by reason of the incidence of any o f the perils insured against by the policy in question." The 
Court, then, ruled that, "there is no reason in principle why such a sub-contractor should not also have 
sufficient interest in the whole contract works to be included as co-assured under the protection of the 
head contractor's policy.", at p. 301. See also, a perfect comment on Stone Vickers case in MacGillivray 
on Insurance, 10* ed., (2003), parag. 1-156, at p. 74, where was stated that, "...the fact that a sub­
contractor might suffer financial disadvantage if  the contract works were to suffer loss or damage is not 
itself a ground of insurable interest. It appears that the sub-contractors in question were unable to 
demonstrate that they possessed a legal or equitable interest in relation to the contract works. Nor could 
they show that the works were at their risk. The possibility of being held liable only for damage caused 
by their own employees would support an insurance against the risk of legal liability to the owners of 
the works but not an insurance of the works themselves. If the risk of becoming liable to the owner of 
property for negligently damaging it was a ground of insurable interest in property, cases in which the 
existence of an interest was denied should have been decided otherwise," as in Macaura case, "and it 
confuses the distinction between insurances on property, on the one hand, and product liability 
insurances on the other."
94 Ibid, at 96.
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" Lord Pearce in Tomlinson v. Hepburn ([1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 309; [1966] AC 
451), at pp. 322 and 481 said:
A bailee or mortgagee, therefore (or others in analagous positions) has by 
virtue of his position and his interest in the property a right to insure for the 
whole of its value, holding in trust for the owner or mortgagor the amount 
attributable to their interest. To hold otherwise would be commercially 
inconvenient and would have no justification in common sense."95
Thus, he was of the opinion that building and engineering contracts would involve 
different sub-contractors, therefore, it would have been more convenient for all parties 
including the insurer to allow the head contractor to take out a single policy covering 
all the whole risk of the contractor and sub-contractors in relation to the entire 
contract works. Having not done that, each sub-contractor would have to take out his 
own policy which "would mean, at the very least, extra paperwork; at worst it could 
lead to overlapping claims and cross claims in the event of an accident." He went on 
to say that, "the cost of insuring his liability might in the case of a small sub­
contractor, be uneconomic."96
The fundamental point being made by Lloyd J. was, therefore, that the sub-
07contractors interest was based upon a pervasive interest in the entire property.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid, at 97; since there had not been any English decision directly had dealt with this issue, Lloyd J 
based his view upon a Canadian case Commonwealth Construction Co Ltd  v Imperial Oil Ltd (1976) 69 
DLR (3d) 558, where de Grandpre J stated that,
"On any construction site, and especially when the building being erected is a complex chemical plant, 
there is ever present the possibility of damage by one tradesman to the property of another and to the 
construction as a whole. Should this possibility become reality, the question o f negligence in the 
absence of complete property coverage would have to be debated in Court. By recognizing in all
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Similarly, the same approach was followed in National Oilwell Ltd v Davy Offshore 
(UK) Ltd,9* where Colman J. considered the issue which was that, whether the 
suppliers of a subsea wellhead completion system to be used as part a floating oil 
production facility was insured under the policy of the contractor's All Risks policy as 
co-insureds. He held that,
"There is, in my judgment, in particular no reason in principle why such a 
supplier should not, and every commercial reason why he should, be able to 
insure against loss of or damage to property involved in the common project 
not owned by him and not in his possession. The argument that because he has 
no possessory or proprietary interest in the property he can have no insurable 
interest in it and that his potential liability in respect of loss of or damage to it 
is insufficient to found such an insurable interest is in my judgment 
misconceived."99
tradesmen an insurable interest based on that very real possibility, which itself has its source in the 
contractual arrangements opening the doors of the job site to the tradesmen, the Courts would apply to 
the construction field the principle expressed so long ago in the area of bailment. Thus all the parties 
whose joint efforts have one common goal, e.g., the completion of the construction, would be spared 
the necessity of fighting between themselves should an accident occur involving the possible 
responsibility of one of them.", at pp 562, 563; see, also, Ahmed Tolu Olubajo, "Pervasive Insurable 
Interest: A Reappraisal" Const. L.J. (2004), 20(2), 45-57, where the author comments, at p. 47, that,
"... the policy objective underlying the court's finding that co-insureds under a construction policy 
possess a pervasive insurable interest in the contract works is to prevent parties involved in a common 
goal from suing one another in the event of damage to the joint effort. Presumably, the reason for this is 
to ensure that the communal goal of the parties in this case, the construction of the plant, is not 
disrupted. There is obvious commercial sense in preventing such parties from suing one another in the 
event that one of them causes damage to the works. The true basis of the doctrine is therefore 
commercial convenience." See, John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", 
Sarah Worthington, Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 356.
98 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 582; see also, Hopewell Project Management Ltd. v. Ewbank Preece Ltd.
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 448, particularly, at p. 456.
99 Ibid, p. 611.
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He observed that, potential liability that derived from a contract which is concluded 
between the insured head contractor and the owner of a property constitutes a 
sufficient insurable interest. In his words,
"The suggestion that there cannot as a matter of law be an insurable interest 
based merely on potential liability arising from the existence of a contract 
between the assured and the owner of property or from the assured's proximate 
physical relationship to the property in question, is in my judgment, to confine 
far too narrowly the requirements of insurable interest. There is nothing in the 
authorities which prevents such a relationship to the property from giving rise 
to an insurable interest in the property for the purposes of an insurance on 
property."100
In this context, Merkin commented that, "The basis of insurable interest in such a 
case, i.e. National Oilwell, is that if the works are destroyed or damaged, the sub­
contractor's own contract will be brought to an end..."101 Hence, it is the view of the 
author that, "an insurable interest exist if: the assured has legal or equitable title to the 
subject matter; or if the assured is in possession of the subject matter; or if  the assured 
is not in possession of the subject matter but may be either responsible for, or suffer 
loss in the event of, any damage to the subject matter."102
Furthermore, in Glengate-KG Properties Ltd. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance 
Society Ltd., The plaintiffs, Glengate, purchased a building with consideration of 
refurbishment. Accordingly, Glengate took out two policies of insurance; the first
100 Ibid.
101 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002). parag. A-0397, p. 
10365.
102 Ibid.
103 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 614.
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policy was a material damage policy and it provided insurance cover in respect of any 
of the property described in the schedule accidentally lost, destroyed or damaged but 
excluded damage to, inter alia, "plans, designs unless specifically mentioned as 
insured by this Section". The second policy was a consequential loss policy and it 
contained a proviso which stated that "at the time of the happening of the Damage 
there shall be in force. . .an insurance covering the interest of the Insured in the 
property at the Premises against such Damage . . . "
A fire broke out in the building which damaged the building and destroyed a large 
number of architects’ plans and drawings. Unfortunately, no copies existed of many of 
these plans and the architects had to reproduce them at considerable expense. In 
addition, the drawings and plans were not insured. The plaintiffs, Glengate, alleged 
that the fire was to delay completion of the work by 22 weeks and that most of this 
was attributable to the time needed to replace the plans that had been destroyed. 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought to recover against the insurer the cost of 
reproducing the plans and revenue lost by reason of the delay in completion of the 
development under the policy that provided against business interruption.
Therefore, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of ’the interest of the 
insured' in a policy that covering the owner of a building against consequential loss 
caused by a fire or other insured peril. Also, it looked into the question that whether 
the insured, Glengate, had an insurable interest in drawings owned by the architects at 
the time of the loss. Although the Court held that the drawings and the plans were not 
owned by the assured, the latter was entitled to insure them. Neill LJ held that,
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"I have come to the clear conclusion that in the context the reference to 
'interest' in the proviso was a reference to an interest in the narrower sense. 
Glengate had no such interest in the architects' drawings, even though they 
might have a licence to use the designs and might one day have acquired the 
property in the drawings. At the time of the fire the drawings were the 
property of the architects and in my judgment it was the architects' 
responsibility to replace them if destroyed."104
Auld LJ, moreover, based Glengate's insurable interest in the drawings and the plans 
on Lawrence J’s factual expectation test.105 He observed that,
"...where the insurance cover in issue is against some loss consequential on 
damage to property, there is no reason why there should be so close a legal 
relationship between the insured and the object damaged. The insurable 
interest is in the event insured against rather than in the object the damage to 
which causes that event."106
He, further, views his opinion that the assured could not insure the drawings under
the material damage policy on the ground that,
" .. .the insurable interest in question under the proviso was that in respect of
damage to property under the material damage policy, that is, 'the property of
the insured or for which. . .they are responsible', not that in respect of loss of
rent resulting from such damage under the consequential loss policy. That is
why the proviso requires that -  there shall be in force, under Section 1 or
otherwise an insurance covering the interest of the insured in the property. .
]04 Ibid, p. 622.
105 Ibid, p. 623. 
m  Ibid, p. 624.
.against such damage." He went on to say that, "the proviso only required 
Glengate to insure against material damage its own property or that in respect 
of which the cost of repair or replacement would fall on it. I do not consider 
that Glengate's possible licence to use the design represented by the drawings 
or its expectation of ownership of the drawings on completion of the project or 
its contingent liability under cl. 4.37 of the RIBA Conditions of Engagements 
to pay the architects' for the work of preparing replacement drawings gave it a 
sufficient proprietary or contractual interest in the drawings themselves to 
make them an insurable interest under the material damage policy."107
Sir Iain Glidewell, nevertheless, disagreed with Neill LJ's description that an 
interest was as a 'personal property interest', which is a narrow definition of insurable 
interest, on the basis that such a description would entitle only an owner or bailee of 
the drawings to insure them and that was not applied to Glengate and, therefore, the 
latter did not have an insurable interest in the drawings. Instead, Sir Iain Glidewell 
could find an insurable interest in the drawing on the basis of Lawrence's 'factual 
expectation' test and, therefore, held that,
"... the phrase 'the interest of the insured in the property' in its context in a 
policy of insurance covers whatever interest the insured has, including an 
insurable interest which is not a personal property interest." Therefore, he 
ruled that, "On the facts of the present case, Glengate clearly had an interest in 
the continued existence of the architects' drawings. In my judgment they 
therefore had an insurable interest in those drawings. I see no unfairness or
107 Ibid, pp. 624-5. Olubajo commented that, "... in Glengate, Auld L.J. was of the view that the wide 
test was an extension of the narrow rule, which made "commercial sense" but should be closely 
defined. This at the very least suggests that he considered commercial motivations to lie behind the 
wider test of insurable interest in property.", Ahmed Tolu Olubajo, "Pervasive Insurable Interest: A 
Reappraisal" Const. L.J. (2004), 20(2), 45, at p. 50.
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illogicality resulting from my conclusion. Since Glengate had an insurable 
interest, they could themselves have insured the architects' drawings under the 
material damage policy. Alternatively (and more probably) they could have 
required the architects themselves to take out such insurance, which would 
have satisfied the proviso. In the absence of any such insurance, however, it is
10Rmy judgment that the proviso applied and was not satisfied."
As regard to the above mentioned, Lowry and Rawlings observed that, "While not 
the primary issue in theses cases, the definition of insurable interest was, nevertheless, 
decisive in determining the rights on obligations of the parties. This line of authority 
can, therefore, be seen as amounting to some recognition of the broader conception of 
interest as adopted in Canada and elsewhere. However," they said, "a limit was placed 
upon this trend by the Court of Appeal in Deepak Fertilisers And Petrochemicals 
Corporation v. Davy McKee (London) Ltd andICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd."109
In Deepak case, the Court of Appeal ruled that a sub-contractor's insurable interest 
in the property ceased immediately after the construction was actually completed, 
notwithstanding his potential liability thereafter.
The facts of the case were that, a construction of methanol plant in India was 
belonging to Deepak. The plant was built between January 1988 and September 1991
108 Ibid, p. 626; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 357; Ahmed Tolu Olubajo, ibid, at pp.
49, 50.
109 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 387, hereafter, Deepak; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking 
Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 
358. See comments on Deepak case in, John Lowry, "The Temporal Limits of Contractors' Insurable 
Interest" [2001-02] King's College Law Journal 236-239; Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on 
Insurance, 10th ed., (2003), parag. 1-157, 1-158.
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and, then, was commissioned in October 1991. Davy, co-defendants, provided 
technical information to Deepak in connection with the construction and 
commissioning the plant. ICI, although not privy to the contract between Deepak and 
Davy, agreed to comment on Davy's designs and provide information and advice 
under the terms of a licence agreement between ICI and Davy which permitted the 
latter to use the ICI's intellectual property. Four months after the performance of the 
plant, Deepak issued a letter of acceptance to Davy in February 1992 which stated 
that although the plant had been demonstrated acceptable quality, retention of £50,000 
would be in effect in relation to certain malfunctions which affected its performance. 
Subsequently, the plant exploded. Nevertheless, although there were no casualties, the 
plant was damaged and needed to be rebuilt. Deepak sued both Davy and ICI for 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation and breach of collateral warranty in 
connection with the design and construction of the plant. ICI claimed an indemnity 
from Davy. The latter, however, argued that its liability was precluded under the 
contract, pursuant to the material terms of the agreement between Deepak and Davy 
which stated that,
Art 10.10.2 DEEPAK shall indemnify and hold DAVY and its employees harmless from and against 
any and all liability for death, illness or injury to any employee of Deepak's or for loss or damage to the 
property of Deepak. . .and shall cause DAVY to be named as co-insured in all policies of insurance 
effected in respect of the Plant all rights of subrogation against DAVY being waived.
Art 10.10.3 For the purpose of this Article Davy shall include the licenser ICI and their employees and 
Deepak shall include all associated organizations, its contractors and their personnel.
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Accordingly, Davy argued that they were entitled to be regarded as a co-insured 
under Deepak's all risks insurance policy, which also covered fire and explosion risks. 
Consequently, Davy argued that the insurance arrangements disentitled Deepak from 
bringing its claim. The issue, therefore, was whether Davy, as sub-contractor, had had 
an insurable interest in the plant at the time of the loss in October 1992.
Rix J, at first instance,110 held that Davy had an insurable interest in the plant in 
October 1992 on the ground of their potential liability, should they have caused 
damage to the plant.111
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal rejected Rix J's findings. Stuart-Smith LJ dealt 
with the question that, "whether Davy would have had an insurable interest in the 
plant itself'. His answer was that, "Davy may well have had an insurable interest in 
the plant whilst it was under construction and commissioning." 112 He went on to say 
that,
"In our judgment Davy undoubtedly had an insurable interest in the plant 
under construction and on which they were working because they might lose 
the opportunity to do the work and to be remunerated for it if the property or 
structure were damaged or destroyed by any of the "all risks", such as fire or 
flood."
Thus, after the works were completed,
110 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 139.
1,1 Ibid, at pp. 158, 159.
112 Supra, n 87, at p. 399.
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"Davy would only suffer disadvantage if  the damage to or destruction of the 
property or structure was the result of their breach of contract or duty of 
care."113
He further declared that,
"In order to protect the contractor and sub-contractors against the risk of 
disadvantage by reason of damage or destruction of the property or structure 
resulting from their breach or contract or duty they would, in accordance with 
normal practice, take out liability insurance or, in the case of architects, 
professional indemnity insurance...what they cannot do is persist in 
maintaining an insurance of the property or structure itself."114
Consequently, should the plant is damaged due to the fault of Davy and after it was 
commissioned, such damage would not be covered by the insurance policy. Therefore, 
Davy could be sued by the insurer.115 In contrast, Hamilton, QC, considered Deepak 
and he preferred that the sub-contractors' pervasive interest should have continued so 
long as damage to property could have involved the sub-contractors in legal 
liability.116
Lowry, moreover, commented on Deepak that, "Although the Court of Appeal did 
not go so far as to disavow the reasoning in the Petrofina, Stone Vickers and National 
Oilwell line of cases, it is patently clear that the prevailing judicial approach to all
1,3 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", Sarah Worthington, Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 335, at 358-9.
116 Adrian Hamilton, QC, "Commentary II on 'Re-thinking Insurable Interest'", Sarah Worthington, 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 369, at p. 371.
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risks policies on plant and works is that they are not to be viewed as being tantamount 
to liability insurance. The interest of a contractor is limited to the risk of loss of 
income in the event of the work terminating as a result of negligently caused damage. 
Once construction work is completed a contractor is no longer subject to such risk 
although, of course, he may continue to be exposed to a liability action. For this
117contingency a separate liability policy should be effected."
1 1  o
Furthermore, in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co o f Canada, Waller LJ declared 
that, in his comment on Deepak, the insurable interest of a sub-contractor could have 
been based on his pecuniary loss due to the plant's destruction by the risk insured 
against because he would have lost his remuneration thereafter. He said,
"...so far as the all-risks policy during the currency of the contract period 
was concerned, an insurable interest even on property seems to go beyond a 
'legal or equitable' interest in the property. A sub-contractor's insurable interest 
on the judgments in the Deepak case flows from the pecuniary loss that he will 
suffer from the loss of the opportunity to do work if the plant was destroyed 
by fire.""9
117 John Lowry, "The Temporal Limits of Contractors' Insurable Interest" [2001-02] King's College 
Law Journal 236-239, at 239.
1,8 [2003] EWCA Civ 885. The case concerned a life assurance policy.
119 Ibid, parag. [94]. It is noteworthy to mention the cases that Waller LJ listed which had concerned 
issues of insurable interests o f sub-contractors in works or plants, he said,
" In the judgment reference is made to Petrofina (UK) Ltd  v MagnaloadLtd [1983] 3 All ER 35, 
[1984] QB 127, Stone Vickers Ltd  v Appledore Ferguson Shipbuilders Ltd  [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 288 
and National Oilwell (UK) Ltd  v Davy Offshore Ltd  [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 582. No disapproval is 
expressed of those decisions; it is simply said ([1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 69 at 85 (para 64)) that '[i]n 
each case the insurable interest subsisted during construction and commissioning'. Those decisions 
were themselves at first instance being respectively of Lloyd J, Mr Anthony Colman QC sitting as a 
deputy judge of the High Court and Colman J as he then became. The Petrofina case, was however, 
also approved in the Court of Appeal (save in one immaterial respect) in Mark Rowlands Ltd  v Berni 
Inns Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 473, [1986] QB 211. They have been followed in Hopewell Project 
Management Ltd  v Ewbank Preece Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 448, a decision of Mr Recorder Jackson 
QC (as he then was). The Petrofina case, the Stone Vickers case, and the National Oilwell case were 
also extensively analysed and approved so far as material in the judgment o f Brooke LJ in Co­
operative Retail Services Ltd v Taylor Young Partnership Ltd [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 865. That
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Subsequently, Waller LJ concluded that,
"The principles which I would suggest one gets from the authorities are as 
follows. (1) It is from the terms of the policy that the subject of the insurance 
must be ascertained. (2) It is from all the surrounding circumstances that the 
nature of an insured's insurable interest must be discovered. (3) There is no 
hard and fast rule that because the nature of an insurable interest relates to a 
liability to compensate for loss, that insurable interest could only be covered 
by a liability policy rather than a policy insuring property or life or indeed 
properties or lives. (4) The question whether a policy embraces the insurable 
interest intended to be recovered is a question of construction. The subject or 
terms of the policy may be so specific as to force a court to hold that the 
policy has failed to cover the insurable interest, but a court will be reluctant so 
to hold. (5) It is not a requirement of property insurance that the insured must 
have a 'legal or equitable' interest in the property as those terms might 
normally be understood. It is sufficient for a sub-contractor to have a contract 
that relates to the property and a potential liability for damage to the property 
to have an insurable interest in the property. It is sufficient under s 5 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 for a person interested in a marine adventure to
judgment was itself approved when the case went to the House of Lords ([2002] UKHL 17, [2002] 1 
All ER (Comm) 918, [2002] 1 WLR 1419). These decisions hold that persons in the position of sub­
contractors have an insurable interest in the work or plant as a whole; the definition of that interest 
relied on in those authorities comes originally from a judgment in the Canadian Supreme Court, 
Commonwealth Construction Co Ltd v Imperial Oil Ltd  (1976) 69 DLR (3d) 558 at 563 which in terms 
recognised the insurable interest of sub-contractors --
’having its source in the very real possibility ("may") of liability, considering the close interrelationship 
of the labour performed by the various trades under their respective agreements.'
They held further that sub-contractors can recover from insurers the full value of the works holding 
(where appropriate) the balance beyond their interest in trust for the owner. They further held most 
relevantly that sub-contractors can defeat a subrogated claim based on the sub-contractor's liability in 
negligence to the owner because the insurers were pursuing a claim in relation to the loss covered by 
the policy." See, also, the House of Lords' decision in Simpson v Thompson (1877) L.R. 3 App Cas 
279.
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stand in a 'legal or equitable relation to the adventure'. That is intended to be a 
broad concept.."120
Significantly, Sir Jonathon Mance outlined the rules that governing insurable 
interest which, according to him, are,
"(a) technical, because of the various different statutory regimes, (b) doubtfully 
necessary in many cases, because of the principle that an insured can only recover an
indemnity and (c) contrary also in spirit in other cases to the principle which allows
121value policies covering sums considerably in excess of the actual loss."
3.2.2. The Principle o f Indemnity
3.2.2.1. Introduction
An insured can only recover his loss and his loss only under a contract of 
insurance. In order to recover his loss under his insurance policy and seek indemnity 
from his insurer, the insured must prove two facts; firstly, the insured must prove that 
the risk insured against has actually occurred and, secondly, as a result of such 
occurrence, he suffered a pecuniary loss. It has been said that, "There is an obvious 
symbiosis between the indemnity principle and the insurable interest requirement.
120 Ibid, parag. 97.
121 Sir Jonathan Mance, "Commentary I on 'Re-thinking Insurable Interest'", Sarah Worthington, 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2003), p. 365.
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Indemnity, which underpins insurance law generally, limits the liability of an insurer 
to the actual loss suffered by the insured..., less any excess that the insured has agreed 
to bear. If the insured is paid a sum greater than that which represents the loss so that
1 99he or she profits the indemnity principle is violated." Therefore, it is necessary, at 
this point, to explore the principle of indemnity.
3.2.2.2. The Nature o f the Principle o f Indemnity
191The nature of the contract of insurance, in particular property insurance, is that, it 
is a contract of indemnity.124 Section (1) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that,
"A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes 
to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against
1 9 c
marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure."
The meaning of indemnity, under a fire insurance policy, was outlined by the Court 
of Appeal via Brett LJ in Castellain v Preston,126 he said that,
122 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (2004), parag. 13.1, p. 641.
123 According to Ivamy, in property insurance "the specified event operates on the property of the 
assured. It comprises marine insurance, fire insurance, burglary insurance, fidelity insurance, solvency 
insurance, and insurance against loss of property by other accidental causes, e.g. plate glass insurance, 
livestock insurance, loss of licence insurance, and insurance against war risks." See, E. R. Hardy 
Ivamy, General Principles o f Insurance Law, 6th ed., (1993), at p. 8.
124 Le Crasv Hughes (1782) 3 Dougl 19, per Lord Mansfield; Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380 
at 386 per Brett LJ; Allgemeine Versicherungs Gesellschaft Helvetia v German Property Administrator 
[1931] 1 KB 672; Finlay v. The Mexican Investment Corporation [1897] 1 Q.B. 517; Re Miller, Gibb 
& Co. Ltd. [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 258.
125 Same meaning was stated in Life Assurance Act 1774 that,
"3. How much may be recovered where the insured hath interest in lives
...in all cases where the insured hath interest in such life or lives, event or events, no greater sum shall 
be recovered or received form insurer or insurers that the amount o f value o f  the interest o f  the insured 
in such life or lives, or other event or events."
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"... I feel obliged to revert to what is the foundation of every rule with 
regard to insurance law, which is this: Every contract of marine or fire 
insurance is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, the meaning of 
which is that the assured in case of a loss is to receive a full indemnity, but is 
never to receive more. Every rule of insurance law is adopted in order to carry 
out this fundamental rule, and if ever any proposition is brought forward, the 
effect of which is opposed to this fundamental rule, it will be found to be 
wrong."127
The significance of the principle of indemnity, nevertheless, appears at the time of 
measuring the loss that an insured suffers from by the risk insured against.128 Thus, 
the 'sum insured', which is usually stated in a policy of insurance, differs from the 
actual cost of loss of the insured. Consequently, it is not necessary that the assured 
should recover the full amount of the sum insured once the risk insured against has 
actually occurred. Therefore, where the sum insured, for instance, under a fire 
insurance policy is £50,000,000 and the actual cost of loss is £10,000, the insured 
cannot recover more than the actual cost of loss, i.e. £10,000.129 Accordingly, 
'indemnity' means that, "the insured is to be put back to the position he or she would 
have been in had the loss not occurred, less any excess which the insured has agreed
126 [1881-1885] All ER Rep 493. See further, Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd  [1978] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 440 per Forbes J; Leppard v Excess Insurance Co Ltd  [ 1979] 1 WLR 512.
127 Ibid, 495 per Megaw LJ.
128 According to Lewis, the loss needs to be identified and quantified. See, Charles Lewis, “A 
Fundamental Principle of Insurance Law” [1979] LMCLQ 275.
129 That, of course, differs from valued policies where the sum recoverable is fixed by the contract (as 
the case in marine insurance policies). Also, it differs from the position in contingency insurance as in 
life and accident policies where the terms of the of the policy fix the sum that should be recovered 
where the risk insured against has occurred. See, John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: 
Doctrines and Principles, (1999), pp. 179, 180. For more discussion on valued policies, see Goole and 
Hull Steam Towing Co Ltd v Ocean Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1928] 1 KB 589, at 594, per 
MacKinnon J; Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on Insurance, 10th ed., (2003), parag. 1-15 at p. 8; 
Susan Hodges, Law o f Marine Insurance, (1996), Ch. 5, at p. 71; Howard Bennett, The Law o f  Marine 
Insurance, (1996), parag. 18.1. at p. 344. John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines 
and Principles, (1999), pp 15,181.
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to bear.1'130 Thus, the principle of indemnity, in fact, limits the insurer's liability 
towards his insured to the latter's actual loss that proved.131
Furthermore, the loss must be pecuniary and derived from the possession of 
insurable interest that is required by law. Accordingly, "where insurable interest is 
determined by reference to economic interest in the insured property, insurable 
interest becomes subsumed within the indemnity principle. If the insured property in
1 'Ueconomically useless insurable interest may be extinguished."
Campbell observes that, there are three meanings of the insurer primary obligation, 
i.e. a promise "to indemnify". They are, namely:
1 - A promise to prevent loss from occurring.
2- A promise that loss will not occur.
3- A promise to compensate the insured in the event that the loss does occur.
Thus, he argued that, the third meaning, i.e. indemnity is a compensation for loss, is 
most likely to accord with the parties' intention in property insurances and with 
precedent and consistent with the insurer's ability to perform the contract in common
130 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (1999), p. 179.
131 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (2004), parag. 13.1, p. 641; 
Halsbury’s Law o f  England, Vol. 25 (Reissue), 4th ed., (2003), p. 10.
132 See summary of an American case, Chicago Title & Trust Co v United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co 376 F Supp 767 (1973) per Will J, in John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, ibid, p. 642, where the 
insured claimed on his policy to seek indemnification from his insurer for destruction of the insured 
building that was empty, secured and boarded. It had been gutted by a previous fire and had not been 
used in any way. Will J ruled that,
".. .it would be ludicrous to allow the plaintiff [the insured] to recover a substantial amount of money 
representing the replacement cost less depreciation of a building that was for all practical purposes non­
existent. It would be grossly inequitable for plaintiffs beneficiary to recover $43,000 for a building 
which less than one month prior to its destruction she had purchased for $4,000 in what appears to have 
been an arm’s length transaction and in which building she had made absolutely no additional 
investment or improvement."
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policy obligations.133 He criticized the manner of the recent English cases as focusing 
on the first meaning of indemnity, i.e. a promise to prevent loss from occurring.134 
Instead, he thought, the third meaning is the one that should have been considered.
Thus, the House of Lords in Firma C-Trade S.A. v Newcastle Protection and 
Indemnity Association (The Fanti),135 Lord Goff did, in fact, emphasize that the 
indemnity meant a promise to prevent loss from occurring. In his words,
"...I accept that, at common law, a contract of indemnity gives rise to an 
action for unliquidated damages, arising from the failure of the indemnifier to 
prevent the indemnified person from suffering damage, for example, by 
having to pay a third party. I also accept that, at common law, the cause of 
action does not (unless the contract provides otherwise) arise until the 
indemnified person can show actual loss: see Collinge v. Heywood (1839) 9 
Ad. & E. 633. This is, as I understand it, because a promise of indemnity is 
simply a promise to hold the indemnified person harmless against a specified 
loss or expense. On this basis, no debt can arise before the loss is suffered or 
the expense incurred; however, once the loss is suffered or the expense 
incurred, the indemnifier is in breach of contract for having failed to hold the 
indemnified person harmless against the relevant loss or expense."136
Campbell mentioned that, there are two obligations fall on an insurer’s shoulders 
towards his insured in property insurance. They are, namely, primary obligation and 
secondary obligation. In primary obligation, the insurer, on the occurrence of loss or
133 Neil Campbell, “The nature of an insurer’s obligation” [2000] LMCLQ 42, at p. 48.
134 He argued that, under liability insurance policies, a promise to prevent loss from occurring, most 
accurately reflects both the parties’ intentions and precedent. See, ibid.
135 [1991] 2 A.C. 1.
136 Ibid, at pp 35-36.
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damage to the property insured, is obligated "to indemnify the insured by providing 
compensation for such loss or damage. Compensation might be provided by paying
i
money to the insured, or by reinstating damaged property."
As far as the insurer’s secondary obligation is concerned, Campbell argued that, 
"Failure by the insurer to perform its primary obligation is a breach of contract. On 
breach the insurer will come under a secondary obligation to pay compensatory 
damages to the insured, and the insurer will acquire a secondary right to payment of 
the same."138 However, the insured, under common law, cannot recover any 
consequential losses that caused by the breach of the insurer of fulfilling his primary 
obligation, i.e. promise to prevent loss from occurring.139 According to Campbell, 
"...the common law has, until recently, been reluctant to award damages for losses 
consequent upon the failure to pay, or late payment of, money."140
Therefore, in Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd,m  the claimant insured was 
owning a small business of collection, processing and redistribution of animal waste 
products and took out theft insurance policy and an insurance policy to cover "sudden 
and unforeseen damage...which necessitates immediate repair or replacement of the 
Plant before it can resume normal working." In April 1986, while the business in
137 Neil Campbell, “The nature of an insurer’s obligation”, LMCLQ 42, at p. 44.
138 Ibid, at p. 46. Campbell divided the losses for which the insured might seek damages in such case 
into two types. They are, "First, the insured will suffer a direct loss of the benefit that the insurer 
promised but failed to provide. In most cases this loss is quantified by determining the sum of money 
that the insurer was primarily obliged to pay to the insured. Secondly, the insured might suffer 
consequential losses as a result of not receiving the benefit promised by the insurer. For example, the 
insured might be unable to afford to repair damaged plant without insurance monies, and lose profit as 
result."
139 President o f India v. Lips Maritime Corporation [1988] A.C. 395, in particular, p. 425, per Lord 
Brandon of Oakbrook, he said:
".. .there is no such thing as a cause of action in damages for late payment of damages."
140 Neil Campbell, “The nature of an insurer’s obligation” LMCLQ 42, at p. 46.
141 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 111.
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financial pressure, vandals broke into the insured premises and destroyed certain 
items of machinery. When the insured claimed on the policy, the insurer unjustifiably 
rejected the claim on the ground that vandalism was not covered by the policy. After 
four years, the insurer admitted liability and paid the insured the value of the items of 
machinery that had been destroyed, (£30,000), plus interest. The insured claimed that 
the delay of payment from the part of the insurer had caused his business to collapse 
and claimed (£75,000) damages. Evans LJ, ruled that such damages were not 
recoverable. Beldam LJ took that same view and he said:
"By long-standing decisions it is settled that the liability of insurers under a 
policy arises when the loss occurs and the liability is to pay money for that 
loss. That the insurers have the option themselves to reinstate or to pay for the 
reinstatement of the property damaged under the terms of the policy does not 
alter the essential nature of their liability, which is to pay the sum of money as 
damages. Thus the failure to pay is a failure to pay damages and, by decisions 
binding on this court, an assured has no cause of action for damages for non­
payment of damages."142
Birds, in his comment on Sprung case, observes that, "It has to be recognised that as 
a matter of strict law, unless and until the House of Lords reviews the question of 
insurance indemnities being damages, the decision in Sprung seems unimpeachable. It 
is thus very difficult to see how the common law could properly compensate the 
insured in that sort of position. But it does seem clear that there should be such a 
remedy where an insurer repudiates or refuses to admit liability without reasonable
142 Ibid, at 119. This judgment was, in fact, followed the decision of Hirst J in Ventouris v Mountain 
(The Italia Express(No. 2)) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 281.
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grounds, and the Court of Appeal thought so also. The only solution, perhaps, is to 
make this another area of insurance law where statutory reform is needed."143
In the light of what has been mentioned, it could be said that the principle of 
indemnity prevents an insured from misusing insurance and making profits out of it. It 
limits insurers' liabilities towards their insureds and allows them to pay the insureds 
what they have actually lost within the extent of their insurable interests.
Harnett and Thornton illustrated the mechanism of the principle of indemnity. They 
stated that, "The general statement that insurance is traditionally a contract of 
indemnity is significant in determining the measure of an insured's recovery, for the 
attempt is always to evaluate the insurable interest and the impairment of it through 
the occurrence of the insured event. Having then ascertained loss in terms of 
economic impairment, that impairment becomes the measure of recovery. 
Colloquially phrased, the amount of allowable recovery is theoretically the extent to 
which the insured is "out of pocket", or alternately put, an insured can recover only to 
the extent of his interest"144
Thus, and recovery exceeds the insured’s interest is, simply, wagering. In this 
regard, they observed that, "To the extent that a possible insurance recovery is in 
excess of the insured’s interest, it is a wager, and limiting indemnity to the extent of 
the interest is simply the way in which an insurance contract is removed from the 
wager category. The traditionally distinct purpose of," they said, "insurable interest as
143 John Birds, “No Damages Remedy when Insurers Unjustifiably Repudiate Liability” [1997] J. B. L. 
368, at 371. See also, Marion Egan, “Insurer’s Duty to Pat” [1998] Int. I. L. R. 6 (5), 166.
144 Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic 
Reevaluation of a Legal Concept", Col. L. R. (1948) 48, p. 1162, at 1176.
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a limitation on indemnity is, then, merely the wagering policy accoutered in different 
verbal cloth"145
145 Ibid, p. 1183.
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3.3. Definition of Insurable Interest under Saudi Law
Unlike the UK legislation, marine insurance contract was defined by article (324) 
of Commercial Court Law 1931. It provides that,
"An insurance policy is a marine contract containing an undertaking to pay the 
full amount of insurance in consideration of a premium received by the insurer 
against losses and damages that may be caused by a marine disaster to items 
which he wants to safeguard against any marine carriage risk."146
El-Sayed, translates the definition of the contract of insurance in article (324) of the 
CCL 1931 [SA] as,
"A marine contract containing an undertaking by the insured to pay an agreed 
insurance premium to the insurer in return for insurance indemnity against 
perils and loss that may be incident to a marine disaster on items that could 
meet a risk on a sea voyage."147
It seems that, El-Sayed is quite satisfied with the latter definition that it is a 
comprehensive one. He is of the opinion that, "...this definition is a comprehensive 
statement expressing the risk that is the object of insurance and, on the strength of this 
definition," he says, "a risk that is the object of insurance is a maritime risk in its legal
14Ssense, apart from the risks that may occur during a voyage." That, of course, differs
146 This is a translation from Arabic to English by, Nicola H. Karam, Business Laws o f  Saudi Arabia, 
Vol. I, (1994), p. 13-66.
147 Hussein M. El-Sayed, Maritime Regulations in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia, (1987), p. 173. The 
author commented that, "...this definition is a comprehensive statement expressing the risk that is the 
object of insurance and, on the strength of this definition, a risk that is the object o f insurance is a 
maritime risk in its legal sense, apart from the risks that may occur during a voyage."
148 Ibid.
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from the manner of English courts which describe the contract of insurance rather 
than define it.149
Furthermore, in the light of both translations of article (324) of the CCL 1931 [SA], 
the Saudi maritime law presents an ill definition for the contract of marine insurance 
that needs an urgent reformation. In fact, the statement of El-Sayed that the definition 
is comprehensive, cannot be supported because it did not consider the features of 
insurance. The weakness of the definition can be noticed where it is compared with, 
for example, the description of the contract of insurance in Prudential Insurance 
Company v. Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue,150 that,
"Where you insure a ship or a house you cannot insure that the ship shall not 
be lost or the house burnt, but what you do insure is that a sum of money shall 
be paid upon the happening of a certain event. That I think is the first 
requirement in a contract of insurance. It must be a contract whereby for some 
consideration, usually but not necessarily for periodical payments called 
premiums, you secure to yourself some benefit, usually but not necessarily the 
payment of a sum of money, upon the happening of some event. Then the next 
thing that is necessary is that the event should be one which involves some 
amount of uncertainty. There must be either uncertainty whether the event will 
ever happen or not, or if the event is one which must happen at some time 
there must be uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen. The remaining
149Medical Defence Union Ltd. v. Department o f  Trade [1980] Ch. 82 at 95. See generally, section 3.2
above.
150 [1904] 2 KB 658.
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essential is that which was referred to by the Attorney-General when he said 
the insurance must be against something."151
It can be noted that the latter description of insurance takes into consideration, for 
instance, that, payments of premiums are periodical. Indemnity is not necessarily to 
be payment of sum of money; that it could be, for example, replacement of the 
subject-matter of insurance; the occurrence of the event and its time insured against 
must be uncertain. In contrast, the definition of insurance under article (324) of the 
CCL 1931 [SA] omitted such features. In other wards, the article lacks 
comprehensiveness.
Furthermore, article 1(12) of the Implementing Regulations of the Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Control Law 2003, interpreted and outlined the nature of 
insurance. It states that,
"Insurance: Mechanism of contractually shifting burdens of pure risks by 
pooling them."152
In addition, article 1(17) identifies "Insurance Policy" as,
151 Ibid, at 663, per Channell J. See, also, Callaghan and Another v. Dominion Insurance Co. Ltd. and 
Others [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 541, at 544, per Sir Peter Webster. The most important and remarkable 
feature of an insurance contract is the application of fulfilling the duty of utmost good faith or the 
doctrine of uberrimae fidei. See examples for English insurance literature, J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, 
Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 2nd ed., (2005), chapter 4, pp. 77-123; John Lowry & Philip 
Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (2004), chapter 4, pp. 129-229; John Lowry and 
Phillip Rawlings on 'Insurers, Claims and the Boundaries of Good Faith' [2005] MLR 82; H. Bennett, 
'Mapping the Doctrine of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law' [1999] LMCLQ, 165; Malcolm A. 
Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, 4th ed., (2002); Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's and Merkin's 
Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002); Nicholas Legh-Jones, MacGillivray on Insurance, 10th ed., 
(2003), chapter 17; Andrew McGee, The Modern Law o f Insurance, (2001), chapter 5; J. Birds and N. 
Hird, Bird's Modem Insurance Law, 6th ed., (2004); Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's and Merkin's 
Insurance Contract Law, 7th ed., (1997), chapter 5; Birds and Hird, "Misrepresentation and non­
disclosure in insurance law- identical twins or separate issues" [1996] MLR 285.
152 English version. See article 1 (7) of the Implementation Regulations, Arabic version.
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"Legal document/contract issued to the insured by the insurer setting out the 
terms of the contract to indemnify the insured for loss and damages covered 
by the policy against a premium paid by the insured."
As a matter of fact, English courts are more conscious about describing insurance 
rather than defining it as the matter in Saudi jurisdiction. That is to say, where the 
latter has specifically identified insurance, English courts describe it rather than define 
it. The reason, according to Templeman J, is that,
"definitions tend sometimes to obscure and occasionally to exclude that which 
ought to be included."153
As far as the principle of insurable interest is concerned, the only definition of 
insurable interest was provided by article 55 of the Implementing Regulations of the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law 2003. The English version of the 
Implementing Regulations requires the insurable interest to be considered at the time 
when the contract is concluded, but it does not define insurable interest. It states that, 
"The basis of the information provided in the policy shall be the application 
submitted by the policyholder. When completing the insurance application, the 
following must be taken into consideration: (1) Insurable interest..."
However, the Arabic version of the Implementing Regulations defines insurable 
interest as the possibility of incurring loss or liability to the assured by the insured 
risk. Article 55 of the Implementing Regulations does not clarify whether the insurer 
is obligated to consider the assured’s insurable interest before accepting the risk, or it
153Department o f Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 99 at 
101.
I l l
is the duty of the assured to show his interest before concluding the contract. In 
practice, however, the insurable interest must be shown by the assured at the time of 
the loss.
In respect of the CCL 1931 [SA], although insurable interest was not clearly defined 
therein by particular rules, it set out items that could be insured and those which could 
be not. Article 327 provides the insurable items that,
"(1) vessels which sail individually or in convoys, whether loaded or empty 
and whether fitted out or not; (2) machinery and equipment of vessels; (3) 
hulls and superstructures; (4) provisions; (5) money borrowed under the 
marine procedure; (6) kind and nature of cargo; (7) anything having value 
which may be the subject of marine hazards."154
It can be noticed that, paragraph (7) of article 327 of CCL 1931 includes the other 
paragraphs of the article. Thus, the vessel and its contents, i.e. hull and machinery, 
equipments and provisions, etc., its cargo and a maritime loan constitute economic 
interests. It has to be borne in mind that, the maritime loan which is considered under 
this article to be insured is that form the part of the lender, whereas the borrower 
cannot insure the maritime loan he gets against marine risks, as it will be seen below. 
According to Haberbeck and Galloway, since intangibles can be insured under article 
327 of the CCL 1931, such as money lent against ship or cargo, "there is no reason 
why a mortgagee may not insure his interest in a ship." They add that, "An insurer 
may reinsure his liability in respect of any given maritime adventure."155 They, 
further, observe that, "The wide definition of insurable subject-matter under article
154 This is a translation from Arabic to English by, Nicola H. Karam, Business Laws o f  Saudi Arabia, 
Vol. 1,(1994), p. 13-67.
155 Anderson Haberbeck and Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, (1990), at p. 224.
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327 (7) makes it clear that the insurance of other intangibles, such as, for example, 
third party liabilities or charterer’s interests, is also valid under the Commercial Court 
Law, provided that their value can be quantified if a claim arises."156
In contrast, article 341 of the CCL 1931 lists the uninsurable items, or things that 
are not subject to insurance. The article provides that:
"The freight of and profit resulting from the goods on board the vessel, as well 
as the crew's wages, and marine borrowings and benefits are not insurable; if 
insurance is carried, it shall be null and void."
Haberbeck and Galloway comment on this article and due to the fact that freight is 
not insurable, they perceive that, "it is...arguable that insurance in respect of charter 
hire is permissible. However, given that no distinction between freight and hire is 
made in the Commercial Court Law's section on carriage of goods, we are of the 
opinion that the use of term freight in this context extends to hire, too."157 They 
conclude, therefore, that, "Article 341 does not confine the exclusion to insurance by
1 Wthe shipowner. Thus, cargo insurance for the c. & f. value of cargo is not valid." 
However, in practice the authors do not think that any Saudi insurer would refuse "to 
pay the freight proportion of a claim on this ground."159
] 56 Ibid.
157 Ibid, at p. 225. Therefore, hire is uninsurable.
158 Ibid. c & f  is abbreviation used usually in international trade and it is "a term in a quoted sales price 
indicating that the quoted price includes the cost o f the goods and freight charges to the named 
destination, but not insurance or other special charges. During shipment, the risk of loss is on the 
buyer." B. A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, (7th ed., 1999), p. 350.
159 Ibid. It is significant here to understand the meaning of the word freight under English law and find 
out about its scope in insurance law. "The word freight in insurance law has a more extensive 
signification than the general law of shipping, and is used comprehensively to denote the benefit 
derived by the shipowner from the employment of his ship."
Freight, strictly speaking, as between the shipowner and freighter, is the price to be paid by the latter to 
the former for the carriage of goods in the ship, and is only payable on the arrival o f the goods at their 
port of destination; but in policies of insurance it also donates that which is less properly called freight,
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In addition, the expected profits from the sale of the goods are excluded from being 
insurable. El-Sayed is of the opinion that the reason for such exclusion, although it is 
not clear, is that "the expected profit could be obtained after arrival."160 Haberbeck 
and Galloway, moreover, take the same view and illustrate this exclusion that, 
"cargoes may only be insured for their arrival value at the destination. Any margin 
taking into account anticipated profits cannot be insured." They carry on explaining 
that, "In Saudi practice, it is common for values to be calculated as c. & f  +  10%. 
Provided that the 10% has some basis in actual costs, such as customs dues, port 
charges, and transport on arrival.. ."161
viz. the price agreed to be paid by the charterer to the shipowner for the hire of the ship, or a part of it, 
under a charterparty or other contract of affreightment, and also the benefit which the shipowner 
expected to derive from the carriage of his own goods in his own ship, in the shape of their increased 
value to him at the port of delivery. As Lord Tenterden observes with respect to the meaning of the 
term "freight," it is the same thing to the shipowner whether he receives the benefit of the use of his 
ship by a money payment from one person who charters the whole ship; or from various persons who 
put specific quantities of goods on board; or from persons who pay him the value of his own goods at 
the port of delivery, increased by their carriage in his own ship. {Flint v Flemyng (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 45 
at p. 48.).
Rule 16 in Schedule I to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that in ordinary policy " The term 
'freight' includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the employment of his ship to carry his own 
goods or moveables, as well as freight payable by a third party, but does not include passage money." 
Both freight in the strict sense of the word and price paid for the hire of the ship under a charterpart are 
no doubt covered by the words "freight payable by a third party."", Raoul Colinvaux, Amould's Law o f  
Marine Insurance and Average, 16th ed., (1981), Vol. I, parag. 311.
160 Hussein M. El-Sayed, Maritime Regulations in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia, (1987), p. 177.
161 The authors are of the view that a Saudi insurer, "may not refuse to pay a claim calculated including 
such percentage." Anderson Haberbeck and Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, (1990), at p. 225. 
Insurance on profits under English law is lawful. The leading view was expressed by Lawrence J. in his 
judgment in Barclay v Cousins (1802) 2 East 544, ER 102, p. 478, that, "As insurance is a contract of 
indemnity, it cannot be said to be extended beyond what the design of such species of contract will 
embrace, if it be applied to protect men from those losses and disadvantages which but for the perils 
insured against the assured would not suffer; and in every maritime adventure the adventurer is liable 
to be deprived, not only of the things immediately subjected to the perils insured against, but also o f the 
advantages to be derived from the arrival of those things at their destined port. If they do not arrive, his 
loss in such case is not merely that of his goods or other things exposed to the peril of navigation, but 
of the benefits which, were his money employed in an undertaking not subject to the perils, he might 
obtain without more risk than the capital itself would be liable to; and if when the capital is subject to 
the risks of maritime commerce it be allowable for the merchant to protect that by insuring it, why may 
he not protect those advantages he is in danger of losing by their being subjected to the same risks? It is 
surely not an improper encouragement of trade to provide that merchants, in case of adverse fortune, 
should not only not lose the principal adventure, but that that principal should not, in consequence of 
such bad fortune, be totally unproductive; and that men of small fortunes should be encouraged to 
engage in commerce by their having the means of preserving their capitals entire...", pp. 546, 547.
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Furthermore, article 341 prohibits taking out an insurance policy to insure crew's 
wages. Haberbeck and Galloway observed that, "If this prohibition is directed at the 
ship's owner only, it can be rationalized on two grounds: Under Saudi law crew
1 f\0members are not entitled to wages if the adventure is frustrated. Accordingly, it is 
arguable that the owner has no insurable interest in respect of wages which he pays in 
such circumstance, since he does so as a volunteer. Secondly, the crew's ordinary 
wages are a contractual liability and not a risk. However, Article 341 also prevents 
crew members from taking out insurance in respect of their potential loss of 
earnings."163
The article, moreover, prohibits insuring money borrowed for a marine loan from 
the part of the borrower. The reason is that under Saudi law, the lender cannot recover 
the marine loan if the vessel is lost or destroyed by a marine peril.164 El-Sayed argues 
that, " ...if insurance on the amount borrowed were to be allowed, this would lead to
162 Article 112 of the Saudi Labor and Workmen Law, Royal Decree No. M/21 1969/1389 A.H.
163 Anderson Haberbeck and Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, (1990), at p. 225. Therefore, this 
article leaves crew members on board Saudi ships unsecured, especially, if  it is known that, "seafarers 
are excluded from the cover provided under the Social Security Regulations of 1969." Thus, the 
authors advise those who work as seamen on board Saudi ships that, "they should take out insurance 
for loss of earning with foreign insurer." See also, Hussein M. El-Sayed, Maritime Regulations in the 
Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia, (1987), p. 177. In English law, the matter was the same. "Seamen have been 
debarred by the laws of most, if not all, maritime states from insuring their wages. The reason being the 
belief that such an insurance might tempt them in time of danger not to exert themselves to the utmost 
for the preservation of the ship. By law of England it was an implied condition of the seaman's contract 
with the shipowner that his wages dependent on the earning of freight by the ship. This rule was 
generally expressed by saying that freight is the mother of wages. Therefore, when a ship was lost in 
the course of the voyage, the seaman was usually a loser to the extent of the wages already earned by 
him, and also (except when he obtained another ship) in respect of the wages which he would have 
earned during the remainder of the voyage. Yet, on grounds of policy,..., the insurance of his wages, or 
of any commodities which he was to receive at the end of the voyage in lieu of wages, was not 
permitted. The law relating to the earning of wages was altered by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. 
Wages are no longer dependent on freight being earned, and seamen are now entitled, in the event of 
the ship being lost, to be paid their wages until the time of the loss... But the loss of the ship may still 
involve a loss of the wages which the seamen would have earned during the remainder of the voyage, 
or of the period of time for which they were engaged.", Raoul Colinvaux, Amould's Law o f  Marine 
Insurance and Average, 16th ed., (1981), Vol. I, parag. 323. Marine Insurance Act 1906, at the present 
time, allows seamen to insure their wages. Section 11 of the Act states that,
"The master or any member of the crew of a ship has an insurable interest in respect o f his wages."
164 Article 316, Commercial Court Law 1931.
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the borrower combining the amount of the loan which he would be exempted from 
paying and the insurance compensation."165
165 Hussein M. El-Sayed, Maritime Regulations in the Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia, (1987), p. 177. In this 
regard, Haberbeck and Galloway comment that, "This prohibition does not prevent the insurance of 
ships or cargoes against which loans are secured, but relates solely to the debts secured thereon. Whilst 
the lender can insure against the loss of property against which a loan is secured, an assured who insure 
both his property and a loan secured thereon would profit from its destruction." Anderson Haberbeck 
and Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, (1990), at p. 225.
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3.4. General Comments
This chapter reviews the description of the contract of insurance and analyzed the 
doctrine of insurable interest under common law. Therefore, it can be said that, the 
contract of insurance includes the following features:
(1) A contract of insurance must contain a promise from an insurer to his insured 
to indemnify him once a certain event happens.
(2) The insured must make, usually but not necessarily, periodical payments 
called premiums.
(3) The payments of premiums are made by the insured to secure some benefit, 
usually but not necessarily, a payment of a sum of money insured. The benefit 
must be of economic value and it does not have to be a sum of money. In 
Department o f Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association 
Ltd,166 the benefit was provided to the SCMA members was providing a driver 
and, if it is necessary, a car and driver for some period of time in the case that 
one of the members could not drive for some reasons.
i fn(4) The contract of insurance is an aleatory contract. The event insured against 
must be either uncertainty whether the event will ever happen or not, or if the
166jDepartment o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd [1974] Lloyd's Rep. 
17.
167 It has been said that a contract of insurance is "a contract upon speculation", in Re Barrett; ex parte 
Young v N  M  Superannuation Pty Ltd  106 ALR 549, (1992) (Fed Court of Australia), per von Dousa J. 
See, Robert S. Pinzur, "Insurable Interest: A Search for Consistency" [1979] Insurance Counsel 
Journal 109. The author perceived that an insurance contract and a wager share some similar 
characteristics. He said, "Both are contracts upon a condition and entail some risk. Both are aleatory 
contracts, whereby the obligor becomes obligated only upon the occurrence of the specified event. 
Furthermore, the purchaser in both contracts pays a relatively small amount of money in exchange for 
the possibility of recovering something of much greater value or, in the alternative, nothing at all. 
Which he will receive depends upon chance-whether his wager is won or whether an insured loss 
occurs.", at p. 110. However Pinzur argued that, "the payor does get something more than "nothing at 
all". In a wager, the bettor gets the thrill and excitement of the gamble. In insurance, the insured is
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event is one which must happen at some time there must be uncertainty as to 
the time at which it will happen.168
(5) The contract of insurance is a devise shifting or transferring risk from the 
insured to the insurer. Insurance, also, allows risk to be spread upon numbers 
of insureds by way of risk distribution. This feature has been considered under 
Saudi law. Article 1 (12) of the Implementing Regulations of the Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Control Law 2003 states that,
"Insurance: Mechanism of contractually shifting burdens of pure risks by 
pooling them."169
(6) The contract of insurance imposes upon the parties to fulfill the duty of utmost 
good faith. Should one of the parties become in breach of such duty, the 
aggrieved party reserves the right to avoid the contract. Section 17 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that,
"A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract 
may be avoided by the other party."
Likewise, article 342 of the CCL [SA] applies the duty of disclosure and 
representation. It states that,
"If the insured keeps silent about or gives different particulars than those he 
should mention in the insurance policy, or if the particulars do not conform to 
those shown in the bill of lading, and if the insurer discovers the true nature 
thereof, regardless whether the risk is not as grave as that which appears to
purchasing some security and freedom from worry. Nevertheless, these subjective factors do not 
involve any economic value." Footnote 3, p. 110. More discussion on the comparison between 
wagering and insurance will take a place in chapter 4.
168 Prudential Insurance Company v. Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1904] 2 KB 658, at p. 663.
169 English version. See article 1 (7) o f the Implementation Regulations, Arabic version. See also, 
article 55 (2).
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result from such silence or statement, or the risk, other than that the presumed 
results, and to a risk nullifying the policy or making the policy according to 
other terms, the insurance policy made out shall in respect of the insurer be 
deemed to be null and void; such silence, or false statement or difference shall 
cause the insurance policy to lapse, even though no event occurs to cause the 
loss and perishing of the insured items."170
As far as the definition of the contact of insurance under Saudi law is concerned, it 
can be said that the definition lacked comprehensiveness. Therefore, it can be said 
that the common law manner in describing insurance rather than defining it, is more 
comprehensive than presenting a fixed definition which could be rigid and might
171exclude some other forms of insurance that should be included.
In respect of the requirement of insurable interest, the repeal of si 8 of Gaming Act 
1845 by s334 Gambling Act 2005 has made insurable interest not a pre-requisite for a 
contract of insurance any longer. The question that arises, however, is that whether 
the requirement of insurable interest will no longer be considered as a criterion that 
differentiates insurance from wagering should the Gambling Act 2005 become in 
effect?
As from the part of the insurer, he might not be able to depend on the lack of 
insurable interest in order to support his defence to escape liability towards his 
insured to indemnify him where the insured proves his loss due to the occurrence of
170 For detailed discussion on the duty of utmost good faith under Saudi law, see, Khaled Ba-Naser, 
Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study, (PhD Thesis), University of 
Southampton, (1999).
171 Department o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd, [1974] Lloyd's 
Rep. 17, at p. 18.
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the risk insured against. Yet, the principle of indemnity in insurance might be the only 
available criterion which distinguishes insurance from wagering. Therefore, having 
said that the insured cannot recover his loss unless he proves that the risk insured 
against has actually occurred and the loss he suffered from was actually caused by 
that risk, it is necessary that the insured has some interest in the property insured 
which made him/her take out an insurance policy to preserve his/her interest therein. 
Consequently, the principle of insurable interest is, in fact, included in the principle of 
indemnity.
In regard to Saudi law, there is no one particular provision deals with the definition 
of insurable interest apart from article 327 of the CCL 1931 [SA] which lists the items 
that are insurable and article 341 of the CCL 1931 which lists the uninsurable items.
As for article 341 of the CCL 1931, it is doubted to be in use at the present time.172 
That is, perhaps, attributable to the fact that, the provisions of the Commercial Court 
Law 1931 were drafted as early as the beginning of 19 century. Furthermore, 
although several parts of this law has been repealed by other provisions, chapter 11 of 
the CCL 1931 which concerns the contract of marine insurance has remained 
untouched and has not been repealed or developed yet. Therefore, it can be said that 
several rules in chapter 11 of the CCL 1931 are almost abandoned. In addition, 
insurance disputes which relate to property or liability insurance policies and that are 
dealt with by arbitration do not refer to the CCL 1931, unless a dispute relates to 
marine insurance policies.
172 Although article 341 prohibits insuring profits, the National Corporate for Cooperative Insurance, 
(NCCI), a Saudi Arabian insurance company, has announced about its offer to insure loss o f profits due 
to the cessation of commercial activities as a result of the occurrence of a risk insured against. See, Al- 
Riyadh Newspaper, Tuesday 12 April 2005, No. 13441.
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Chapter Four: The Consequence of Lack of
Insurable Interest and The Effect of 
Gambling Act 2005
4.1. Introduction
It has been said that, the principle of insurable interest gives a property insurance 
contract its identity as indemnity.1 It, also, distinguishes the contract of insurance 
from wagering and gambling. Therefore, it may by thought desirable to explore the 
position where an insured does not possess an interest in the subject-matter insured at 
the time of the occurrence of an insured peril or risk. Thus, this chapter surveys the 
consequence of lack of insurable interest in property insurance and that will take place 
in section 4.2. The time of the requirement of insurable interest and when it must be 
shown is discussed in section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 analyses the use of lack of insurable 
interest as defence. That will lead, therefore, to explore the consequence of lack of 
insurable interest on the return of premiums in section 4.2.3. Furthermore, this chapter 
discusses the concepts of contractual interest and statutory interest in section 4.2.4; 
then it finds out whether the requirement of insurable interest could be waived in 
section 4.2.5.
1 See section 1.1, supra.
2 The nature of the contract of insurance is that, it is an aleatory contract. The word aleatory means, 
"depending on the throw of a die or on chance", see, Concise Oxford Dictionary (10 ed), 2001. See, 
Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 
2003, parag. 1-10. Professor Merkin observes that "Contracts o f insurance, like wagering contracts, are 
aleatory contract "depending upon uncertain event or contingency as to both profit and loss"; for 
financial or other consideration the insurer agrees to pay or otherwise benefit the insured on the 
happening of a specified event or contingency which is outside the control of the insurer." Robert 
Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0001.
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In addition, the impact of s. 18 of Gaming Act 1845 is explored in section 4.3. It, 
also, examines the effect of Gambling Act 2005 on the requirement of insurable 
interest in section 4.4. Moreover, this chapter finds out the position of lack of 
insurable interest under Saudi jurisdiction in section 4.5. Section 4.6 is for general 
comments.
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4.2. The Consequence of Lack of Insurable Interest
Broadly speaking, the absence of an insurable interest in indemnity insurance at the 
time of the loss insured against renders the insurance policy worthless and provides a 
defence to the insurer. There is no statutory requirement that insurable interest must 
to be possessed by the insured in goods other that in the sphere of marine insurance. 
By virtue of section 4 of MIA 1906, a marine policy, to be valid and enforceable, 
must be attached by insurable interest. By contrast, a marine policy which is not 
supported by insurable interest will be null and void and, therefore, unenforceable.4 
Section 4 (1) of MIA 1906 states that:
"Every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void."
Section 4 (2) of the Act describes a marine policy which is considered to be by 
gaming or wagering. It provides that:
"A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering 
contract-
(a) Where the assured has no insurable interest as defined by this Act, and the 
contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring such an interest; or
(b) Where the policy is made "interest or no interest", or "without further proof 
of interest than the policy itself', or "without benefit of salvage to the insurer", 
or subject to any other like term:
3 Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag.
1.26.
4 See, John Edwards & Co Ltd v Motor Union Insurance Co [1922] 2 KB 249.
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Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be 
effected without benefit of salvage to the insurer."
Section 1 of Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 imposes criminal 
liability. It enacts that,
"If-
(a) any person effects a contract of marine insurance without having any bona 
fide interest, direct or indirect, either in the safe arrival of the ship in 
relation on which the contract is made or in the safety or preservation of 
the subject matter insured, or a bona fide expectation of acquiring such an 
interest; or
(b) any person in the employment of the owner of a ship, not being a part 
owner of the ship, effects a contract of marine insurance in relation to the 
ship, and the contract is made 'interest or no interest', or 'without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself, or 'without benefit of salvage to the 
insurer', or subject to any other like term,
the contract shall be deemed to be a contract by way of gambling on loss by 
maritime perils, and the person effecting it shall be guilty of an offence, and 
shall be liable, on summary convection, to imprisonment, with or without hard 
labour, for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 3 on 
the standard scale,5 and in either case to forfeit to the Crown any money he 
may receive under the contract."6
5 Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 s.l (1) (amended by virtue of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1948 s.l (2); and the Criminal Justice Act 1982 ss.38, 46). 'Standard scale' means the standard 
scale of maximum fines for summary offences as set out in the Criminal Justice Act 1982 s. 37 (as 
amended). See, Halsbury's Laws o f  England, Vol. 25 ,4th ed., (2003 Reissue), parag. 387; see also,
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Accordingly, where a policy is made in "ppi" form or intended to be in a way of 
wagering or gambling, the policy is void.7
4.2.1 The Time of Existence o f Insurable Interest
The time that an insured is required to possess an insurable interest in order to 
validate his claim against the insurer in indemnity insurance is the time of the
Q
occurrence of the loss. However, the only one exception to this rule is where the 
subject-matter is insured 'lost or not lost'.9 Thus, section 6 of MIA 1906 provides that,
"(1) The assured must be interested in the subject-matter insured at the time of 
the loss though he need not be interested when the insurance is effected: 
Provided that where the subject-matter is insured 'lost or not lost,' the assured 
may recover although he may not have acquired his interest until after the loss, 
unless at the time of effecting the contract of insurance the assured was aware 
of the loss, and the insurer was not.
parag. 22, note 9, "At the time at which this volume states the law, the standard scale is as follows: 
level 3, £1000."
6 (9 Edw. 7, c. 12). See, Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), 
parag. A-0393/1, note 1, at p. 10362; James Davey "The reform of gambling and the future of 
insurance law" Legal Studies (2004) Vol. 24 No. 4, 507, at 509 and note 15.
7 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0482. 
Bearing in mind, however, the effect of Gambling Act 2005, infra.
8 Sparkes v Marshall (1836) 2 Bing NC 761; Howard v Lancashire Insurance Co (1885) 11 SCR 92.
9 Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 
2003, parag. 1-39.
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(2) Where the assured has no interest at the time of the loss, he cannot acquire 
interest by any act or election after he is aware of the loss."10
The effect of s.6 was considered in Cepheus Shipping Corporation v. Guardian 
Royal Exchange Assurance Pic. (The "Capricorn"),11 where Mance J observed that:
"Under s. 6 of the Marine Insurance Act, the plaintiffs' insurable interest in the 
subject-matter insured (here freight or other income from trading) must have 
existed at the time of the loss though no such interest need exist when the 
insurance is effected."12
4.2.2. Lack of Insurable Interest as a Defence
Lack of insurable interest constitutes a "technical" defence for an insurer against his
insured and, therefore, the issue of lack of insurable interest should be raised by the
insurer as a defence. In other words, "the onus is upon the insurer to either put the
1 ^insured to poof of his insurable interest or deny it." Such a defence, however, is not 
favoured by English courts. For example, Mance J has observed:
10 The matter is different in respect of life assurance. Insurable interest is required therein at the time of 
effecting the policy. See, Dalby v India and London Life Assurance Co (1807) 9 East 72; Robert 
Merkin, "Gambling by insurance -  a study of the Life Assurance Act 1774" (1980) 9 Anglo-American 
LR 331; John Birds' & Norma Hird, Birds' Modern Insurance Law, (6th ed.), 2004, at p. 36; Nicholas 
Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, parag. 
1-32; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrine and Principles, (2nd ed.), 2005, p. 152.
11 [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 622.
12 Ibid, at p. 641.
13 Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag.
1.27.
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"If underwriters make a contract in deliberate terms which covers their assured 
in respect of a specific situation, a Court is likely to hesitate before accepting a 
defence of lack of insurable interest."14
Hence, the insured is not obliged, in principle, to state his interest in the contract of 
insurance.15 In Macaura v. Northern Assurance Company Ltd case,16 the insurer did 
successfully reject the insured's, who was the sole share holder in his company, claim
i non the basis of the lack of insurable interest in the company's asset. Bird and Hird
noted that, the insurers, in Macaura, did not reject the insured's claim on the ground
of lack of insurable interest as they recognised that the policy was valid, but because
they did not accept that the insured did have, at the time of loss, the interest necessary
1 8required in such a contract of indemnity.
However, while an insurer in England is able to support his claim against his 
insured for the lack of insurable interest in a case similar to Macaura, the issue is
14 The Capricorn [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 622, at p. 641.
15 Mackenzie v. Whitworth (1874-75) LR Ex. 142, 148. See, Stock vlnglis (1883-84) LR 12 QBD 564, 
where Lord Brett MR held, at p. 571, that,
"In my opinion it is the duty o f a Court always to lean in favour of an insurable interest, if  possible, for 
it seems to me that after underwriters have received the premium, the objection that there was no 
insurable interest is often, as nearly as possible, a technical objection, and one which has no real merit, 
certainly not as between the assured and the insurer. Of course we must not assume facts which do not 
exist, nor stretch the law beyond its proper limits, but we ought, I think, to consider the question with a 
mind, if the facts and the law will allow it, to find in favour of an insurable interest."
See, also, Malcolm Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (4th ed.), 2002, sec. 4-ID. Professor 
Clarke observes that, "...but that is a defence that he [the insurer] is slow to raise, because it is bad for 
the image of the industry to take what is widely perceived as a technical defence, and courts are ill 
disposed to companies that take premiums and then cry "no contracts"."; Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., 
John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, ibid, parag. 1-13.
16 [1925] A. C. 619.
17 See the facts in section 3.2.1.1, supra.
18 John Birds & Norma Hird, Bird's Modern Insurance Law, (6th ed.). 2004, at p. 59. Thus, this case 
shows the difference between the contractual requirement of interest and the statutory requirement of 
interest as they both will be illustrated below.
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differently viewed in Supreme Court's decision in Constitution Insurance Co o f  
Canada v Kosmopoulos}9
Unlike Macaura, the sole share holder in a company, Mr. Kosmopoulos, had 
insurable interest in the company's asset and, therefore, the insurer could not escape 
liability to indemnify the insured for the asset's destruction by claiming that the 
insured did not have insurable interest in the company's asset. Furthermore, in the 
case that the insurer does not plead lack of insurable interest and stays silent "there is
90effectively a presumption in favour of there being an interest."
Lowry and Rawlings argue that, modem insurers can insert questions in the 
proposal forms regarding the relationship between the proposer and the property that 
is intended to be insured which make them make their decisions whether or not to 
accept the risk.21 Thus, "the duty of disclosure, which places the insurer in an 
advantageous position when compared with parties in non-insurance contracts, makes 
it difficult to justify a situation in which the insurer can freely enter into the contract 
on the basis of full disclosure and still deny liability because of a lack of insurable 
interest."22 Therefore, Lowry and Rawlings are of the opinion that it is wrong to allow 
the requirement of insurable interest "to be used as a technical defence in 
circumstances which bear no relation to its original policy objectives."23
19(1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2. See the facts in section 3.2.1.2, supra.
20 Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag.
1.27.
21 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", in Sarah Worthington, 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2004), 335, at p. 362.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid, at p. 364.
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It seems that, the defence of lack of insurable interest depends on the scope or 
description of insurable interest in a jurisdiction.24
4.2.3 The Effect o f Lack o f Insurable Interest upon Return of Premium
Where a policy is void due to lack of insurable interest or where the policy has been 
avoided by the insurer, the only possible remedy from the part of the insured is the 
return of premium. Section 84 (1) of MIA 1906 enacts that:
"Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and 
there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, the 
premium is thereupon returnable to the assured."
Furthermore, section 84 (3) (a) provides that:
"Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the 
commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that there has 
been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not 
apportionable, and has once attached, the premium is not returnable."
Section 84 (3) (c) goes on to states that:
24 See the two descriptions of insurable interest, i.e. Eldon's legal interest and Lawrence's factual 
expectation, which are adopted in common law system in Lucena v Craufurd (1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. (N. 
R.) 269, 127, ER 630. per Lord Eldon and Lawrence J.
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"Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency of the 
risk, the premium is returnable, provided that his rule does not apply to a 
policy effected by way of gaming or wagering."
In the light of section 84 of MIA 1906 and its sub-sections, Merkin sets out three 
situations where insurable interest is lacked of.
1) Where an insured does not possess insurable interest at the time of concluding the 
contract, but he is expecting to obtain an interest during the currency of his insurance 
policy. Here, it does not mean that the policy was made by way of gaming or 
wagering should the insured could not obtain the interest, it means, nevertheless, that 
the consideration for the payment of the premium has totally failed. In other words,
9Sthe policy is invalid due to the non-existence of a considerable insurable interest. As 
a result of that, the insured it entitled to recover the premium that he has paid from his 
insurer pursuant to ss.84 (1) and 84 (3) (c) of MIA 1906.26 The same rule applies 
where the insured possesses an insurable interest at the time of taking out the policy 
on his goods, for example, but loses it during the currency of the policy because he 
sells the goods. Here, the consideration would not have totally failed and, therefore,
97the insurer should return the premium to the insured.
25 Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag. 
1.29.
26 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0482 and A- 
0507.
27 See, Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, 
parag. 1.29, where it is noted, in footnote (2) at p. 14, that, "unless the contract is divisible (in the sense 
that the contract reveals that premium is assessed monthly or can be attributed to the period of cover 
which has failed), a claim in restitution cannot be maintained."
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2 8Thus, in Newbury International Ltd. v. Reliance National Insurance Co., the 
plaintiffs were the assureds under two policies. The insurer undertook to indemnify 
the assureds in respect of their contractual liability in the event Russell Ingall, a well 
known racing driver, achieves a top three series position after the 12th race in the 
1992/1993 New Zealand International Formula Ford Series. In the first policy the sum 
insured was £425,000. In the second policy the sum insured was £66,000. Russell 
Ingall came in first in every single race in the 12 race series, but he was not declared 
the winner in the last race because he was disqualified. The assureds claimed under 
the policies, but the insurer rejected the claim. It was argued that the assureds suffered 
no loss; that the liability of the assureds was contingent on the receipt of the moneys 
from the insurer and since they had not received any moneys under the policies they 
were under no liability to make payment to anyone else. The issue was whether or not 
these policies represented true policies of insurance or whether they were in reality 
simply wagering contracts without any insurable interest. Hobhouse J. declared that 
the assureds lacked insurable interest, but they were entitled to retain the premiums. 
In his words, Hobhouse J. observed that,
"...on the face of it Newbury International themselves have suffered no loss as 
a result of being unable to recover under the policies save that the premiums 
have been wasted but as previously stated, in the light of my decision of the 
dispute as between Newbury International and Reliance, Newbury 
International will receive back those premiums which are presently being held 
in an interest bearing escrow account."29
2) Where an insured takes out an insurance policy without possessing insurable
28 [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 83.
29 Ibid, at p. 92.
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interest nor is he having any expectation of acquiring insurable interest, the policy is 
deemed to be made by way of gaming or wagering as it is described by s.4 (2) (a). 
Therefore, by virtue of s.84 (3) (c) the insured is deprived of recovering the
30premium.
3) Where an insured has actually an insurable interest or an expectation of acquiring 
an insurable interest; therefore the policy, according to s.4 (a) MIA 1906, is valid, but 
because the policy has been made in "ppi" form, the policy is void pursuant to s.4 (b) 
MLA 1906. Consequently, the insured has no right of restitution of his premium under 
s. 84 (3) (c) MIA 1906. In Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office, 
Lawrence J. dealt with a case evolved a marine policy in "ppi" form and he explained 
the reason of inserting a term "ppi" in an insurance policy. According to him, that 
does not mean that the insured does not possess an insurable interest according to s.4
(a). In his words,
"... the term p.p.i. in a policy does not necessarily indicate that the assured has 
no insurable interest or does not expect to acquire an insurable interest. That 
term is inserted because the insurable interest is such that a loss in respect of 
it, though real, would be difficult to prove or assess. By the addition of such a
30 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0482. See,
also, Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th 
ed.), 2003, parag. 8-27, where is stated that it was held in Brophy v N. American Life Ass. Co. (1902)
32 S.C.R. 261, a Canadian case that, "where a company had insured in the belief that the assured had 
an insurable interest, and subsequently during the currency of the risk discovered that he had no such 
interest, it might apply to the court for cancellation of the contract, and was not bound to return the 
premium where the policy amounted to an illegal wagering contract."
Robert Merkin, ibid.
32 [1922] 2 Ch. 67, (1922) 10 LI. L. Rep. 370.
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term to the contract the underwriters agree to release the assured, in the event 
of a claim, from the difficulty and expense of proving his interest."
Lawrence J. clearly declared that where a policy was made by way of gaming or 
wagering, such policy would not be illegal, but only void.34 Accordingly, he ruled 
that,
"The policies as issued were in substance and in fact p.p.i. policies and the 
effect of attaching the p.p.i. clause was in my judgment to render the policies 
void by virtue of the provisions of s. 4 of the Act of 1906. In my judgment 
therefore, unless the assured can succeed in their claim for rectification, all the 
policies to which the p.p.i. clause was attached at the time of issue are void."
However, Lawrence did allow the insured to recover his premiums.36 In this regard, 
Merkin observes that, "It is certainly difficult not to have sympathy with this 
approach, as the assured who has a legitimate insurable interest but who cannot claim
33 Ibid, at p. 71. In other occasion he said that,
" In my opinion the fact that the policies contain the p.p.i. clause does not of itself prove that the 
assured has no insurable interest in the subject matter of the insurance, or that the policies are gaming 
or wagering policies, as that clause may have been inserted on account of some difficulty in proving 
interest." At p. 79.
Note that, insurance policies that were made by way of gaming and wagering were illegal under MIA 
1745. See, Raoul Colinvaux, Amould’s Law o f  Marine Insurance and Average, Vol. I, (16th ed.), 
(1981), parag. 389, p. 263. It seems that inserting "ppi" terms in insurance policies was a usual practice 
in marine insurance. P.O. Lawrence J. observed that, " It has become usual to add a p.p.i. clause (when 
required) by means of a slip bearing the following form of words: "This slip is no part of the policy and 
is not to be attached thereto, but is to be considered as binding in honour on the underwriters: the 
assured however having permission to remove it from the policy should they so desire."
34 Ibid, at p. 73.
35 Ibid, pp. 82-83. It is of significance to note the issue that was arisen by P.O. Lawrence in respect of 
that, "whether the claimants are entitled to have these policies rectified by striking out the p.p.i. 
clause." In such circumstances, a Court would reject any possibility of rectification. P.O. Lawrence was 
of the opinion that,
"... the claim for rectification cannot possibly succeed as there is no evidence whatever o f a common 
or even of a unilateral mistake. The reason why the company attached the p.p.i. clause to these policies 
is because the closing instructions expressly stipulated that the policy should be a p.p.i."
36 Ibid, at p. 85.
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under the policy because of its form has probably been punished enough. A further 
consideration is that the reason for the policy being in "ppi" form is at least as much 
to do with the insurer's drafting practices as with the assured's desires, and it seems 
inappropriate that the insurer -  or its liquidator- should have a windfall of the 
premiums in those circumstances."37
4.2.4. Contractual and Statutory Requirements o f Interest
It has been said that there are two kinds of interest which are, namely, contractual 
interest, (or insurable interest that required by the character of the contract of
‘JO
insurance itself) and statutory requirement of interest. In the case of lack of 
contractual interest, an insurer would have a defence against his insured where the 
latter has no insurable interest at the time of the loss at all or the interest is not 
sufficient to meet the standard of insurable interest that is required by law. Therefore, 
the policy would not be enforceable by the insured. Nonetheless, if  the insurer 
chooses not to deny the insured’s insurable interest, the insured would be able to 
enforce the policy.40 In respect of statutory requirement of insurable interest:
"Whether the terms of the contract demand an insurable interest or not, an 
interest of some kind and to some extent is required directly or indirectly by
37 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin''s Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0482.
38 Nicholas Legh-Jones, John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, 
parag. 1-11, 1-13 & 1-17.
9 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. [1925] A.C. 619, 632.
40 Nicholas Legh-Jones, John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, 
parag. 1-13.
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statute in every contract of insurance, and the contract will be void, and in 
some cases illegal if the requisite interest is absent.”41
According to Birds and Hird, the LAA 1774 is not likely to be regarded as 
applicable to any indemnity insurance.42 Thus, the only relevant statutory requirement 
is the prohibition on gaming or wagering and the requirement of insurable interest that 
is implied into the contract of insurance as a consequence of the nature of the 
principle of indemnity which requires an insured to show his loss at the time of the 
occurrence of the risk 43 It has to be borne in mind, of course, that the requirement of 
insurable interest in s.4 of MIA 1906 provides a certain kind of interest, i.e. legal or 
equitable interest, which constitutes a statutory requirement of interest for marine 
policies. This provision has aided judges in non-marine cases, more particularly in 
relation to indemnity insurance generally. Therefore, it has been held that,
’’Anybody who sues on a policy can only sue in respect of his own interest 
unless by special provisions, the law allowing it, the policy is made for the 
sake of another, or unless some statute says the policy shall ensure for the 
benefit of somebody else."44
41 Ibid, parag. 1-17. See, Chitty on Contracts, Vol. II, (28th ed.), 1999, s. 41-010.
42 Mark Rowlands Ltd v Berni Inns Ltd  [ 1986] QB 211, at p. 227 per Kerr J. It is interesting to note 
that, before the LAA 1774, it had been held in Sadler's Co vBadcock (1743) 2 Atk 554, that insurable 
interest in buildings had been required at the time of the policy. However, in Re King, Robinson v Gray 
[1963] Ch 459, Lord Denning MR, at p. 485, noted that it was dismissed that the LAA 1774 did apply 
to buildings insurance. See, John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrine and Principles, 
(2nd ed.), 2005, p. 151.
43 John Birds & Norma Hird, Bird's Modern Insurance Law, (6th ed.). 2004, at pp. 58-59.
44 Cosford Union v Poor Law and Local Government Officers' Mutual Guarantee Association Ltd 
(1910) 103 LT 463, at 465, per Phillimore J., cited in E. R. Hardy Ivamy, Dictionary o f  Insurance Law, 
(London, Butterworths, 1981), at p. 66.
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4.2.5. Waiver of Proof of Insurable Interest
An important issue is whether the requirement of proof of insurable interest can be 
waived. According to Lowry and Rawlings, the question of whether an insurer can 
waive insurable interest has been left open by English decisions.45 Nonetheless, in 
relation to the contractual interest, the insurer is able to waive proof of interest by not 
denying the insured's interest where the latter claims on his policy, so long as the 
interest arises out of the nature of the insurance and not statutory 46 Thus, in Williams 
v Baltic Insurance Association o f London f  Mr Eric Bransby Williams, the owner of 
a motor car, took out a policy of insurance by which the insurers agreed to indemnity 
him against damage to, or loss of, his motor car, and (by cl. 2) "against all sums for 
which the insured (or any licensed personal friend or relative of the insured while 
driving the car with the insured's general knowledge and consent) shall become 
legally liable in compensation for .... accidental bodily injury caused to any person." 
During the currency of the policy and while the insured's sister, Miss Bransby 
Williams, a licensed driver, was driving the car with his general knowledge and 
consent of the insured, an accident happened which caused personal injuries to third 
parties. The injured parties recovered damages against her. The insured, therefore, 
claimed that the insurers were liable under the policy to indemnify his sister and to 
pay to her or to him as trustee for her the amount of those damages. The insurer, 
however, rejected the claim on the ground that the insured incurred no liability by the 
accident, and consequently he cannot recover. Nor had Miss Bransby Williams any
45 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, 2004, p. 312.
46 Nicholas Legh-Jones, John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, 
parag. 1-16.
47 [1924] 2 KB 282.
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interest in the event. She had no interest in the car itself apart from the bare possibility 
that she might be allowed sometimes to drive it. That was a mere chance, which gave 
her no interest; certainly not at the essential date - namely, when the policy was 
effected.48 Nevertheless, Roche J rejected the insurer's argument and observed that:
"On the question of interest Mr. Claughton Scott [counsel for the insured] said 
that Mr. Bransby Williams was interested in Miss Bransby Williams's 
immunity from claims, and that she was herself interested in her protection 
against claims; further that she was interested as the driver of the motor car in 
respect of the motor car itself. I do not decide these points, but I think there is 
a great deal in them. With regard to the last point it will be noted that in the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, a person is interested in a marine adventure who 
(inter alia) may incur liability in respect thereof."49
Thus he held that,
"The general argument that Mr. Bransby Williams cannot recover for Miss 
Bransby Williams because the latter cannot recover for herself, is based upon 
this, that the insured is Mr. Bransby Williams. That, I think, is begging the
48 The insurer relied on Life Assurance Act 1774, that s.l of the Act makes null and void insurances on 
the life of any person or on any event, wherein the assured has no interest. Sect. 2 states that: ".... It 
shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies on the life or lives of any person or persons, or other 
event or events, without inserting in such policy or policies the person or persons name or names 
interested therein, or for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or 
underwrote." Sec.3 provides that no greater sum shall be recovered from insurers than the amount or 
value of the interest of the insured. Sect. 4: "Provided always that nothing herein contained shall 
extend, or be construed to extend, to insurances bona fide made by any person or persons, on ships, 
goods, or merchandises; but every such insurance shall be as valid and effectual in the law as if this Act 
had not been made." Roche J, however, rejected the insurer's argument in this regard on the ground that 
the 1774 Act did not apply in that case and it was sufficient to prove the loss at the time of the 
commencement of the risk because the insurance was on a car which is considered as goods, thus, it 
was excepted by s.4 of LAA 1774. At pp. 289-90.
49 Ibid, p. 290.
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question. Mr. Bransby Williams is the insured in the sense that he is the person 
who effected the insurance, but it is an insurance for himself and the other 
persons mentioned in cl. 2, and, accordingly, the company's contract is to 
indemnify all such persons in the event of those things happening against 
which the insurance is effected."50
In the light of the facts of the above case, cl. 2 constituted a wavier by the insurer of 
proof of interest by the insured. Likewise, in Prudential Staff Union v. Hall,51 the 
union effected a policy of insurance with Lloyd's underwriters covering the loss by 
any of its members by certain perils, including burglary and house-breaking, of any 
moneys held by them as agents or collectors of the company. The policy described the 
union as "the assured" and the underwriters contracted to pay the union in case of a 
loss occurring within the policy. The underwriters had previously paid the union in 
respect of claims made on behalf of members and had represented that it was proper 
for the union to present such claims. The assured claimed indemnity for loss by 
burglary of moneys held by two of its members for the company, the defendant 
underwriters pleaded that the union had no insurable interest and, therefore, they 
could not sue. That the action should have been brought by the members who claimed 
to have suffered the loss. Although the Court admitted that the union lacked insurable 
interest, Morris J held that,
"In my judgment, the alleged loss is one in relation to which the union are 
entitled to sue, because the defendant contracted to pay to the union. No doubt 
the union would regard themselves as trustees for the particular members of
50 Ibid.
51 [1947] KB 685. See also, Waters v Monarch Life and Fire Assurance Co (1856) 5 El & B1 870; 
Thomas v National Farmers' Union Mutual Insurance Society [1961] 1 WLR 386.
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any amount recovered, so that those members could pay such amount in 
settlement of any claims made on them by their employers for moneys 
received or held on their behalf.. ,"52
Lowry and Rawlings comment case that, "By enlisting the trust device Morris J was 
able to circumvent any element of wagering thus avoiding any violation of public 
policy considerations."
So far as the statutory requirement of interest is concerned, the parties of an 
insurance contract are not allowed to waive the illegality or nullity by inserting a 
clause in the policy or otherwise.54 A court will not enforce an insurance policy that is 
made without an insurable interest even if the insurer does not, in fact, arise this point, 
at the litigation, as a defence against the insured.55 Thus, in Gedge v Royal Exchange 
Assurance Corporation,56 for instance, the plaintiff insured took out an insurance 
policy to be indemnified against loss with regard to non-arrival by a ship at a certain 
date in a certain port. The Court found that the policy was a "ppi" policy and was, 
therefore, illegal under s.l of Marine Insurance Act 1745.57 Although the insurer did 
not plead the invalidity of the policy, Kennedy J. ruled that,
52 Ibid, p. 691.
53 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, 2004, p. 312. See, further, 
John Birds & Norma Hird, Birds' Modern Insurance Law, (6th ed.), 2004, pp. 58-60.
54 Nicholas Legh-Jones, John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, (10th ed.), 2003, 
parag. 1-17.
Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag. 
1.27; Chitty on Contracts, Vol. II, (28th ed.), 1999, s. 41-010.
56 [1900] QB 214.
57 Section 1 of MIA 1745 stated that,
"No assurance or assurances shall be made by any person or persons, bodies corporate or politick, on 
any ship or ships belonging to His Majesty, or any of his subjects, or on any goods, merchandises, or 
effects, laden or to laden on board of any such ship or ships, interest or no interest, or without further 
proof of interest than the policy, or by way o f gaming or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the 
assurer; and every such assurance shall be null and void to all intents and purposes."
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"Their counsel [the plaintiffs'] argued that the illegality was not pleaded by the 
defendants [insurer]; in my opinion that makes no difference... No Court 
ought to enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of 
enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract or transaction which is 
illegal, if the illegality is duly brought to the notice of the Court, and if the 
person invoking the aid of the Court is himself implicated in the illegality. It 
matters not whether the defendant has pleaded the illegality or whether he has 
not. If the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality, the Court 
ought not to assist him."58
Furthermore, s. 18 of Gaming Act 1845 renders void every contract of insurance 
made without interest or, at least, a reasonable expectation of acquiring an interest "in 
the occurrence of the future risk or event other than the amount which will be won or 
lost under the contract."59
However, it has been expected that Gambling Act 2005 will enter into force from 1 
September 2007, which means that s. 18 of Gaming Act 1845 will be repealed. 
Therefore, it is necessary, at this stage, to consider, firstly, the effect of s. 18 of 
Gaming Act 1845 and, then, the effect of Gambling Act 2005 on the requirement of 
insurable interest in property insurance.
58 [1900] QB 214, at p. 220. See also, Griffiths v Fleming [1909] 1 KB 805, 820; Cheshire & Co. v 
Vaughan & Co. [1920] 3 KB 240,251, 255-256; Newbury International v Reliance National Insurance 
Co [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 83, 85.
59 Lord Justice Mance, lain Goldrein and Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (2nd ed.), 2003, parag.
1.8 .
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4.3. The Effect of Gaming Act 1845, s. 18
It has been said that effecting an insurance policy without an insurable interest was 
legal in England until middle of the 18th century.60 However, s.4(l) of Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 makes effecting insurance policies "by way of gaming or 
wagering" void and s.4(2) describes the cases where an insurance policy is deemed to 
be made by way of gaming or wagering.61 Additionally, Life Assurance Act 1774
fOrenders insurance policies without insurable interest not only void, but also illegal. 
Parliament, moreover, has passed Gaming Act 1845 to make all wager contracts void 
by section 18 of Gaming Act 1845, which provides that,
"All contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of 
gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or 
maintained in any court of law and or equity for recovering any sum of money 
or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager..."
The Act does not define a wagering contract, but the contract has been defined by 
Hawkins J in Carlill v. The Carbolic Smoke Ball C o m p a n y that,
"one by which two persons, professing to hold opposite views touching the 
issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that, dependent upon the
60 In particular, until the application of Marine Insurance Act 1745. See section 2.3.1, supra. In fact 
wagers, at that time, were legal and enforceable. See, John Birds' & Norma Hird, Birds' Modern 
Insurance Law, (6th ed.), 2004, at p. 34.
61 See section 4.2, supra.
62 Section 1 of LAA 1774.
63 See Chitty on Contracts, Vol. II, (29th ed.), 2004, ch. 40.
64 [1892] 2 QB 484.
141
determination of that event, one shall win from the other, and that other shall 
pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither of the 
contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or 
stake he will so win or lose, there being no other real consideration for the 
making of such contract by either of the parties. It is essential to a wagering 
contract that each party may under it either win or lose, whether he will win or 
lose being dependent on the issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining 
uncertain until that issue is known. If either of the parties may win but cannot 
lose, or may lose but cannot win, it is not a wagering contract."65
Merkin discusses the meaning of "by way of gaming or wagering." A wagering 
contract needs the attention of both parties to wager which means it would be difficult 
to find, outside insurance, many situations where one party is wagering and the other 
is not. He argues that, "If mutuality is a requirement, it is apparent that the Gaming 
Act, s. 18 will have little, if any, impact, as insurers are not gamblers within the 
generally accepted meaning of the word."66 He concludes that s.4(2)(b) of MIA 1906 
has no relevance outside the marine context,67 where it is obvious that an insurer 
intends to wager.68
65 Ibid, at pp. 490-91.
66 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0392.
67 The section provides that,
"A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering contract-...
(b) Where the policy is made "interest or no interest", or "without further proof of interest than the 
policy itself', or "without benefit of salvage to the insurer", or subject to any other like term:
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be effected without benefit of 
salvage to the insurer."
68 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0392. 
Professor Merkin adds that, "MIA 1906, s.4(2)(b) operates to avoid a "ppi" or equivalent policy 
whether or not the assured has an interest, whereas it is unlikely that the Gaming Act 1845, s. 18 would 
apply to a case in which the assured himself has an interest and is not wagering."
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According to Merkin, an insurance policy could be by way of gaming or wagering 
where the assured alone intends to gamble. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to amount 
to a wager where the assured does not possess an insurable interest as he might have 
acquiring an interest in future, but where he does not have expectation of acquiring an 
interest, the Gaming Act 1845, s. 18 would apply to the insurance contract.69
Despite the fact that Gaming Act 1845, s. 18 has its impact upon insurance contracts, 
it is necessary to examine the effect of Gambling Act 2005 which renders wagering 
contracts enforceable.
69 Ibid. See, also, Chitty on Contracts, (28th ed., 1999), ss. 41-012,40-018,40-027.
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4.4. The Effect of Gambling Act 2005
It has been mentioned that all contracts that are made by way of gaming or wagering 
have been null and void in England by section 18 of Gaming Act 1845.70 However, 
section 18 of Gaming Act 1845 has been repealed by section 334(1 )(c) of Gambling 
Act 2005 which provides that,
(1) The following shall cease to have effect-
(c) section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 (c. 109) (voiding of gaming 
contracts).
Furthermore, section 335 of Gambling Act 2005 renders gaming, or gambling, 
contracts enforceable. It states that,
"(1) The fact that a contract relates to gambling shall not prevent its 
enforcement.
(2) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to any rule of law preventing the 
enforcement of a contract on the grounds of unlawfulness (other than a 
rule relating specifically to gambling)."
It can be said that, s.335 (2) constitutes a saving for "any rule of law preventing the 
enforcement of a contract on the grounds of unlawfulness" unless the unlawfulness is 
based upon a rule relating specifically to gambling. As consequences of Gambling 
Act 2005, Merkin notes that, "(a) gambling contracts are valid; (b) any rule of law that
70 See section 2.3.2, supra. See, also, Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, 
Vol. I, parag. A-0392. Professor Merkin argues that, "It has yet to be decided whether the assured's 
expectation of acquiring an interest must be reasonable although, given that the test of wagering is 
subjective, it would seem that the assured's honest belief that he might acquire an interest is enough to 
save the policy from the taint of wagering."
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does not relate specifically to gambling and that renders the contract unlawful remains 
operative; and (c), by way of exception to (b), any rule of law that relates specifically 
to gambling and that renders the contract unlawful ceases to have effect.”71
Therefore, as for the requirement of insurable interest in life insurance the rule is 
saved and remains applicable. Pursuant to the LAA 1774, an insured must possess
77insurable interest at the date of effecting the policy and failing to do so is unlawful.
79However, in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co o f Canada, Waller L.J. observed that 
"the gambling was not the antithesis of insurable interest."74 According to Merkin, "A 
contract struck down by the 1774 Act is not, therefore, a gambling contract, but 
simply one that is not supported by insurable interest. It might be thought on this 
basis", he said, "that the Gambling Act 2005, s.335 (1) has no effect on the statutory 
insurable interest requirement for life assurance. Even if that is wrong, then the LAA 
1774 is preserved by s.335(2) because it sets out a rule of law that provides for 
unlawfulness and it is not a statute that relates specifically to gambling."75 Thus, this 
rule applies to any insurances policy that fall within the scope of LAA 1774.
As far as marine insurance policies are concerned, it has been mentioned that s.4(l) 
of MIA 1906 renders a policy that is made "by way of gaming or wagering" void and 
s.4(2) illustrates positions where an insurance policy is deemed to be made "by way of
71 Robert Merkin, ibid, parag. A-0393; R. Merkin, "Insurable Interest: The repeal of the prohibition on 
gambling", (Dec. 2005) Insurance Law Monthly 4, at p. 5.
72 Dalby v India & London Life Assurance Co (1854) 15 CB 365; Robert Merkin, ibid, parag. A-0393. 
For more discussion on this, see, Robert Merkin 'Gambling by insurance- a study of the Life Assurance 
Act 1774' (1980) 9 Anglo- American LR 331.
73 [2003] EWCA (Civ) 885, [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 637.
74 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin's Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0393
15 Ibid
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gaming or wagering." Further, the position in respect of insurance policies on goods is 
the same that applies in marine insurance policies.
An important issue is whether s.l of Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 
1909 has any effect on saving the requirement of insurable interest from being 
abolished?
Section 1 of Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 states that,
"(l)If-
(a) any person effects a contract of marine insurance without having any bona 
fide interest, direct or indirect, either in the safe arrival of the ship in 
relation on which the contract is made or in the safety or preservation of 
the subject matter insured, or a bona fide expectation of acquiring such an 
interest; or
(b) any person in the employment of the owner of a ship, not being a part 
owner of the ship, effects a contract of marine insurance in relation to the 
ship, and the contract is made 'interest or no interest', or 'without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself, or 'without benefit of salvage to the 
insurer', or subject to any other like term,
the contract shall be deemed to be a contract by way of gambling on loss by maritime 
perils, and the person effecting it shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable, on 
summary convection, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not
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7Aexceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, and in
77either case to forfeit to the Crown any money he may receive under the contract."
Thus, the 1909 Act criminalises taking out a marine insurance policy "by way of 
gaming or wagering." Having said that, the requirement of insurable interest in s.4 of 
MIA 1906 should be saved by s.335(2) of Gambling Act 2005 which states that,
"...without prejudice to any rule of law preventing the enforcement of a 
contract on the grounds of unlawfulness..."
In other words, the position here should be similar to that relating to life assurance 
policies under LAA 1774 which renders void and illegal the taking out of insurance 
policies within the scope of the 1774 Act without insurable interest. However, Merkin 
argues that s.4 of MIA 1906 does not render insurance policies without interest 
unlawful; it simply renders them void. He is of the opinion that, "s.335(2) does not 
apply to any rule of law which relates specifically to gambling, but this is precisely 
what s.4 does." Therefore, he thinks that, "It might be thought, therefore, that s.335 of 
the Gambling Act 2005 deprives s.4 of the 1906 Act of any effect."78
In so far as the application of 1909 Act is concerned, there is no authority that could 
be found on applying s.l of Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 on an 
insured who had gambled on an insurance policy. Davey observes that, "...the
76 Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 s.l (1) (amended by virtue of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1948 s.l (2); and the Criminal Justice Act 1982 ss.38,46). 'Standard scale' means the standard 
scale of maximum fines for summary offences as set out in the Criminal Justice Act 1982 s. 37 (as 
amended). See, Halsbury's Laws o f  England, Vol. 25 ,4th ed., (2003 Reissue), parag. 387; see also, 
parag. 22, note 9, "At the time at which this volume states the law, the standard scale is as follows: 
level 3, £1000."
77 (9 Edw. 7, c. 12).
78 Robert Merkin, "Insurable Interest: The repeal of the prohibition on gambling", (Dec. 2005)
Insurance Law Monthly 4, at p. 5.
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effecting of marine gambling policies is criminalised by the Marine Insurance 
(Gambling Policies) Act 1909." He notes, however, that, he "can find no reported 
prosecutions under this Act. Such prosecutions require the consent of the Attorney- 
General, and his office has confirmed that it has no record of this consent being 
granted."79
Merkin observes that "It is the case that the Marine Insurance (Gambling Act) 1909 
does create criminal offences in virtually all cases where the policy is made without 
interest under the MIA 1906, s.4. However, the 1909 Act does not of itself render 
policies without interest "unlawful" in the civil sense: the reason that they are 
unenforceable is not because they are criminal under the 1909 Act, but because they 
are void under the 1906 Act."80
In fact, there is no authority whatsoever repeals the Marine Insurance (Gambling 
Policies) Act 1909 which means that, the rule that gambling on insurance policies is 
illegal is still in effect notwithstanding the repeal of s. 18 of Gaming Act 1845. If this 
analysis is not agreed with, the principle of indemnity is always there to safeguard 
insurance policies from being gambled upon.81
79 James Davey "The reform of gambling and the future of insurance law" Legal Studies (2004) Vol. 24 
No. 4, 507, at 509 and note 15. In Moran v Lloyd’s [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 51, Lloyd J. said, at p. 54, 
that, " After the passing of the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act, 1909, it would, of course, 
have become necessary for a person charged with an offence under that Act by reason o f having 
effected such a policy to prove his interest. Otherwise he would have been liable to a maximum penalty 
of six months imprisonment." Davey notes that, the allegation in Moran case " would have fallen 
within the 1909 Act had they concerned marine and not aviation insurance."
80 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, Vol. I, (2002), parag. A-0393/1, note 
1, atp. 10362.
81 Robert Merkin, "Insurable Interest: The repeal of the prohibition on gambling", (Dec. 2005) 
Insurance Law Monthly 4, at p. 5. Professor Merkin observes that, "The indemnity principle is 
untouched by the 2005 Act and it remains the case that the assured must prove his loss when the peril 
occurs. There is little point, therefore, in the assured taking out a policy without interest given that he 
can never recover under it, assuming, of course, that there is no move to write policies on a ppi basis, a 
practice which was permitted by the common law in the marine context before 1745, when it was 
outlawed but only as regards marine policies."
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One more thing need to be said here is that, the principle of insurable interest is, 
actually, included in the principle of indemnity. That is to say, you cannot be 
indemnified for a loss of a property unless you are interested in it. Thus, it is the duty 
of law to form a clear definition of insurable interest and identify the time of its 
presence.
Under Islamic law, for instance, there is nothing preventing a son from looking after 
his dead father’s friend financially according to the father’s will because, in fact, that
89is an obligation on the son under Sharia. If, for example, the wealthy son buys a 
house for his father’s poor friend and registers it in the latter’s name, the son, on the 
face of thins, is not interested in the house; thus, under English law, he cannot insure 
the house in his name even if he pays the premium to an insurer. It is obvious, under 
legal interest test, that the son has no insurable interest in the house. Insurable 
interest under legal interest test is described by Lord Eldon as,
"a right in the property, or derivable out of some contract about the property, 
which in either case may be lost upon some contingency affecting the 
possession or enjoyment of the party.”84
However, it is arguable that the son is interested in the house under the factual 
expectation test which is presented by Lawrence J:
82 Under Islamic law of succession, a person is allowed to grant a non-successor person up to one third 
of his wealth. It is assumed in this hypothesis, there was an agreement between the father and the son 
that instead of granting one third o f the father's wealth to his poor friend, the son undertakes to look 
after the friend financially during the friend's life.
83 Lucena v Craufurd (1806), 2 B. & P. (NR.) 269, 127 ER, 630,per  Lord Eldon.
u  Ibid, at 321.
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"To be interest in the preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with 
respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its 
destruction. The property of a thing and the interest deviseable from it may be 
very different: of the first the price is generally the measure, but by interest in 
a thing every benefit and advantage arising out of or depending on such thing, 
may be considered as being as comprehended."85
Therefore, applying the notion of factual expectation test on this hypothesis, if the 
son could prove that he is so circumstanced with respect to the house as to have 
benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction, why could not he insure the 
house in his name, especially if he could prove his responsibility on looking after his 
father's friend according to the father's registered will and the fact that the son 
disclosed the position to the insurer at the stage of negotiation?
Furthermore, the principle of indemnity obliges the injured insured to show his loss 
when the risk insured against has actually occurred. Therefore, the insured will satisfy 
such a requirement where he shows his loss. In commercial activities, such a 
conclusion would be convenient due to its flexibility. Thus, the main role of the 
contract of insurance is to shift the risk from the insured to the insurer and that what 
the insured pays the premium for. Accordingly, in the above hypothesis, the friend is 
looked after by the son according to the father's will, consequently, the friend will not 
be able to reinstate the house where it is burnt down by an insured risk, i.e. fire and, 
therefore, the man will be homeless. If that is happened, the son is obligated either to
85 Ibid, at 301-2.
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reinstate the house or provide another accommodation to the friend, which means that, 
the son has an economic interest in the friend's house. Therefore, since the son pays 
the premium to the insurer to shift such a risk to the latter, the insurer cannot deny, 
when the risk insured against has occurred, the insured son's claim on the ground of 
lack of insurable interest. It could be argued, therefore, that the requirement of 
insurable interest, herein, could be described as a contractual requirement which could 
be waived by the insurer. In addition, should the insurer claims, at the litigation, that 
he could reject the insured's claim for wanting of proof of interest, a Court could 
reject it on the ground that the insured has disclosed all the essential facts which 
allowed the insurer to reject the claim at the time of the negotiation stage.
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4.5. Lack of Insurable Interest under Saudi Law
The matter is not clear under Saudi law due to the fact that insurance cases are not 
acceptable by Saudi Courts on the basis that insurance does not comply with the 
Sharia general rules.86 However, insurance disputes have been dealt with by Ministry 
of Commerce and Arbitration. Unfortunately, none of insurance cases that have been 
dealt with by these offices have been published. Furthermore, neither the Commercial 
Court Law 1931 nor the Co-operative Insurance Companies Control Law 2003 and its 
Implementing Regulations provide clear solutions in cases where insurable interest is 
lacking.
Therefore, it is assumed that lack of insurable interest would render an insurance 
contract void pursuant to the general practice of insurance disputes which will depend 
solely on views of various arbitrators or members who are appointed to resolve 
insurance disputes in the Saudi Ministry of Commerce who base their decisions on 
rules of foreign jurisdictions such as the UK.
86 See, generally, chapter six, infra.
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4.6. General Comments
The principle of insurable interest is a fundamental element in the contract of 
insurance and it cannot be abolished for any reason because it lies at the center of 
insurance. The principle of indemnity does not trigger in the contract unless there is 
an insurable interest possessed by an insured. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
principle of insurable interest is likely to be of little significance due to the principle 
of indemnity. Lowry and Rawlings are of the view that, "the principle of indemnity, 
which prohibits recovery to those who cannot establish proof of loss, is in itself 
sufficient to render the requirement [of insurable interest] redundant."87
Professor Clarke presents other more traditional reasons for the requirement of 
insurable interest.88 One reason is to stop people using insurance for gambling or 
wagering. In his opinion, using insurance for wagering is a thing of the past, but today 
there are "many more convenient devices available to the serious wagerer."89 Another 
reason is that; "people with insurable interest are less likely to succumb to temptation 
to bring about the loss insured against."90 He is of the view that a person who has a 
large debt might be tempted to insure other people’s property and then bum it when he 
needs insurance money, but the same temptation will not be where the insured insures 
his own property. He justifies his view for some motives. Firstly, sentiment or the 
inconvenience of being deprived of the property will secure that a temptation of such
87 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, "Re-thinking Insurable Interest", in Sarah Worthington, 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, (2004), 335, at p. 364.
88 Malcolm Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (4th ed.), 2002, parag. 4-2.
89 Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance Law in The Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, 
2005), at p. 36, cited from Constitution Ins. Co. vKosmopoulos [1987] 1 SCR 2, 22, per Wilson J.
90 Ibid.
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kind is resisted.91 Secondly, insurance on a property gives rise of 'moral hazard' which 
can be overrated where the countervailing factors of sentiment and inconvenience are 
ignored and the fact that insurers take long time to pay insurance money.92 Apart from 
that, according to him, fraudulent claims can be discovered by skilled investigators
Q-l
and unlikely to succeed.
It can be said that, insurers have many weapons which they use against their 
insureds to escape liability of making good their losses. Therefore, it seems that lack 
of insurable interest is the weakest weapon of insurers against their insureds. Clarke 
observes that, "in practice [insureds] will find it difficult to insure property of any 
value and in which they have no interest at all other than crime without falling foul of 
the rules about misrepresentation or non-disclosure. If they do insure it," he says, "and 
then bum it, they will find it impossible to obtain the insurance money without 
committing fraud."94 Thus, even if a fraudulent claim is successful, insurers are too 
slow to pay and, then, the enjoyment of the insurance money "is spoiled by 
unwelcome attention of the policy.95
Consequently, Clarke is of the opinion that the requirement of insurable interest 
either in its strict since, as the case under English law, or in its broad concept does not 
appear to serve its purpose. He thinks that people should be allowed to insure what 
ever they like.96
91 Ibid, at p. 37.
92 Ibid. Professor Clarke criticizes the manner of modem insurers in Britain in paying their insureds 
insurance monies and he gives an example for that, "in late 2003 a leading insurer confessed at a 
conference that its offices took between 500 and 1,200 days to settle claims under£2,500."
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, at p. 38.
96 Ibid.
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The opinion of Professor Clarke that people should be at liberty to insure other 
people's property is, in my opinion, correct. The reason is that, so long as an insured 
could prove his loss at the time of the claim by any legal evidence, there is no reason 
why his insurer rejects the claim as long as the principle of indemnity is, in fact, 
satisfied. The main role of insurance, as it has been mentioned, is to shift the risk from 
the insured to the insurer whose duty is promise to compensate the insured in the
07event that the loss does occur. If the insured proves his loss successfully about a 
property, it means he is economically interested in such property.
97 See section 3.2.2.2, supra.
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PART TWO: INSURANCE UNDER 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE AND 
SAUDI REGULATIONS
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Chapter Five: Law of Contract 
under Saudi Legal System
5.1. Introduction
This chapter outlines the concept of contract under the Saudi legal system and 
underlines how Saudi law deals with the law of contract to find out how Saudi 
jurisdiction deals with insurance contracts generally. That will necessarily lead to 
explore three elements that make a contract or a transaction unlawful. Those are, 
namely, Riba, usury, Gharar, uncertainty and May sir, gambling. However, it has to 
be noted that, chapter six will be devoted to discuss the position of the contract of 
insurance in the eyes of Islamic jurisprudence together with the position under the 
Saudi legal system. Furthermore, chapter six will examine whether the elements of 
Riba, Gharar and May sir do, in fact, exist in the contract of insurance? If they do, to 
what extent?
Therefore, section 5.2 outlines the principles that the Saudi legal system is based 
upon. Section 5.3 summarises the influence of Islamic law upon Saudi law. Definition 
of contract in Islamic jurisprudence and how Saudi jurisdiction deals with it will be 
discussed in section 5.4. The latter section will also include discussions on the 
motives of invalidating a contract in Sharia. In particular, it will explore the elements
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of Riba, usury, Gharar, uncertainty and May sir, gambling. Concluding comments 
take place in section 5.5.
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5.2. Saudi Legal System
Broadly speaking, Islamic Law, Sharia, is the sole source of the Saudi regulations. 
That is clearly indicated in the Saudi Basic Law 19921 which provides:
Article (1):
"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as 
its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and 
peace be upon him, are its constitution, ..."
Article (7) provides:
"Government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran and the 
Prophet's tradition."
Article (48) states:
"The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Sharia in the cases that are 
brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated in the Book 
(Quran) and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not 
contradict the Book or the Sunnah."
1 Royal Order No. (A/91). 27/8/1412 H., 1/3/1992.
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Having mentioned that Islamic Law is the basis and the sole source of Saudi Law, it 
is crucial, at this stage, to give a brief explanation about Islamic Law, Sharia, in order 
to understand how Saudi Law operates.
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5.3. The Essential Framework of Islamic Law
Briefly, by way of background, it could be noted that, Islamic Law consists of 
orders and prohibitions arising from the Quran and Sunnah. Quran3 is the Islamic 
holy book and it includes rules and principles regulating, for instance, relationships 
between God "Allah" and a person, Allah's servant,4 people with each other, and 
societies in general, relationships between people and their Governments and 
Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Sunnah is the Prophet Mohammad’s, peace be upon 
him, tradition, i.e. Prophet Mohammad’s, peace be upon him, statements, actions and 
decisions. It explains, supplements and interprets the general principles of Quran. For 
instance, Muslims are obliged to pray and to pay Zakat5 by the Quran as it provides:
2 In Arabic language it is called "Sharia" which is translated in English as Law. For more discussion on 
Islamic Law, see, for example, K. Faruki, Islamic Jurisprudence, (1962), p. 5; J. Nasir, The Islamic 
Law o f Personal Status, 2" ed., 19.
3 It is spelt also "Koran", and defined as: "the sacred writings of Islam revealed by God to the prophet 
Muhammad during his life at Makkah and Medina. The Koran is the sacred book of the Muslims 
(sometimes called Mohammedans by non-Muslims, a term considered offensive by some Muslims). It 
is the most important foundation on which Islam rests and it is held in the highest veneration by all 
Islamic sects. When being read it must be kept on a stand elevated above the floor. No one may read it 
or touch it without first making a legal ablution. It is written in the Arabic language, and its style is 
considered a model. The substance of the Koran is held to be uncreated and eternal. Mohammed was 
merely the person to whom the work was revealed. At first the Koran was not written, but entirely 
committed to memory. But when a great many of the best Koran reciters had been killed in battle,
Omar suggested to Abu-Bekr (the successor of Mohammed) that it should be written down. Abu-Bekr 
accordingly commanded Zeid, an amanuensis of the prophet, to commit it to writing. This was the 
authorized text until 23 years after the death of the prophet. A number of variant readings had, 
however, crept into use. By order o f the calif Osman in the year 30 of the Hejira, Zeid and three 
assistants made a careful revision which was adopted as the standard, and all the other copies were 
ordered to be burned. The Koran consists o f 114 suras or divisions. These are not numbered, but each 
one has a separate name. They are not arranged in historical order. These suras purport to be the 
addresses delivered by Mohammed during his career at Mecca and Medina. As a general rule the 
shorter suras, which contain the theology of Islam, belong to the Makkan period; while the longer ones, 
relating to social duties and relationships, to Medina. The Koran is largely drawn from Jewish and 
Christian sources, the former prevailing. Moses and Jesus are reckoned among the prophets. The 
biblical narratives are interwoven with rabbinical legends. The customs of the Jews are made to 
conform to those of the Arabians. Islamic theology consists in the study of the Koran and its 
commentaries. A very fine collection of Korans, including one in Cufic (the old Arabic character), is to 
be found in the Khedival Library at Cairo, Egypt." See, Online Dictionary website on, 
http://onlinedictionarv.datasegment.com/word/Quran.
4 That is worshipping of Allah by all manners such as praying, fasting Ramadhan, the holy month, and 
Paying Zakat, a specified sum of money in a particular time paid for a specified group of people.
5 Ibid.
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([110] And perform As-Salat (prayer) and give Zakat and whatever of 
good (deeds that Allah loves) you send forth for yourselves before you, 
you shall find it with Allah. Certainly, Allah is All-Seer of what you do.)6
But that are not described. Sunnah, however, describes the performance of praying, its 
conditions, its times, etc., and how and when should a Muslim pay Zakat.
Therefore, Quran and Sunnah are primary sources of Islamic Law which set out the 
general principles of Islamic Law, "Sharia". Furthermore, religious scholars are 
playing a significant role in interpreting and explaining those principles. An opinion 
of a scholar about an issue in respect of its legitimacy is called "Fatwa". The latter, 
analyses a new issue and identifies its principles, then, it compares them with the 
general principals of "Sharia". The scholar, thereafter, will be able to endeavour and 
make his opinion about the issue whether it is lawful, which is so called "Halal" or 
forbidden, which is so called "Haram" and that action is called "Ijtihad'1. There are
O
two main doctrines in Islamic Law and they are, namely, Sunni and Shi'ey.
Under Sunni doctrine there are different schools of law, namely, Maliki, Hanafl, 
Shafiy and Hanbali. In fact, an opinion about a case varies from one school to another 
and sometimes a view of a scholar on an issue differs from another in the same school 
of law, this difference is called "Ikhtilaff", bearing in mind that the difference is not 
about the principles, but about their interpretation and details. Furthermore, where 
scholars unanimously agree about a legitimacy of an issue in one period, it is called
6 Surat Al-Bagarah, I, verse 110.
7 See, J. Nasir, The Islamic Law o f  Personal Status, 2nd ed., (1990), p. 3.
8 The clearest example of a jurisdiction which adopts the Sunni doctrine is in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
Pakistan. However, Iran adopts the Shi'ey doctrine.
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"Ijmaa" which constitutes law and will bind Muslims.9Additionally, Islamic scholars 
operate, usually, "Qe'yas", analogy, in order to compare and examine principles of a 
new issue with the general principles of Sharia to make a judgement whether the new 
issue is lawful under Sharia or not. Thus, Ijmaa and Qe'yas constitute secondary 
sources of Islamic law.
In fact, most Islamic countries adopt the Sunni doctrine. Nevertheless, these 
countries follow different schools of law. For example, Maliki school is followed by 
Kuwait and Algeria, Hanafl school is followed by Egypt and Sudan, Shafly school is 
followed by Yemen. Saudi Arabia, however, follows the Hanbali school.
Judges, nevertheless, refer to fatwas about a case to explain its issues, especially, if 
the issue is new, such as insurance, and sometimes a judge finds several fatwas about 
a certain question and, of course, he has to make his judgment about it. Under such 
circumstances, he usually evaluates the fatwas, according to the school of law he 
belongs to, and justifies his decision once he makes his judgment.
9 J. Nasir, The Islamic Law o f  Personal Status, 2nd ed., (1990), at p. 22.
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5.4. The Concept of Contract in Saudi Law
Generally, there is no a precise regulation in Saudi law deals particularly with the 
law of contract. However, understanding the concept of contract is derived from the 
general understanding of contract by the orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, "The 
Sharia textbooks do not set out general principle of contract law, but instead detail the 
rules relating to a number of specific contracts, such as sale, hire, and loan 
agreements."10 Bearing in mind that, Islamic Sharia does not strictly nominate certain 
contracts to be lawful, but it obligates parties to avoid unlawful gaining of profits by 
complying with its general rules and avoiding particular forbidden elements.
Islamic Sharia, therefore, permits Muslims to conclude what ever contracts they 
desire according to their interests as long as those contracts do not contain any 
element that infringes Sharia principles. In addition, parties, under Sharia principles, 
are obligated to fulfill their duties that are arisen from their contracts. That is 
attributable to the general obligation in the Quran. Allah, glory to Him, said,
(O you who believe! Fulfil (your) obligations)11
Thus, in order to make lawful transactions, such transactions must be freed from 
illegal elements such as, for instance, riba, usury, gharar, uncertainty and maysir, 
gambling. The general principle in Sharia is that a person must not eat unlawfully 
other people's money. Allah, glory to Him, said,
10 Anderson Haberbeck and Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, (Surrey: Fairplay Publications,
1990), at pp. 9, 10.
11
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(O you who believe! eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good­
will: nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you 
Most Merciful!).12
As far as the definition of contract is concerned, Muslim jurists describe a bilateral
agreement, such as a sale contract, and a unilateral act, such as a will, as Aqd (pi.
1 ^Uqud), which means contract. As a matter of fact, most of Muslim jurists define 
contract as "the obligation of an offer given by one party to the acceptance given by 
the other party, in a way where its legal effect is expressed on the thing contracted 
upon."14 Or, contract is "a binding or a connection between the offer and the 
acceptance which fulfills certain criteria so that it has a legal effect."15
Baharum drew a comparison between English and Islamic laws regarding the 
concept of contract and he deduced that, "in comparison with English law, the Islamic 
concept of contract is wider. Under English law," he said, "a contract will not be valid 
unless it is concluded with at least two essential elements present: agreement of the
12 An-Nessa, 4, verse 29. See, M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f THE NOBLE 
QURAN, (1417 A.H, 1996-1997), at p. 310.
13 Fadi Moghaizel, Insurance in the Light o f Islamic Legal Principles, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University o f London, 1990), pp. 119-120. The author observed that, "Unlike 
Western system of law, the Sharia does not contain a general law of contract. Each contract is studied 
separately in the classical texts without the elaboration of a general theory applicable to all contracts. It 
is modem authors who have deduced from the rules which are common to various Islamic contracts a 
numbers of general principles in an attempt to build a comprehensive Islamic theory of contracts and 
obligations."
14 Salih A. Al-Kuhaimi, Contract Law and Judicial Law in Saudi Arabia, (PhD Thesis, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1982), p. 162.
15 Ibid, at p. 163.
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parties, and consideration. In Islamic law, by contrast, a contract may exist without 
the agreement of the other."16
As for regulating contracts in Saudi Arabia, Saudi authorities cannot, in principle, 
codify or enforce rules that are described as being against the general Sharia 
principles. Therefore, Saudi government, for example, could not enforce Saudi people 
on buying motor insurance at the time that Saudi eminent Muslim scholars were of the 
opinion that insurance was repugnant to Sharia}1 However, when the scholars 
decided that cooperative insurance does comply with the general rules of Sharia, the 
Saudi government enforced third party insurance and health insurance and presented 
them as cooperative insurances.18 Nevertheless, there is no evidence that cooperative 
insurance is, in fact, practiced. Instead, conventional or commercial insurance is the 
type of insurances that is actually adopted.
Therefore the government passed the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control 
Law 2003 and its implementation regulations as well as the National Cooperative 
Health Insurance Law 199919 and its implementation regulations,20 which regulate the 
Saudi insurance market.
16 Mohammad Ali Haji Baharum, Misrepresentation: A Study of English and Islamic Contract Law, 
(PhD Thesis, University o f Essex, 1986), p. 32.
17 Decision No. (10/5), 4/4/1397 A.H., 25/3/1977, Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi 
Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance),Vol. 4, (2001), 35, at p. 307. For further details on the status of 
insurance under Islamic jurisprudence and Saudi law, see chapter six, infra.
18 The enforcement of third party insurance (or driving license insurance) took a place on 15 Ramadan 
1423 H., 19 December 2002. Note that, both of motor and health insurances have been presented as 
cooperative insurances.
19 Royal Decree No. (M/10) 1/5/1420 H., 11/9/1999.
20 Ministerial resolution No. D/23/460 on 27/03/1423 H, 08/07/2002.
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5.4.1. Invalidity of Contract
A contract will be invalid in Saudi law where it is rejected by the general rules of 
Islamic Sharia. Thus, where the subject-matter of the contract is forbidden under 
Sharia, the contract is void under Saudi law. Accordingly, the sale of pork or alcohol 
is void under Saudi law because they are both forbidden under Sharia. Consequently, 
the Saudi courts refuse to deal with a contract that its subject-matter is, in fact, 
forbidden under Islamic law.
Furthermore, where a contract contains Riba, usury, a serious degree of Gharar, 
uncertainty or Maysir, gambling, such a contract will be void. Therefore, it is of 
significance, at this stage, to explore these three elements.
5.4.2. Riba
The element of Riba has been forbidden by the primary source of Sharia, i.e. Quran 
and Sunnah. Therefore, it is interesting to tackle the authority that forbids Riba and, 
then, explore the notion of Riba.
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5.4,2.1. Prohibition of Riba
Generally speaking, riba is forbidden in Quran and Sunnah.
Firstly, Allah, glory to Him, forbids riba in Quran in several occasions:
1- Allah, glory to Him, said in SurratAr-Rum (No. 30, V. 39):
(And that which you give in gift (to others), in order that it may increase 
(your wealth by expecting to get a better one in return) from other 
people's property, has no increase with Allah; but that which you give in 
Zakat seeking Allah's countenance, then those they shall have manifold 
increase).21
2- Allah, glory to Him, said in Surrat Al- Baqarah (No. 2, V. 275, 276, 278 and 
279):
([275] Those who eat Riba (usury) will not stand (one the Day of 
Resurrection) except like the standing of a person beaten by Shaitan 
(Satan) leading him to insanity. That is because they say: "Trading is only 
like Riba (usury)," whereas Allah has permitted trading and forbidden 
Riba (usury). So whosoever receives an admonition from his Lord and 
stops eating Riba (usury) shall not be punished for the past; his case is for 
Allah (to judge); but whoever returns [to Riba (usury)], such are the 
dwellers of the Fire they will abide therein.
21 M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f  THE NOBLE QURAN, (1417 A.H), (1996- 
1997), p. 545.
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[276] Allah will destroy Riba (usury) and will give increase for Sadaqat 
(deeds of charity, alms, etc.) And Allah likes not the disbelievers, sinners.
[278] O you who believe! Be afraid of Allah and give up what remains 
(due to you) from Riba (usury) (from now onward), if you are (really) 
believers.
[279] And if you do not do it, then take a notice of war from Allah and His 
Messenger but if you repent, you shall have your capital sums. Deal not 
unjustly (by asking more than your capital sums), and you shall not be 
dealt with unjustly (by receiving less than your capital sums.)22
3- Allah, glory to Him, said in Surrat Al-Imran (No. 3, V. 130)
(O you who believe! Eat not Riba (usury) doubled and multiplied, but fear 
Allah that you may be successful.)23
4- Allah, glory to Him, said in Surrat An-Nisa (No. 4, V. 161)
([160] For the wrong-doing of the Jews, We made unlawful for them 
certain good foods which had been lawful for them and for their 
hindering many from Allah's Way; [161] And their taking of Riba (usury) 
thought they were forbidden from taking it and their devouring of men's 
substance wrongfully (bribery). And We have prepared for the 
disbelievers among them a painful torment.)24
Secondly, Riba has been forbidden in Sunnah by Prophet Mohammad, may peace be
upon him. The following Hadiths are some of what was narrated about him.
22 Ibid, pp. 62, 63.
23 Ibid, p. 92.
24 Ibid, p. 137.
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1- Narrated Abu Saeed Al-Khudri: Once Bilal (one of the Prophet's companions) 
brought Barni (a kind of) dates to the Prophet, peace be upon him, and the Prophet 
asked him, "From where have you brought these?" Bilal replied, "I had some inferior 
kind of dates and exchanged two Sa (measure) of it for one Sa of Barni dates, in order 
to give it to the Prophet to eat." Thereupon the Prophet said, "Beware! Beware! This 
is definitely Riba (usury)! This is definitely Riba! Do not do so, but if you want to buy 
(a superior kind of dates) sell the inferior kind of dates for money and then, buy the 
superior kind of dates with that money."25
2- Narrated Abu Hurairah: The prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Avoid the seven 
great destructive sins." The people enquired, "O Allah's Messenger! What are they?" 
He said, "(1) To join others in worship along with Allah, (2) to practice sorcery, (3) to 
kill a person which Allah has forbidden except for a just cause (according to Islamic 
law), (4) to eat up Riba (usury), (5) to eat up an orphan's wealth, (6) to show one's 
back to the enemy and feeling from the battlefield at the time of fighting, (7) and to 
accuse chaste woman, who never even think of anything touching their chastity and
Of*are true believers."
3- Narrated Abu Saeed Al-Khudri: The prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Gold for 
gold, silver for silver, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, may 
be exchanged in such manner that they are equal measure for measure payment being
25 Ibid, footnote (2b), p. 63, {Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol.3, Hadith No. 506).
26 Ibid, footnote (lb), p. 92. {Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol.4, Hadith No. 28).
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made from hand to hand. If any one gives more or asks for more he has dealt in Riba. 
The receiver and the giver are equally guilty."27
Thirdly, Saudi law prohibits usury. For example, article (2) of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency Law states that,
"The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency shall not pay nor receive interest, but it 
shall only charge certain fees on services rendered to the public and to the 
Government, in order to cover the Agency's expenditures. Such fees shall be 
charged in accordance with a regulation passed by the Board of Directors and 
approved by the Minister of Finance.
The Agency shall not have a capital and shall, therefore, repay to the 
Government its entire capital."
5.4.2.2. Definition o f Riba
Riba is usually translated in English as "usury" or "interest". Saleh, however,
90 #observes that, riba in its Islamic context has broader sense. He defines it as,
27 Mohammad ibn Issa Al-Titmithi, Sunan Al-Tirmithi, Vol. 3, (Maktabat Mustafa Al-Halabi, Cairo- 
Egypt), (1956), p. 541; in SherifMadi M. Madi, The Concept o f  Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit 
in Islamic Law, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), (1989), at 
p. 96.
Royal Decree No. 23, 23/5/1977 H., 15/12/1957. See, also, Article (6) of Commercial Instruments 
Law, Royal Decree No. M/37, 11/10/1383, 25/2/1964. The article renders any stipulation on an interest 
in a commercial instrument null and void. It provides that: "A provision in the bill of exchange for 
payment of interest shall be null and void."
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"unlawful gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values 
in any transaction purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species.. 
which belong to the same genus...and are governed by the same efficient 
cause... Deferred completion of the exchange of such species, or even of 
species which belong to different genera but are governed by the same 
.. .efficient cause is also riba, whether or not the deferment is accompanied by 
an increase in any one of the exchanged counter-values."30
Accordingly, there are two categories of riba, namely, rida Al-Fadhil that is 
manifested in the unlawful excess of one of the counter-values, and riba An-Nase'ah
that is manifested in delaying completion of the exchange of the counter-values with
1 1
or without a profit or an increase. Riba is also described as, "any unjustified increase 
of capital, whether in loans or sales, for which no equal compensation or return is 
given."32
5.4.3. Gharar
The element of Gharar has been a significant issue in Islamic jurisprudence which 
affects the validity of onerous contracts. Sharia principles aim to achieve fare
29 See also, Sami Tamer, The Islamic Financial System, Economics and Management, Series V, (2005), 
p. 33. Tamer translates Riba as "unlawful gain"; at footnote 49, p. 33; Sherif Madi M. Madi, The 
Concept o f  Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London), (1989), at p. 85.
30 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 2nd ed., (1992), p. 16.
31 Ibid. The basic form of riba is riba Al-Jahilleyah or the pre-Islamic riba which appears in that where 
a lender asks his debtor at the due time of the payment of the debt whether he would pay or delay the 
payment with a particular increase of the debt. See, Nabil A. Saleh, ibid, at p. 17; Sherif Madi M. Madi, 
The Concept o f Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University o f London), (1989), at p.88; Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance, (2004), 
p. 38. The author explains both kinds of riba as that riba Al-Fadhil occurs when goods of similar kinds 
are exchanged with a disparity between them. Rib An-Nai'ah appears when there is a delay in 
performance.
2 Sherif Madi M. Madi, ibid, at p. 85.
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equivalence between parties in a transaction in order to avoid any dispute, as much as 
possible, that might be arisen by one of the parties. Therefore, it is important, at this 
stage, to go though Sharia authority in relation to forbidding Gharar in contracts and, 
then, explore Gharar as a concept.
5.4.3.1. Prohibition o f Gharar
1- Quran
Unlike the element of Riba, Gharar is not nominated in Quran, but the general 
prohibition of the element of Gharar could be derived from the following verse,
Allah, glory to Him, said,
(O you who believe! eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good­
will: nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you 
Most Merciful!).33
33 An-Nessa, 4, verse 29. See, M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f THE NOBLE 
QURAN, (1417 A.H), (1996-1997), at p. 310.
2- Sunnah
There are many Hadiths that have forbidden Gharar and some transactions that 
contain the element of Gharar.34 For example,
A- "Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported that Allah's Messenger (may 
peace be upon him) forbade (two types of transactions) Mulamasa and 
Munabadha."35
B- "Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported that Allah’s Messenger (may 
peace be upon him) forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, and the type 
which involves some uncertainty."36
C- "Ibn Abbas (Allah be pleased with them) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace 
upon him) as saying: He who buys food-grain should not sell it until he has taken 
possession of it."37
D- "Jabir Ibn Abdullah (Allah be pleased with them) is reported to have said that 
Allah messenger (may peace be upon him) forbade the sale of a heap of dates the 
weight of which is unknown in accordance with the known weight dates."
34 See, Imam Ahmad Ibn Ali Al-Asqalani, Fatih Al-Bari Shark Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, (Dar As- 
Salam, Riyadh-Saudi Arabia), (2000), pp. 450-55; Imam Shihab Ad-Deen Al-Qistalani, IrshadAs-Sari 
Shark Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, (Dar Al-Kutub Al-A'alamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), pp. 108-112.
35 Imam Muslim, Sahih Muslim, Vol. Ill, No. (3608), (Ashraf Printing Press, Pakistan, 1987), p. 797; 
see footnote 1970 & 1971, "Mulamasa means that a man touch another's garment of cloth or anything 
else without turning it over. Munabadha means that man throws his cloth to another, and the other 
throws his cloth to the first, thus confirming their contract without inspection or mutual agreement."
36 Ibid, No. (3614), at p. 798. Transactions by throwing stones were during pre-Islamic period where 
one of the parties either the seller or the buyer throw a stone to items and any item that is touched by 
the stone would be taken by the buyer and, therefore, the transaction would be binding.
37 Ibid, No. (3640), at p. 801.
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E- "Ibn Umar (Allah be pleased with them) reported that Allah’s Messenger (may 
peace be upon him) forbade the sale of fruits until they were clearly in good 
condition; he forbade it both to the seller and to the buyer."39
5.43,2. Definition o f Gharar
Gharar is a difficult concept to be identified due to the fact that the concept includes 
more than one meaning; it includes risk, peril, uncertainty, speculation, want of 
knowledge and unknown outcome or results.40 Furthermore, each Sharia school of 
law has a different interpretation about the scope of the concept of Gharar, but there is 
no disagreement between them about the prohibition of Gharar in onerous contracts in 
a certain degree.
The Hanbali school of legal scholarship describes Gharar as the unknown outcome41 
or a subject-matter that is not being able to be handed over whether it exists or it does 
not;42 it is the subject-matter that is unknown whether it will happen or not, or where
38 Ibid, No. (3654), p. 803.
39 Ibid, No. (3665), p. 805
40 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 2nd ed., (1992), p. 63; Sami 
Tamer, The Islamic Financial System, Economics and Management, Series V, (2005), p. 115; Aly 
Khorshid, Islamic Insurance, (2004), p. 39; Sherif Madi M. Madi, The Concept o f  Unlawful Gain and 
Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1989), at p. 159; Al-Dhareer observes that it has been difficult to find a word in other legal 
systems provides the same meaning of Gharar under Sharia. See, As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al- 
Gharar wa Atharaho fe  Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts 
in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), p. 47.
41 Imam Ahmad Ibn Abdul Halim Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu'a Al-Fatawa, Vol. 29, (Dar Al-Kutub Al- 
A'alamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (2000), p. 13.
42 As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, supra, pp. 31, 32. The Hanafi school of law describes Gharar as the 
suspicion about the existence of the subject-matter; ibid, p. 28. The Maliki school of law describe 
Gharar as the unknown existence of a thing that its character is unknown; ibid, p. 29. The Shafiy school
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its measure or quantity is unknown.43 Muslim jurists have presented numerous 
examples in some sale contracts that contain the element of Gharar. For example, it is 
Gharar where a vendor sells fish in the sea or a free bird in the air or a fetus of an 
animal in its mother womb and, therefore, such transactions are illegal and any 
contract is concluded thereupon is void.44 Thus, Khorshid observes that, "Gharar... 
resides in the uncertainty affecting the occurrence of the contract or of the obligations 
under it. This is to be seen as separate from juhalah-45 ignorance or uncertainty as to 
the outcome of the contract. The concept of juhalah, means that the commodity or the 
price to be paid is unknown, whereas in the case of Gharar the contract and the 
obligations of the parties under it are certain to take place but one of the elements of 
the contract is not defined."46
However, some jurists do not distinguish between Gharar and jahalah. Instead, they 
treat Gharar and jahalah as one thing.47 Al-Dhereer argues that the concept of Gharar 
is wider than the concept of jahalah, unknown subject-matter, that every unknown 
commodity is Gharar, but not every Gharar is unknown. In other words, Gharar could 
exist without being unknown, as, for example, selling a stray animal; here the animal 
could exist and be well defined, but the vendor cannot hand it over to the purchaser.48 
It can be said that, according to Al-Dhareer, Gharar is where the existence of the
of law describes it as the risk or the unknown result; ibid, p. 30. See, Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance, 
(2004), p. 39; Hussain Hamid Hassan, Hukom Ash-Sharia Al-lslamiyah f i  UqoodAt-Tameen, (Arabic), 
The Judgment of Islamic Sharia in Insurance Contracts, undated, pp. 449-454.
43 Imam Shams Ad-Deen Mohammad Ibn Qayym Al-Jawziyah, ZadAl-Ma'ad, Vol. 5, (Dar Al-Kutub 
Al-A'alamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (1998), p. 436. See, also, Mohammad Ibn Idris Ash-Shafei, Al-Umm, 
Vol. 6, (Dar Qutaybah), (1996), pp. 214-15.
44 Sherif Madi M. Madi, The Concept o f Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, (PhD 
Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University o f London), (1989), at p. 164.
45 It is spelt as Jahalah.
46 Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance, (2004), p. 39.
47 Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, (Arabic), Insurance and its Rules, (Dar Ibn Hazim, 
Beirut-Lebanon), (2003), footnote (1), p. 230; As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar waAtharaho fe  
Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, 
(1967), p. 39.
4*Ibid, p. 39.
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subject-matter is unknown even if it is well defined, whereas the element of jahalah is 
where the subject-matter does exist but its features are unknown, as, for example, 
where a person buys a house for a certain price but without knowing its features and 
whether it is suitable to be a dwelling-house.
The Hanbali jurists Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim, considered Gharar as 
gambling;49 that where a vendor sells a stray animal, the transaction is on risk and, 
therefore, the purchaser would pay much less than its real price. Accordingly, should 
the subject-matter of the contract, i.e. the stray animal is found, the purchaser wins the 
difference between the paid price and the real price of the animal. On the other hand, 
where the animal is not found, the vendor wins, surely, the reduced price for nothing 
and the purchaser losses what he has paid the vendor. Thus, in the latter transaction 
one party unlawfully eats the other party’s money which causes enmity and hatred.
5.4.4. May sir
The element of May sir, gambling, has been forbidden by Quran and Sunnah. The 
principle element in gambling is that it contains an excessive degree of gharar, 
uncertainty, and risk. That, to win a stake, both parties depend solely on luck and 
none of them knows whether will win or lose. However, one of the parties will win 
whereas the other party will lose, usually but not necessarily, sum of money.
49 Imam Ahmad Ibn Abdul Halim Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu'a Al-Fatawa, Vol. 29, Dar Al-Kutub Al- 
A'alamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (2000), p. 13; Imam Shams Ad-Deen Mohammad Ibn Qayym Al- 
Jawziyah, Zad Al-Ma'ad, Vol. 5, (Dar Al-Kutub Al-A’alamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (1998), p. 439.
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5.4.4.1. Prohibition of May sir
1- Quran
Allah, glory to Him, said in Surrat Al-Ma'idah (No. 5, w . 90, 91),
([90] O you who believe! Intoxicants (all kinds of alcoholic drinks), and 
gambling, and Al-Ansab,50 and Al-Azlam (arrows for seeking luck or 
decision) are an abomination of Shaitan, (Satan) handiwork. So avoid 
(strictly all) that (abomination) in order that you may be successful.
[91] Shaitan (Satan) wants only to excite enmity and hatred between you 
with intoxicants (alcoholic drinks) and gambling, and hinder you from the 
remembrance of Allah and from As-Salat (the prayer). So, will you not 
then abstain?).51
Ibn Kathir, a Muslim Quran commentator, interpreted these verses that, "Allah 
forbids His believing servants from consuming Khamr (Intoxicants) and Maysir 
(Gambling) which is gambling. Ibn Abi Hatim recorded that 'Ali bin Abi Talib, the 
Leader of the Faithful, said that chess is a type of gambling. Ibn Abi Hatim recorded 
that 'Ata', Mujahid and Tawus, or, two of them, said that every type of gambling, 
including children's playing with (a certain type of) nuts, is Maysir. Ibn 'Umar said
50 Al-Ansab were altar stones, in whose vicinity sacrifices were offered (during the time of Jahiliyyah).
51 M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f  THE NOBLE QURAN, (1417 A.H), (1996- 
1997).
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that Al-Maysir means gambling, and this is the same statement that Ad-Dahhak 
reported from Ibn 'Abbas, who added, "They used to gamble during the time of 
Jahiliyyah, until Islam came. Allah then forbade them from this evil behavior."52
Allah, glory to Him, also said,
(They ask you (O Muhammad, may peace be upon him) concerning 
alcoholic drink and gambling. Say: "In them is a great sin, and (some) 
benefits for men, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit."...).53
2- Sunnah
Narrated Abu Hurairah: Allah's Messenger, may peace be upon him, said: 
"Whoever takes an oath in which he (forgetfully), mentions Lat and Uzza (i.e. two 
idols of Arab pagans) should say: "La illah illallah" (none has the right to be 
worshipped but Allah), and whoever says to his companion, 'Come along let us 
gamble,' must give alms (as an expiation)."54
52 See, http://www.theholybook.Org/en/a.46197.html.
53 Al-Baqarah, 2, verse 219, M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f  the meaning o f  THE NOBLE 
QURAN, (1417 A.H, 1996-1997), p. 46.
54 Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 6, No. 383, ibid, FN. 4.
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5.4.4.2. Definition of May sir
Muslim jurists use terms Maysir or Quimar to refer to gambling.55 Qimar is where 
someone wins a property or money from someone else depending on a chance or a 
contingent event. Al-Sanhuri defined gambling as a contract where a gambler 
undertakes to pay money or anything else that is agreed upon to another in the case 
that he loses the gambling.56 Rehan, wagering, is a kind of Maysir, that where one 
wagerer undertakes to pay to another, usually but not necessarily, a sum of money 
should an uncertain event occurs. Thus, Al-Sanhuri describes Rehan, wagering is a 
contract between tow wagerers, that if the event occurs, one of the wagerers loses 
whereas the other wins. In contrast, where the event does not occur, the wagerer wins 
while the other wagerer loses.57
Muslim scholars describe gambling as a danger that threats Muslim societies. 
According to Madi, the reason behind prohibiting gambling in Islamic Sharia is that, 
"it can harm society, especially the needy, and because it may provide income without 
work. There is always a winner and a loser in gambling. For the loser there may be a 
stressful feeling of regret and frustration. Hence, the total prohibition of games of
CO
chance and lotteries and all services relating to evil work in Muslim society."
55 For general definition of gambling, see, Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At- 
Tameen (Insurance),Vol. 4, (2001), 35, at p. 116. Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, 
(Arabic), Insurance and its Rules, (Dar Ibn Hazim, Beirut-Lebanon), (2003), p. 223.
56 Mustafa Mohammad Al-Faqi, Abdul Rrazag Al-Sanhuri, Al-Waseetfi Shark Al-Qanoon Al-Madani, 
(in Arabic), Al-Waseet in Explanation of the Civil Law, part 7, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., (Dar An-Nahdhah Al- 
Arabiyah Cairo-Egypt), (1990), p. 1257.
51 Ibid.
58 Sherif Madi Muhammad Madi, The Concept o f Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 
(PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1989), at p. 183.
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Shaikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi remarked that, "Gambling has its own compulsions, the 
loser plays again in the hope of winning the next game in order to regain his earlier 
losses while the winner plays to enjoy the pleasure of winning impelled by greed for 
more... This habit consumes gamblers’ time and energy, making them non-productive 
idlers and parasites in society, who take, but do not give, who consume, but do not 
produce. Moreover, due to his absorption in gambling, the gambler neglects his 
obligations towards his community. It often happens that a gambling addict sells his 
honor, religion and even his country for the sake of the gambling table, since his 
devotion to the table dulls his sense of values and kills all other devotions."59
59 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Al-Halal wa Al-Haram f i  Al-Islam, (Arabic), The Lawful and the Prohibited in 
Islam, (Shorouk Interenational, UK, 1985), p. 305, cited in, Sherif Madi, ibid, pp. 183-184.
5.5. General Comments
This chapter is an introduction for understanding the law of contract under Islamic 
law together with Saudi law in order to understand the reason behind the rejection of 
the conventional insurance contract by the majority of contemporary Muslim scholars.
Therefore, in the light of the above discussions, it is the purpose of this study to 
examine the contract of insurance under Islamic jurisprudence to highlight the 
position of the contract of insurance under Saudi law. In addition, it is the aim of this 
study to find out whether the contract of insurance contains the elements of Riba, 
Gharar and Maysir and it should be, therefore, rejected in both Sharia and Saudi law. 
Thus, it will be appropriate to discuss these issues within the next chapter.
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Chapter Six: The Contract of Insurance 
under Islamic Law (Sharia)
6.1. Introduction
This chapter will explore the legitimacy of insurance contracts under Sharia. It 
seeks to answer a significant question: why do the majority of Islamic scholars claim 
that insurance is repugnant to Sharia? This chapter will, therefore, survey the main 
motives for not accepting commercial insurance, the original form of insurance or the 
conventional insurance, i.e. Riba, usury, Gharar, uncertainty and Maysir, gambling. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the notions of Riba, Gharar and Maysir have been 
dealt with by Islamic jurisprudence in great detail. This chapter will deal with these 
three notions inasmuch as they relate to the contract of insurance.
It will, also, explore a suggested form of insurance, as a substitute for conventional 
insurance, i.e. cooperative insurance, that has been suggested by some contemporary 
Muslim jurists and has enjoyed a general approval by the Board of Great Ulama in 
Saudi Arabia.1 However, it is important to survey the issue of "subject matter of the 
contract of insurance" to discover how the element of Gharar goes to the root of the 
contract of insurance and influence its validity.
1 The Board of Great Ulama contains great Islamic jurists in Saudi Arabia which has its power and 
influence upon Saudi policy, society and commercial activities by viewing its fatwas. The members of 
the board are appointed by the Saudi government.
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Thus, section 6.2, below, will discuss the issue of the subject-matter of the contract 
of insurance. Section 6.3 will explore the doctrine of cooperative insurance. Whether 
it is a workable form of insurance is tested in section 6.3.1. In addition, the legality of 
the conventional insurance and the motives for rejecting this form of insurance by the 
majority of Muslim scholars is surveyed in section 6.3.2. The argument surrounding 
the legality of the contract of insurance is discussed in section 6.3.3. Section 6.4 will 
explore the position of insurance contracts under Saudi jurisdiction and how insurance 
disputes have been resolved. Finally, section 6.5 contains concluding comments.
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6.2. The Subject-matter of The Contract of Insurance
It must be stressed that the issue is whether it is possible to identify the object of 
the contract of insurance. In other wards, it must be discovered what an insured is 
paying a premium for. Broadly speaking, the insured is paying the premium to be 
insured or to be indemnified by his insurer or to protect himself against certain risks. 
Thus, it is of significance to find out what exactly is the insured buying from the 
insurer? It must be distinguished, however, from the issue of "the subject matter 
insured."
Braham Atallah observes that, there has been a disagreement between legal jurists 
about identifying the subject-matter of the contract of insurance. Some legal jurists 
claim that the subject-matter of the contract is the object that is exposed to an insured 
risk, in other words, it is the subject-matter insured. Accordingly, the subject-matter 
of the contract in life insurance would be the person who insures his life; in fire 
insurance on a house the subject-matter would be the house; as for liability insurance
' i
the subject-matter is the liability of the insured. Some others are of the opinion that 
the subject-matter of the contract of insurance is the risk insured against. According to 
As-Sanhuri, for instance, there are three elements in the contract of insurance; there 
are, namely, the risk, the premium and the insurance money. He claimed that, the 
premium is the subject-matter of the insured's duty; the insurance money is the 
subject-matter of the insurer. The risk, however, is the principle subject-matter of the 
contract of insurance because it is the subject-matter of the duty of the insured and the
2 Braham Mohammad Atallah, At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance, (Al-Thaqafiyah Al-Jami'eyah, 
Alexandria- Egypt), (1984), p. 83.
3 Ibid, p. 84.
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insurer. He argued that, the insured's duty is to pay the premiums to insure him self 
from the risk insured against, and the insurer's duty is to pay the insurance money to 
the insured to insure the latter from the risk. Therefore, the insured risk is the motive 
for the payments of the premiums and the insurance money.4 However, some other 
legal jurists are of the opinion that the principle of insurable interest is the subject- 
matter of the contract of insurance. Sarkhoh, for example, observes that the subject- 
matter of the contract of insurance is every legal economic interest which encourages 
an insured to go into a contract of insurance to insure such interest against a 
contingent risk.5
In respect of common law, in Feasey case,6 Weller LJ discussed the notion of "the 
subject-matter of insurance"; he reviewed some authorities and came up with a 
conclusion that the subject-matter could be grouped into four groups, that:
"Group (1) are those cases where the court has defined the subject matter as an 
item of property; where the insurance is to recover the value of that property;
4 Mustafa Mohammad Al-Faqi, Abdul Rrazag Al-Sanhuri, Al-Waseetfi Shark Al-Qanoon Al-Madani, 
(in Arabic), Al-Waseet in Illustration of the Civil Law, part 7, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., (Dar An-Nahthah Al- 
Arabiyah Cairo-Egypt), (1990), pp. 1540-41. This view has been approved by number of Arab legal 
jurists which, as it seems, depends of the French view. See, for example, Mohammad Ali Arafah, 
Shark Al-Qanoon Al-Madani Al-Jadeedfi At-Tameen wa Al-UqoodAs-Saghirah, (Arabic) Explanation 
of The New Civil Law in Insurance and Small Contracts, 2nd ed., (University of Fuad the First Press, 
Cairo, Egypt)2nd ed., (1950), p. 26; Jalal M. Ibrahim, At-Atameen, (Arabic), Insurance, (University of 
Kuwait Press, Kuwait), (1989), p. 126; Khamis Khudr, Al-Uqood Al-Madaniyah Al-Kabirah, (Arabic), 
The Large Civilian Contracts, (Dar An-Nahdhah Al-Arabiyah), (1979), p. 414; Ahmad Sharaf Ad- 
Deen, Ahkam At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance Rules, (University of Kuwait Press, Kuwait), (1983), p.
170. The auther argues that there is more the one object in insurance as subject-matter of the contract 
such as indemnity. However, the risk is the principle subject-matter of the contract of insurance.
5 Yaqub Sarkhoh, At-Tameen Al-Bahri f i  Al-Qanoon Al-Kuwaiti, (Arabic), Marine Insurance in Kuwaiti 
Law, (University of Kuwait Press, Kuwait), (1993), p. 104. See, also, Mohammad H. Lutfi, Al-Ahkam 
Al-A’ammah Le-Aqd At-Tameen, (Arabic), General Rules of Insurance Contract, 3rd ed., (2001), p. 142; 
Braham Mohammad Atallah, At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance, (Al-Thaqafiyah Al-Jami'eyah, 
Alexandria- Egypt), (1984), p. 85.
6 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Company o f  Canada [2003] EWCA Civ 885, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 
587.
186
and where thus there must be an interest in the property-real or equitable-for 
the insured to suffer loss which he can recover under the policy."7
The second group was that where the subject-matter was identified to be a particular
o
life of a particular person. The third group was that,
"where even though the subject matter may appear to be a particular item of 
property, properly construed the policy extends beyond the item and embraces 
such insurable interest as the insured has."9
Furthermore, Weller LJ observed that,
"Group 4 are policies in which the court has recognised interests which are not 
even strictly pecuniary. In relation to life policies there are policies on own 
life; policies on husband's life and policies on the life of the wife,... But even 
in the case of property something less than a legal or equitable or even simply 
a pecuniary interest has been thought to be sufficient."10
7 Ibid, parag. [81]. He declared that within this group, "Lucena v Craufurd (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 269, 
127 ER 630... The subject was certain identified ships; the perils insured against were the loss of the 
ships; the Commissioners had no interest legal or equitable in the ships but a mere expectation. That 
expectation could not be insured, therefore the subject did not embrace the insurable interest. Also 
within this group is Anderson v Morice (1875) LR 10 CP 609; affirmed (1876) 1 App Cas 713. Rice 
was the subject matter of the policy; if uninsured the plaintiff would have suffered no loss from any 
destruction of the rice since they were never at the plaintiffs risk; the loss of profits might have been 
insured but were not. Therefore the plaintiff could not recover. In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co 
Ltd [1925] AC 619, [1925] All ER Rep 51 the subject matter of the insurance was identified timber 
owned by a company; a shareholder in the company had no interest in the timber whatever in that even 
without insurance the shareholder would suffer no pecuniary loss from destruction of the timber as 
such. Any loss suffered would have been as shareholder and his profits as shareholder were not the 
subject of the insurance. It was, however, recognised in Macaura's case that it would have been 
possible to so describe the subject of the insurance as to embrace the insurable interest in profits, and 
approval was given to Wilson v Jones (1867) LR 2 Exch 139..."
8 Ibid, parag. [82].
9 Ibid, parag. [87]. According to him, Wilson v Jones (1867) LR 2 Exch 139 exemplifies this group.
10 Ibid, parag. [90]. Weller LJ referred to Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance pic, The Moonacre [1992] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 501, where the court recognized the boat as the subject of the insurance; Glengate-KG 
Properties Ltd  v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society L td[  1996] 2 All ER 487, where Neill LJ 
supported The Moonacre judgment as being 'valuable judgment' and Auld LJ was less sure that the 
ruling was right; Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemicals Ltd  v Davy McKee (London) Ltd [1999] 1 All
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As noted above, identifying the subject-matter of the contract is elusive. Having 
said that the subject-matter of the contract of insurance could be the risk insured 
against or the subject-matter insured or the principle of insurable interest, it is difficult 
to be accepted. In fact, the risk insured against is a future possible event and the 
consequence of its occurrence triggers the insurer's fulfillment of its duty of 
indemnity. This is the reason for concluding an insurance contract. Article (344) of 
Saudi Commercial Court Law 1931 states that events which are described as 
"maritime perils", that,
"All losses and damages sustained by the insured items shall be bome by the 
insurer, whether it be a result of a tempest, sinking, wreck, leakage or 
cracking, or as a result of the necessary change of course in the voyage, or the 
replacement of the vessel, or the jettisoning of goods through fire, seizure, 
usurping, or arrest of the vessel by a court order or as a result of the 
declaration of war or acts of retaliation and hostilities and any other peril and 
marine siege."11
As for English law, section (3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 defines "maritime 
peril" as:
""Maritime perils" means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the
navigation of the sea, that is to say, perils of the seas, fire, war, perils, pirates,
rovers, thieves, captures, seizures, restraints, and detainment's of princes and
peoples, jettisons, barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or
which may be designated by the policy."
ER (Comm) 69 and some other cases. Consequently, he concluded that, inter alia, "it is from the terms 
of the policy that the subject of the insurance must be ascertained." Parag. [97].
11 Nicola H. Karam, Business Laws o f  Saudi Arabia, Vol. I, (1994), p. 13-71.
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In property Insurance, the subject-matter insured can be described as the thing or the 
object that is considered to be the source of the insured's loss or liability where it is 
damaged or destroyed be the insured risk or peril. Article (327) of the CCL 1931 
states objects that are described as subject-matters insured, that,
"(1) vessels which sail individually or in convoys, whether loaded or empty 
and whether fitted out or not; (2) machinery and equipment of vessels; (3) 
hulls and superstructures; (4) provisions; (5) money borrowed under the 
marine procedure; (6) kind and nature of cargo; (7) anything having value
19which maybe the subject of marine hazards.”
Regarding English law, section (3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 describes the 
subject-matter of a marine policy as:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every lawful marine adventure may 
be the subject of a contract of marine insurance.
(2) In particular there is a marine adventure where -
(a) Any ship goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils.
Such property is in this Act referred to as "insurable property”;
(b) The earning or acquisition of any freight, passage money, 
commission, profit, or other pecuniary benefit, or the security for any 
advances, loan, or disbursements, is endangered by the exposure of 
insurable property to maritime perils;
(c) Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or 
other person interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by 
reason of maritime perils."13
12 Ibid, p. 13-67.
13 For more discussion on this, see, for example, Susan Hodges, Law o f Marine Insurance, (1997), p.
23; John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrine and Principles, 2nd ed., (2005), pp. 364 
& 374.
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In relation to the principle of insurable interest, it is a requirement that must be 
complied with by the insured only in order to validate his insurance policy. Therefore, 
it seems that the principle of insurable interest is not suitable to be the subject-matter 
of the contract of insurance.14
Thus, in order to identify the subject-matter of the contract of insurance, the way of 
concluding an insurance contract must be illustrated. Where a person intends to insure 
his house, for example, against fire and theft, he contacts an insurer either directly or 
indirectly, i.e. via an insurance broker or agent, to propose to the insurer his wish to 
insure his property. At the stage of negotiation, both parties, the insurer and the 
proposer, agree that the insurer promises to indemnify the proposer where he suffers a 
loss due to the occurrence of the insured risk in the subject-matter insured, i.e. the 
house, in return that the proposer pays a premium(s) to the insurer. The insurer's 
promise is contained in a document called "the insurance policy" and which requires 
the payment of the premium by the proposer at the stage of concluding the contract. 
After concluding the contract, the proposer becomes, from legal point of view, an 
insured where he is bound to pay the premium, whether in full or via installments. On 
the other hand, the insurer is bound to hand over the insured an insurance policy. 
Technically, the insured buys the document, i.e. the policy, from the insurer that 
represents the promise of indemnity from the part of the insurer. Therefore, the 
transaction between the two parties, the insurer and the insured, could be described as 
a sale of a conditional promise. That is to say that, the promise of the insurer is to
14 See chapter 3, supra, for detailed discussion on the principle of insurable interest.
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indemnify the insured or to hold him harmless against the insured risk(s).15 The 
condition is, obviously, that the loss that is suffered by the insured must be caused by 
an insured peril or risk. Consequently, it can be said that the subject-matter of the 
contract of insurance is the insurer’s promise of indemnifying the insured. Thus, 
having identified the subject-matter of the contract of insurance, it will be possible to 
know whether the element of Gharar does exist in an insurance contract and if it does 
what its degree is.
15 Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle P  & I  Association (The Fanti) [1991] AC 1, at p. 35. For more 
discussion on the nature of the duty of the insurer under English law, see chapter 3, supra, parag. 
3.2.2.2. See, also, Neil Campbell “The Nature of an Insurer’s Obligation” [2000] LMCLQ 42, at p. 48; 
John Lowry and Philip Rawlings "Insurers, Claims and Boundaries of Good Faith" (2005) 68(1) MLR 
82, at p. 90.
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6.3. Cooperative Insurance v Commercial Insurance
The emergence of the insurance contract goes back to the twelfth and thirteenth 
century in Italy in the guise of marine insurance in connection with the improvement 
of commerce.16 The insurance contract, nevertheless, was unknown by the orthodox 
Islamic schools of law. Consequently, Muslim scholars have viewed the insurance 
contract with suspicion.
The first leading recorded fatwa  in respect of insurance was found in the early 19th 
century by a Syrian scholar from the Hanafi school Ibn Abdin (1784-1836). He 
decided that insurance contracts, when was asked about marine insurance contracts, 
are not valid under Sharia for two reasons. Firstly, because a contract of insurance is 
not similar to any of recognised contracts by classic Muslim jurists and the 
commitment under such contract is not binding from the part of the insurer.17 The
16 C. McArthur, The Contract o f  Marine Insurance, 2nd ed., 1890, xx. Therefore, insurance was 
invented in the west and it was said that it had been invented by Jews when they were expelled from 
France by its King by that time. Nevertheless it has not been proved that was the origin of insurance. 
McArthur mentioned that, "The French jurist Cleirac asserts, on the authority of Villani, a Florentine 
historian of the thirteenth century, that insurance was invented by the Jews, who had been expelled 
from France and found a refuge in Italy, and who resorted to this expedient as a means of securing 
themselves against the losses to which the removal of their property and effects was liable. It is said 
that the merchants o f the north of Italy, who were cognizant o f this device, being impressed with its 
utility, imported it into their dealings. While there appears no good reason for rejecting this statement, 
it cannot be regarded as a certain account of the first beginning of insurance, which is attaches to the 
origin of most of other inventions..." Ibid, footnote (d).
17 Mohammad Ameen, Ibn Abdin, Rad El muhtar Ala Eldur El mukhtar Shark Tanweer Al-Absar, (in 
Arabic), Vol. 4, 3rd ed.,(Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi, Cairo-Egypt), (1984), 184; Yaqob Sarkhoh, At- 
Tameen Albahrifi Alqannon Al-Kuwaiti, (in Arabic), Marine Insurance in Kuwaiti Law, 1993, p. 24; 
Andreas Haberbeck & Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, 1990, p. 213. Additionally, there were 
other jurists adopt Ibn Abdin's view that insurance contract is illegal under Sharia because it is not 
similar to any contract that is recognized by Islamic jurisprudence. See, the jurist Mohammad Bekeet 
Al-Mute'iy, Article by , Isawi, "Aqd At-Tameen min wejhat nathar Ashareia al-Islamiah wa Al- 
Qanoon", (Article in Arabic), Insurance contract from the aspect of Islamic Sharia and Law, in 
Majallat Al-Ulom Al-Qanooneyah wa Al-Eqtisadeyah, July 1962, pp. 167, 187, 188.
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fatwa of the jurist Ibn Abdin has been considered by wide range of Islamic scholars.18 
Haberbeck and Galloway observed that, jurist Ibn Abdin "Without giving clear 
reasons, decided that contracts of insurance are not valid under Islamic law. In his 
view the mere non-existence of insurance contracts in the framework of contracts 
recognized by the classic Sharia texts made this type of transaction suspect."19
In fact, Ibn Abdin drew an analogy between an insurance contract and some other 
contracts that had been known by the orthodox Muslim jurists, such as lucrative 
bailment, by comparing and contrasting rights and duties under each contract. His 
conclusion was that insurance does not impose a legal duty upon an insurer to 
guarantee the property of an insured when it is damaged by the risk insured against.20 
Ibn Abdin, moreover, distinguished between two cases. On the one hand, where a 
contract of insurance is concluded in an Islamic country, the contract would be illegal 
on the ground that Islamic law would have been applied, therefore, a Muslim cannot 
benefit from the insurance money because insurance clashes with the general 
principles Sharia. On the other hand, where the contract is concluded in a non-Islamic 
country, the contract would be legal because a Muslim insured in such contract would 
earn the insurance money by the agreement of the other party, the insurer, because
91Sharia would not apply therein.
18 However, it is not necessarily that all legal researchers and Islamic jurists agree with this fatwa. See, 
for example, Mohammad Beltaji, UgoodAttameen min wejhat Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (in Arabic),
Insurance Contracts from the viewpoint o f Islamic Jurisprudence, 2 ed., (2000), pp. 21-25; As-Sayed 
Abdalmuttalib Abdoh, Mabady At-Tameen, (in Arabic), Insurance Principles, 4th ed., (1986), at p. 122.; 
Hussain bin Mansur, At-Tameen feeAsharia Al-Islameyah, (in Arabic), Insurance in Islamic Sharia, 
(1992), p. 31; Abdulhadi A. M. Al-Hakeem, AqdAt-Tameen: Hageegataho wa Mashroeyatoh, (in 
Arabic), Insurance Contract: its Truth and Legitimacy, (2003), p. 292.
19 Andreas Haberbeck & Mark Galloway, Saudi Shipping Law, 1990, p. 213.
20 See, Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance), Vol. 4,
(2001), 35, at p. 81.
21 Mohammad Ameen, Ibn Abdin, Rad El muhtarAla Eldur El mukhtar Shark Tanweer Al-Absar, (in 
Arabic), Vol. 4, 3rd ed., (Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi and his sons Co.), (1984), p. 185.
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In this manner, Shaikh Mohammad Bekheet Al-Mutai'ey, observed that indemnity 
applies under Sharia in three cases. These are, namely, guarantee, transgression and 
destruction. Thus, the contract of insurance is not a contract of guarantee, nor is the 
insurer in transgression position to the insured property, nor is the insurer destroying 
the insured property. Accordingly, since the duty of an insurer is to indemnify his 
insured under a contract of insurance cannot be found under the said cases, such duty, 
therefore, is not binding. He was of the opinion that insurance contains adventure 
that sometimes occurs, sometimes does not. Therefore, insurance, in this meaning, is 
gambling.23
Recently, there have been several meetings in several conferences and symposia 
that have been arranged by Muslim jurists researching into the lawfulness of 
insurance. The very first Islamic juristic conference was held in Damascus, Syria in 
1961. The members who met in that conference examined both cooperative and 
commercial insurances. However, the members did not reach a unanimous 
conclusion. According to Al-Hakeem, there were two viewpoints; on the one hand, a 
group of the members was of the opinion that all forms of insurance are not valid 
under Sharia. On the other hand, insurance is, actually, valid and lawful under 
Sharia}4 The first viewpoint was argued by Shaikh Mohammad Abo Zahrah; the
*yc
second viewpoint was argued by Mustafa Al-Zarga.
22 Issa Abdoh, At-Tameen bayn Al-Halal wa Al-Haram, (in Arabic), Insurance between Lawfulness and 
Prohibition, (1978), pp. 227-229. Abdoh mentioned other jurist took this manner, i.e. insurance is 
forbidden under Sharia, Shaikh Abdu Rrahman Qura'a, Dr Yusif Al-Qaradhawi, Dr Jalal Assayad and 
some others, at pp. 227-249.
23 Ibid; Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance), Vol. 4,
(2001), 35, at pp. 86-88.
24 Abdul Hadi A. M. Al-Hakeem, AqdAt-Tameen: Hageegataho wa Mashroeyatoh, (in Arabic), 
Insurance Contract: its Truth and Legitimacy, (2003), p. 288.
25 Both arguments are cited in Issa Abdoh, At-Tameen bayn Al-Halal wa Al-Haram, (in Arabic), 
Insurance between Lawfulness and Prohibition, (1978). Mustafa Az-Zarga's argument at p.l 19. Shaikh 
Mohammad Abo Zahrah's argument at p. 136.
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The second meeting was The Second Conference for Islamic Researches Assembly 
that took place in Al-Azhar26 in Cairo, Egypt in 1965. The members decided that, 
cooperative insurance, which is performed by cooperative associations, is lawful 
because it is cooperation.27 Furthermore, in The Third Conference for Islamic 
Researches Assembly that was held in Al-Azhar in 1966, the jurists decided that 
social insurance, which is provided by governments, cooperative insurance and health 
insurance are legal under Sharia. However, private insurance, which was meant to be 
commercial insurance, should have been explored and examined in depth.28 In 1972, a 
symposium was held in Libya and it was recommended that cooperative insurance 
should be substituted by commercial insurance.
Furthermore, in September 1978 the jurists met again in the Assembly of Islamic 
Jurisprudence in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.29 The members adopted the decision that had 
been made in March 1977 by the Council of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi 
Arabia. The members declared that it had been unanimously decided that commercial 
insurance, including life insurance, had been forbidden under Islamic Law30 for the 
principle following reasons:
26 Al-Azhar is an Islamic institution in Egypt that contains the Egyptian Islamic jurists. It has the same 
role of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia. Al-Azhar and the Board of Great Ulama are both 
enjoying a great respect in the Islamic world.
27 Issa Abdoh, At-Tameen bayn Al-Halal wa Al-Haram, (in Arabic), Insurance between Lawfulness and 
Prohibition, (1978), p. 249; Mohammad Al-Fanjari, Al-lslam wa At-Tameen, (Arabic), Islam and 
Insurance, 2nd ed., (Okath Co.), (1984), p. 61; Sadi Abo Jaib, At-Tameen bayn Al-Hather wa Al-Ibahah, 
(Arabic), Insurance between Prohibition and Permission, (1983), footnote (1), p. 6.
28 Mohammad A. Khafaji, "Netham Al-Faedah fe Al-Muamalat Al-Iqtesadeyah wa Rae'y Al-lslam 
Feeha", (an Arabic article), "The System of Interest in Economic Transactions and The Opinion of 
Islam about it" (April 1983) 29 Majallat Al-Bonok Al-lslamiyah, Islamic Banks Report, 50, at 52.
29 Abdulhadi A. M. Al-Hakeem, AqdAt-Tameen: Hageegataho wa Mashroeyatoh, (in Arabic), 
Insurance Contract: its Truth and Legitimacy, (2003), p. 289.
30 Decision No. (10/5), 4/4/1397 A.H., 25/3/1977, Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi 
Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance),Vol. 4, (2001), 35, at p. 307.
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-5 1
1- Insurance contract is a mu'awadhah contract, which can be translated in English 
as onerous contract, contingent and an aleatory contract. It contains excessive Gharar, 
uncertainty, by which the insured cannot, nor the insurer, at the time of concluding the 
contract, know the amount which he should pay and that he will get from the insurer 
in the case of the occurrence of the event insured against. The insured might pay one 
or two premiums and the risk occurs. The insurer, thereafter, is bound to indemnify 
the insured for his loss that is usually more than the total of what the latter has paid. 
On the other hand, the insured might pay all the agreed premiums without taking 
anything. Allah's Messenger, (peace and blessings be upon him), forbade Gharar?2
2- Insurance contract is a type of gambling due to the risk it contains in a financial 
contractual relationship; that, where the risk insured against occurs, the insured 
unlawfully earns the insurance money either without an equivalent right, as the 
situation under a life insurance policy, or more than the actual loss. On the other hand, 
the insurer unlawfully earns the premiums, which have been already paid by the 
insured in the case of non-occurrence of the event insured against. The uncertainty, 
therefore, is so excessive and that is forbidden under Sharia. Allah, glory to Him, said 
in Quran that:
(O you who believe! intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and 
(divination by) arrows, are an abomination of Satan's handiwork: eschew 
such (abomination), that ye may prosper [91] Satan's plan is (but) to 
excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling,
31 Arabic word that is translated as commutative contract in Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, 
Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary o f Islamic legal terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut- 
Lebanon), (1996), p. 408.
32 Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance),Vol. 4, (2001), 35, 
at p. 308.
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and hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer: will ye 
not then abstain?).33
3- Insurance contract contains Riba, usury. That, when an insured gets, in the case of 
indemnity, more than what he paid an insurer by way of premiums, the insured gets 
unlawfully more than what he already paid and that is Riba Al-Fadhil. If that 
happened after period of time, it becomes Riba An-Nase'ah. Thus, both kinds of Riba, 
namely, Al-Fadhil and An-Nase'ah are forbidden under Sharia by Quran and Sunnah. 
Allah, glory to Him said, in Quran:
(O you who believe! devour not Usury, doubled and multiplied; but fear 
Allah; that ye may (really) prosper).34
4- Insurance contracts contain unlawful gaining of the others' money, that the insurer 
unlawfully gains the insured's money in the case of non-occurrence of the insured 
risk. In contrast, the insured may gain more than what he actually suffered and that is 
repugnant to Sharia. Allah, glory to Him, said in Quran that:
(O you who believe! eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good­
will: nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you 
Most Merciful!).35
Furthermore, the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia has, recently, researched 
insurance and concluded that, there are tree doctrines set out by Islamic scholars and
33 Al-Ma'idah, 5, verses 90, 91. See, M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f the meaning o f  THE 
NOBLE QURAN, (1417 A.H), (1996-1997), at p. 309.
34 Al-Imran, 3, verse 130. See, Ibid. p. 92.
35 An-Nessa, 4, verse 29. See, Ibid, at p. 310.
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legal jurists about the legitimacy of insurance under Sharia. The first doctrine 
observes that there are two types of insurance; they are, namely, cooperative 
insurance, which complies with Sharia and, secondly, commercial insurance, which is 
the conventional insurance and that is unacceptable under Sharia. The second doctrine 
claims that insurance, whether it is cooperative or commercial, is repugnant to Sharia. 
The third one is of the opinion that insurance are, actually, valid and legitimate under 
Sharia whether it is cooperative or commercial insurance.36 Therefore, it is essential, 
at this juncture, to explore and evaluate these doctrines.
6.3.1. Cooperative Insurance
It has to be borne in mind that the practice of cooperative insurance does not exist in 
Saudi insurance market. The following illustration of this form of insurance has been 
presented by various Muslim scholars and legal jurists and it will be noted that they 
present suggestions that could be adopted. It will, also, be noted that the scholars and 
the jurists have been trying to clear the contract of insurance from those elements that 
turns it to be illegal. Thus, the form of cooperative insurance is theoretical more than 
practical.
Indeed, with regard to insurance on properties, the scholars divide insurance 
contracts into two categories, namely, commercial insurance and cooperative
36 Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance),Vol. 4, (2001), 35,
p. 81.
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insurance. Commercial insurance is the conventional insurance or the original form of 
insurance and that includes life insurance and all other insurances.37 Cooperative 
insurance is a type o f insurance based upon donation and cooperation between a 
group of people who have mutual interests to spread a loss which a member of the 
group might suffer between all other members by way of contribution. Nonetheless, 
under this form of insurance, the premium paid by an insured should be paid with the 
intention of donation and the payer should not be waiting for a benefit form what he 
has paid. In addition, they suggest that an insurance company should have two roles; 
firstly, to practice insurance and pay indemnities from the assureds' premiums, or 
what is called contributions; secondly to invest the excess of the total of the premiums 
in legal commercial transactions and the profits should be paid back to the assureds 
according to their contributions.38 In respect of being in deficit, the scholars suggest 
that, all members should cover such deficit according to each member's
. . . 3 9participation.
Bin Hmaid is of the opinion that cooperative insurance could contain different 
insurance policies except life assurance. Further, he calls this form of insurance 
"Islamic insurance" and he says that the insurance is operated and managed by an 
Islamic insurance company which invests the total amount of the contributions on the 
members' behalf in return of a certain share form profits that are derived from such 
investment as it is a speculator, or in return of a certain amount of money, or fee, as 
an agent, but without infringing Sharia principles.40
37 For further details, see chapter three above.
38 Saleh A. Bin Hmaid, At-Taameen At-Taawni Al-lslami, (Arabic), Islamic Cooperation Insurance, 
http://islamtoday.net/islam/articles/show_articles_content.cfin?id=71 &catid=74&artid=1679. Shaikh 
Bin Hmaid is the chairman o f Mjlis Ash-Shura, or Consultation Counsel, in Saudi Arabia.
39 Bin Hmaid, ibid.
40 Ibid.
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Shaikh Mawlawi defines cooperative insurance as, a participation of a group of 
people in establishing a fund that they finance by paying premiums by each one of 
them. Every one of the group take a particular part of the fund where he suffers a loss 
from a particular event. He says that the difference between cooperative insurance and 
commercial insurance is that in cooperative insurance the sum of money that is 
collected from the members of the group remains in the possession of the group, 
whereas in commercial insurance the sum of money that is collected goes for the 
shareholders of the insurance company. Therefore, cooperative insurance is mere 
organised solidarity.41 In addition, cooperative insurance, he says, does not aim to 
make profits for the people who adopt it, but to remove suffering a loss from any of 
the insureds. Shaikh Mawlawi also observes that, Zakat42 is a kind of solidarity 
system, but it is based upon taking money from a rich person to be given to a poor 
person, whilst cooperative insurance is not restricted to this principle. However, this 
kind of insurance is similar to another solidarity system which is Al-Aaqilah43 system
41 Shaikh Faisal Mawlawi, Netham At-Tameen wa Mawqiff Ashariah menho, (Arabic), Insurance 
System and its Position in Sharia, (Dar Ar-Rashid Al-Islamiah- Beirut-Lebanon), (1988), p. 136. See 
also some other definitions o f cooperative insurance that are similar to this definition in: Mustafa M. 
Az-Zarga, Netham At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance System, (Al-Resalah Est., Beirut-Lebanon), (1984), 
pp. 42, 43 & 123; Sadi Abo Jaib, At-Tameen bayn Al-Hather wa Al-lbahah, (Arabic), Insurance 
between Prohibition and Permission, (1983), p. 18; Hussain bin Mansur, At-Tameen fe  Asharia Al- 
Islameyah, (in Arabic), Insurance in Islamic Sharia, (1992), p. 53; Abd An-Nassir T. Al-Attar, Hukom 
At-Tameen fe  Al-Shariah Al-lslamiyah, (Arabic), The Judgment o f Insurance in Islamic Sharia, (Al- 
Nahthah Al-Misreyah Book Shop, Egypt), (1983), p. 7; Mabrok Al-Najar, AqidAt-Tameen, (Arabic), 
The Contract of Insurance, (Dar An-Nahdhah Al-Arabiyah, Egypt), (1994), p. 94; Ghareeb Al-Jammal, 
At-Tameen At-Tijari wa Al-Badeel Al-Islami, (Arabic), Commercial Insurance and The Islamic 
Substitute, (Dar Al-Ietisam, Cairo-Egypt), (1979), p. 252; As-Sayed A. Abdoh. At-Tameen Al-Islami, 
Islamic Insurance, (Dar Al-kitab Al-Jamre'ey, Cairo-Egypt), (1988), p. 107; Ahmad Sharaf Ad-Deen, 
Uqood At-Tameen wa Uqood Dhaman Al-Istethmar, (Arabic), Insurance Contracts and Security 
Investment Contracts, (Hassam Press, Cairo-Egypt), (1986), pp. 242-245; Ahmad S. Melhim, At- 
Tameen At-Ta'awni Al-Islami, (Arabic), Islamic Cooperative Insurance, (National Library, Jordan), 
(2000), p. 61; As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa Atharaho fe  Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, 
(Arabic), Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), p. 640.
42 A specified sum of money in a particular time paid for a specified group of people. It is taken from 
rich people to be given, inter alia, poor people. See, p. 7, supra.
43 An Islamic system that invites members in one family to unite to pay a sum of money to the victim's 
family as an indemnity where one o f them kills a human without malice aforethought. See, Mohammad
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where members of a family of a killer in manslaughter case gather together to pay 
Diyah44 to the victim's family. He, moreover, states that, since the system of Muslims 
Treasure House, which its role is to provide social security to Muslims in a state, may 
not exist at the present time, cooperative insurance could be a smaller Muslims 
Treasure House for a group of Muslims that could protect some of their interest. 
Therefore, some motorists could agree together to provide cooperative insurance to 
each other. Likewise, some traders could do the same to protect their interests in the 
same manner. Thus, this system does not infringe Islamic principles and could cover 
any additional expenses of solidarity that are not covered by Zakat.A5
Al-Fanjari elucidates the mechanism of cooperative insurance. According to him, 
the value of contributions that are paid by members of a cooperative society might 
vary each year. The value would depend on the total amount of indemnities during a 
year. A member might not pay until a risk insured against has actually occurred and, 
then, the member could pay according to his proportion. Or, he might pay a part of his 
contribution and pay the rest at the end of the year; or he might get a refund 
depending on the calculation of the total amount of indemnities that year.46 
Additionally, cooperative insurance is called mutual insurance because the insureds 
are the insurers at the same time, that there is no an intermediary or a shareholder that 
could profit from shares between the members 47
Biltaji, Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance Contracts, (Maktabat Al-Balad Al-Ameen, Cairo- 
Egypt), (2000), p. 126.
44 An Islamic device which is an indemnity that consists of, usually but not necessarily, sum of money 
that is given to the victim's family by the killer, where he kills the victim without malice aforethought. 
See, Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lug hat al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary of Islamic legal 
terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 188.
45Shaikh Faisal Mawlawi, Netham At-Tameen wa Mawqiff Ashariah menho, (Arabic), Insurance 
System and its Position in Sharia, (Dar Ar-Rashid Al-Islamiah- Beirut, Lebanon), (1988), p. 136-7.
46 Mohammad Al-Fanjari, Al-lslam wa At-Tameen, (Arabic), Islam and Insurance, 2nd ed., (Okath Co.), 
(1984), p. 36.
47 Ibid.
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Sharaf Ad-Deen remarks on the concept of cooperative insurance that, when 
members of a cooperative society pay contributions or premiums, they pay them as 
donations and they agree to indemnity each other should one of them suffer a loss. In 
addition, since each one of the members combine both characters of insureds and 
insurers and since indemnity is binding upon each member as well as they all pay 
premiums, the contract of cooperative insurance is away from being a commutative or 
onerous contract. In fact, this contract could be categorised as a donative contract. 
That the members go into the contract and pay the premiums as donations for 
cooperation; therefore, the element of Gharar, uncertainty, does not affect the legality 
of the contract and the legitimacy of taking the insurance money. Furthermore, he 
argues that, where the insurance money exceeds the total amount of the paid 
premiums, Riba, usury, does not appear in such a case because usury appears only in 
commutative or onerous contracts, but not in donation.
Admittedly, Sharaf Ad-Deen recognises that there are difficulties that the system of 
cooperative insurance could encounter in order to be practised widely. Further, the 
system is not profitable and contributions or premiums are variable according to the 
number of the occurrence of risks insured against. However, he suggests solutions for 
such difficulties. The cooperative society, which represents the members, could invest 
the premiums in legitimate ways, then, by this way, profits could be made. 
Indemnities and any administration fees could be paid therefrom plus saving a sum of 
money for emergencies or pay any extra sum that remains back to the members
48Ahmad Sharaf Ad-Deen, Uqood At-Tameen wa Uqood Dhaman Al-lstethmar, (Arabic), Insurance 
Contracts and Security Investment Contracts, (Hassam Press, Cairo-Egypt), (1986), p.245.
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without spending any expenses from the capital.49 His view, moreover, is that the 
investment of the premiums is not considered as an insurance activity; therefore, such 
activity does not alter the nature of the whole transaction from being donation to a 
commutative or onerous transaction.50
Zaki Ad-Deen Shaban observes that the cooperative insurance is more favourable 
than the commercial, or conventional, insurance for economy because the latter 
scheme allows insurance companies to control people's money and their wealth and 
makes them in the possession of insurance companies. That will, therefore, expand 
the control of insurance companies on the economic life. Shaban considers the 
commercial insurance, in this sense, as a source of danger upon a national economy.51 
He said that cooperative insurance fulfils the reason for insurance without causing any 
danger or harm because it is not influenced by the temptation of making profits. In 
addition, cooperative insurance is based on the principle that people's money is for 
them and under their control and it is available for everyone especially for those who 
have limited income due to the fact that the rate of cooperative insurance premium is 
low comparing it with the rate of commercial insurance premiums and that makes it
c 'y
more beneficial.
Hussain Hassan considers this type of insurance, i.e. cooperative insurance, as 
mutual insurance. It can be said that, he emphasises that, there has been no 
disagreement between Muslim scholars and legal jurists on the fact that where
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. See also another argument in this manner in Zaki Ad-Deen Shaban, "At-Tameen min Wejhat 
Nathar Al-Shariyah Al-Islamiyah", (Article in Arabic), Insurance from Islamic Sharia Point of View, in 
Majallat Al-Huquq wa Al-Sharia, (Kuwait), Second Year, Vol. 2, (June 1978), 7, at p. 14.
51 Zaki Ad-Deen Shaban, ibid, at p. 15.
52 Ibid.
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insurance is tackled as cooperation between some persons to indemnify each other by 
paying contributions by way of donation, insurance is desired under Sharia, therefore, 
it is legitimate.53
Shaikh Abdullah Al-Mini, in his research on the contract of insurance, is of the 
opinion that procedures of cooperative insurance and its elements are the same that 
could be found in commercial insurance;54 they are, namely, insurer, insured, subject- 
matter of insurance, premium and insurance money where it is applicable. He 
criticises the opinion that there is a distinction between the two schemes of insurance. 
He reasons that the surplus that is derived from the total amount of the members’ 
contributions, in the cooperative insurance, would be paid back to the members 
according to each member's contribution because they cooperate together to 
indemnify each other and they would cover any deficit. In contrast, the surplus in the 
commercial insurance would be a profit for the insurance company and in the case of 
being in deficit the company would be obliged to cover it from either its capital, or its 
capital stock.55 Therefore, he argues that there is no distinction between cooperative 
insurance and commercial insurance.56
Mohammad Biltaji clearly suggests that cooperative insurance should be based upon 
the following grounds. Firstly, that all forms of Islamic cooperative insurance have to 
be founded on general Islamic principles such as solidarity, mercy and cooperation,
53 Hussain Hamid Hassan, Hukom Ash-Sharia Al-lslamiyah fe  Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), The 
Judgment of Islamic Sharia in Insurance Contracts, undated, p. 441.
54 Shaikh Abdullah Bin Sulaiman Al-Menee'a (Member of the Board o f Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia), 
"At-Tameen bayn Al-Halal wa Al-Haram", (Arabic), Insurance between Lawfulness and Unlawfulness, 
(a research was presented to King Faisal Centre fo r  Research and Islamic Studies), (2002), p. 12. See 
also this research on the web site,
http://islamtoday.net/articles/show_articles_content.cfm?id=71&catid=74&artid=1683.
55 Ibid, p. 13.
56 Ibid, pp. 17-24.
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like, for instance, the case in Al-Aaqilah system, Al-Muwalat and An-Nehid.51 
Furthermore, cooperative insurance must be cooperative or mutual because each 
member is bound by same duties and enjoys same rights that applicable to the other 
members. Secondly, a cooperative insurance system must not be (commercial), i.e. the 
intention of the parties must not be making profits, but solidarity. Nevertheless, the 
total amount of the members’ contributions could be augmented and increased by way
C O
of Mudharaba, but the profits must be added to the capital, i.e. the total amount of 
the premiums or contributions, in order to indemnify those members who suffer 
economic losses.59
Ghareeb Al-Jammal set out three features of cooperative insurance. Firstly, each 
member of a mutual, cooperative, insurance society gather both characters of the 
insured and the insurer because each member enjoys the benefit of security or 
insurance and each member, by contrast, bears indemnifying the other. Thus, the total 
amount of the paid contributions would be the pluses of the shared account; on the 
other hand, the total amount of the indemnities of losses would be the minuses for 
such account. Thus, where there is surplus in the account it would not be considered
57 An Islamic system where each member o f a group of people pay out contributions that could be food, 
money, gold by way of charity to support each other and that their contributions do not have to be 
equal to each other. It is, also, where a group o f people on a journey contribute to share the expenses of 
their journey. Mohammad Biltaji, Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance Contracts, (Maktabat Al- 
Balad Al-Ameen, Cairo-Egypt), (2000), p. 189.
58 A contract whereby one party advances a sum of money to another party, as an agent, for investment 
that contains sharing of profits and losses. It is, also, sleeping partnership. See, Mohammad Qal'aji & 
Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary of Islamic legal terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, 
Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 405. Mudharaba, as a contract, is practiced today by Islamic banks and it 
has been suggested to be practiced by cooperative insurers in order to increase the capital o f the 
cooperative members in order to meet their claims and indemnities. See, Fadi Moghaizel, Insurance in 
the Light o f  Islamic Legal Principles, (PhD Thesis), SOAS- University of London, (1990), at pp. 162- 
172.
59 Mohammad Biltaji, Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance Contracts, (Maktabat Al-Balad Al- 
Ameen, Cairo-Egypt), (2000), at p. 196.
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as a profit by its all means; instead, it would be an increase of the contributions that is 
a legal right to the members that could be paid back to them.60
Secondly, solidarity between the members which means they cover each other 
against their risks. Although the principle of indemnity applies herein, that a member 
should not get more than his actual loss, Al-Jammal was of the opinion that there is 
possibility to agree on the contrary, i.e. a member can recover more than his loss on 
the ground that such agreement is not against the public system, or public interest.61
Thirdly, the rate of the contribution, the premium, varies depending upon the 
number of the occurrences of the risks insured against and the indemnities that have 
been paid. That is to say, where the total amount of the paid contributions is, in fact, 
insufficient to meet the due indemnities, the members are responsible for covering 
that deficit. In addition, the members can agree on a particular limit for their 
responsibility of indemnity. On the contrary, where there is surplus, the members 
have the right to claim back such surplus according to each member's contribution.
Accordingly, Al-Jammal concludes that cooperative insurance societies could not be 
considered as companies because they do not aim to share profits, but to share losses. 
These societies differ from insurance companies in that insurance companies fix 
premiums according to statistics and they bear the risks where the indemnities of 
losses are more than the paid premiums. Furthermore, commercial insurance 
companies do, sometimes, use some cooperative insurance functions, that sometimes
60 Ghareeb Al-Jammal, At-Tameen At-Tijari wa Al-Badeel Al-Islami, (Arabic), Commercial Insurance 
and The Islamic Substitute, (Dar Al-Ietisam, Cairo-Egypt), (1979), p. 253.
61 Ibid, p. 254.
62 Ibid. p. 255.
63 Ibid.
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an insurance company stipulates that an insured is entitled to share some profits that 
are earned by the company whereby the insured’s premium will be decreased, unless 
the insured chooses to add the earned profit to the insurance money.64 Al-Jammal, 
moreover, observes that, since insurance contracts contain Gharar, uncertainty, 
insurance must be controlled by cooperative societies to be practiced in the sphere of 
donation in order to be lawful under Sharia.65
Sulaiman Bin Thunayan, distinguishes between two forms of mutual insurance; they 
are, namely, direct mutual insurance and developed mutual insurance.66 The first 
form, i.e. direct mutual insurance, is the one that is based upon cooperation between 
members of a group of people in one family or tribe or members in one occupation to 
insure each other against some losses.67 The members gather together to finance a 
fund in this regard and where there is deficit, the members pay voluntarily to cover it 
without being forced by a contract. The second form, i.e. the developed mutual 
insurance, is, nowadays, different form the direct mutual insurance. The developed 
mutual insurance is dealt with by a modem and specialised administration, which is 
similar to the administrations that deal with insurance companies, whereas the direct 
mutual insurance's administration is practiced voluntarily. Participating in the 
developed mutual insurance has become through contractual agreement with every 
insured individually, while participating in direct mutual insurance was throw
ZQ
solidarity that was based upon relationships between the members. Generally
64 Ibid, p. 256. The author mentioned that, this procedure is used in life insurances, but there is no 
reason prevents that to be adopted in other insurances.
65 Ibid, at p. 259.
66 Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, (Arabic), Insurance and its Rules, (Dar Ibn Hazim, 
Beirut-Lebanon), (2003), p. 273.
67 Ibid.
6* Ibid, pp. 276, 277.
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speaking, the developed mutual insurance has become similar to the commercial 
insurance; therefore, it contains Riba, Gharar and gambling.69
Ali Al-Gurrahdaghi argues that, Islamic insurance should be based on the following 
principles:
First, insurance contracts must comply with Islamic Sharia rules. That is to say, a new 
contract, such as insurance, must be free from any element that makes the contract 
illegal. A well recognised Islamic principle in Sharia is that all contracts and 
stipulations under Sharia are legal unless they contain what turns them to be illegal.70
Second, insurance contracts must be based on donation because Gharar that affects 
commutative or onerous contracts and makes them illegal does not affect charities or
n  i
donations. In a commutative or onerous contract each party gives something for 
getting something else from the other party. Therefore, the subject matter of the 
contract has to be well identified for not causing any conflict between the parties. 
However, in charities and donations the ignorance of the given object would not cause 
any conflict.72
Thus, where a person promises another to present a watch, for example, to him by 
way of charity, it does not matter what kind of watch it is and that would not give a
69 Ibid, p. 284.
70 Ali Mohe'y Ad-Deen Al-Gurrahdaghi, "At-Tameen ala Al-Hayat wa Ad-Dhawabid Ash-Sharreyah 
Le-Uqood At-Tameen ala Al-Hayat", in Bohooth fe  Fiqh Al-Muamalat Al-Maleyah Al-Muaseerah,
(Dar Al-Bashayer Al-Islamiyah, Beirut-Lebanon), (2001), 261, at 315. It seems that the author supports 
the opinion that cooperative insurance is the form that complies with Sharia, whereas commercial 
insurance infringes Sharia principles.
71 Ibid, p. 318.
72 As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa AtharahofeAl-JJqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), 
Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), pp. 522; Fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Vol. 3, pp. 342, 343.
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donee the right of taking legal action against his donator. By contrast, where a vendor 
sells a watch for £1000 without identifying its mark or its features, the contract would 
be void due to the ignorance of the subject matter and the element of Gharar, but 
where the purchaser identifies the watch and the vendor presents a cheaper watch to 
the purchaser, the latter would possess a legal right to take legal action against the 
vendor for claiming his watch or a satisfactory compensation.
Third, distribution of the surplus among the members,73 that Al-Gurrahdaghi 
suggests, the amounts of money that are deposited in the insurance company could be 
invested in legal ways and profits could be made therefrom. Therefore, such profits 
plus the amount of the premiums that remains after the payment of indemnities of the 
members’ losses must be paid back to the insureds and the sharers.74
Fourth, participation in administration and losses, that Al-Gurrahdaghi sets out some
n c
cooperative insurance features, such as that there are mutual interests between the 
members which require them to insure each other; the members share solidarity to 
cover each other; the premiums, or contributions, vary each year according to the cost
7 f \of indemnities that are paid from the paid premiums.
In the light of the above arguments, the element of donation in cooperative 
insurance is a fundamental and that excludes this form of insurance from commerce 
generally. That is to say, since the word "donation or charity" does not exist in 
commercial dictionary, there is no need to say that cooperative insurance is needed in
73 Ibid, p. 322.
74 Ibid, pp. 322, 323.
75 Ibid, pp. 323, 324.
76 Ibid.
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Islamic social life due to the fact that the Islamic Sharia and jurisprudence are rich of 
schemes that secure people. For instance, the system of Zakat imposes supporting 
eight categories of people on rich Muslims or those who are living in a good standard 
of life. Allah said, in Quran,
(As-Sadagat (here it means Zakat) are only for the Fuqara (poor), and Al- 
Masakin (the needy) and those employed to collect (the funds), and to 
attach the hearts of those who have been inclined (towards Islam), and to 
free the captives, and for those in debt, and for Allah's Cause (i.e. for 
Mujahidun -  those fighting in a holy battle), and for the wayfarer (a 
traveller who is cut off from everything); a duty imposed by Allah. And 
Allah is All-Knower, All-Wise).77
In addition to that, it has been said there are numerous of cooperative systems under 
Sharia that impose and encourage Muslims to support each other such as Sadagat, 
charities, Al-A'aqilah system, Al-Muwalat and An-Nehid systems and other systems 
that cannot be tackled in details at this stage.
6.3.2. Illegality o f Insurance under Sharia
The majority of contemporary Muslim scholars and legal jurists support the need of 
insurance as a cooperative system and they observe that insurance contracts are legal 
under Islamic Law provided they are free of prohibited elements. It has been argued
77 Al-Taubah, verse 60, M. Al-Hilali & M. Khan, Translation o f the meaning o f  THE NOBLE QURAN, 
(1417 A.H), (1996-1997), at p. 254.
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that, conventional insurance is a commercial insurance and it is based upon 
fundamental prohibition elements such as Riba and Gharar and May sir™
Therefore, having said that Riba, Gharar and Maysir are three of the main reasons 
behind not accepting the commercial insurance, including life insurance, contracts, it 
is significant for the purpose of the thesis to give a sufficient explanation about how 
do these elements manifest in insurance at this stage.
6.3.2.1. Riba
Riba is manifested in insurance by that where the risk insured against has been 
actually occurred, the position would not be out of the following conditions: either the 
insured gets more than the amount of the premium that he has paid the insurer; or the 
insured gets less than the paid premium from the insurer; or he gets the same amount 
of the paid premium(s); therefore, riba occurs in all conditions. In the first and second 
condition riba Al-Fadhil occurs because the insured paid the premium before the 
insurer pays him the insurance money and they exchange one thing of same kind, i.e. 
money, in different time. In the third condition, riba An-Nase’ah appears in
70exchanging a thing of same kind in different time.
78 In other words, they support cooperative insurance. See; Ahmad Sharaf Ad-Deen, Ahkam At-Tameen 
f i  Al-Qanoon wa Alqadha, (in Arabic), Rules of Insurance in Regulation and Judiciary, 1983, p. 60; 
Yaqob Sarkhoh, At-Tameen Albahrifi Alqanoon Al-Kuwaiti, (in Arabic), Marine Insurance in Kuwaiti 
Law, 1993, 23, p. 27.
79 Researches of the Board of Great Ulama in Saudi Arabia, At-Tameen (Insurance), Vol. 4, (2001), 35, 
at p. 131; Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, (Arabic), Insurance and its Rules, (Dar Ibn 
Hazim, Beirut-Lebanon), (2003), p. 217; Hamad Al-Hammad, Uqood At- Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance 
Contracts, (1989), p. 13; Mabrok Al-Najar, Aqid At-Tameen, (Arabic), The Contract of Insurance, (Dar
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Mohammad Biltaji is of the opinion that the contract of insurance is a kind of 
currency exchanging contract which has been surveyed by the orthodox Islamic 
scholars that where a person sells a currency to another.80 Therefore, the transaction is 
exchanging currencies and that, under Sharia, must be at the same time, otherwise, it 
would be riba An-Nase'ah where the completion of the transactions is delayed.
Therefore, Shawkat Olayan observed that, the calculation of interest, which is riba, 
is a fundamental element in the insurance system that cannot be avoided.81
According to the above arguments, it seems that some jurists treat the contract of 
insurance as some well known contracts such as money exchanging contracts where 
riba An-Nase'a might occur in the case of delaying completion of the transaction. The 
analogy that has been drawn by some jurists between the contract of insurance and the 
money exchanging contract might be true where the analogy is drawn with, what is 
called, contingency insurance policies, such as life policies where the sum recovered
An-Nahdhah Al-Arabiyah, Egypt), (1994), p. 244; Mohammad Biltaji, Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), 
Insurance Contracts, (Maktabat Al-Balad Al-Ameen, Cairo-Egypt), (2000), p. 98. In this regard, a 
question was arisen to IslamOnline.net about the legitimacy of insurance transactions. The answer was 
provided by Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajid, a Saudi scholar and he declared that,
"All types of commercial insurance no doubt entail Riba (interest) because you pay a specific sum of 
money and take a larger or smaller amount should a risk occur. Accordingly, this coverage contains 
Riba An-Nasi ’ah interest on lent money) and Riba Al-Fadl (exchanging a superior thing of the same 
kind of goods with more o f inferior quality of the same kind of goods), for as we know, the insurers 
take premiums from those under this coverage and promise to give them smaller or larger amounts 
should a risk occur to the insured. No doubt, this is the very same Riba which is prohibited according to 
many Qur’anic verses." http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English- 
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=l 119503544750, 06 March 2005.
80 Ibid. See, also, Hussain Hamid Hassan, Hukom Ash-Sharia Al-lslamiyah f i  Uqood At-Tameen, 
(Arabic), The Judgment of Islamic Sharia in Insurance Contracts, undated, p. 474. Hussain Hassan is of 
the opinion that the contract of insurance contains the element of riba because it is an agreement 
between one party, the assured, to pay a sum of money either at once or by instalments to another 
party, the insurer, to undertake to pay the assured or his/her successors or his/her beneficiary a sum of 
money when the risk insured against has occurred. Thus, Hassan treats the contract of insurance as a 
contract of exchanging money or currency.
81 Shawkat Olayan, At-Tameen f i  Ash-Sharia wa Al-Qanoon, (Arabic), Insurance in Sharia and Law, 2nd 
ed., (Dar Ar-Rasheed, Riyadh-Saudi Arabia), (1981), p. 217.
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is fixed by the policy, but the matter might be different in indemnity insurance 
policies, for example property insurance. That is to say, in property insurance it is not 
necessary that the insurer must pay the insured a sum of money where he suffers a 
loss due to the occurrence of the risk insured against as an indemnity. Instead, the 
indemnity could be by reinstatement, i.e. that where the insurer pays for the repair or 
replacement of the insured property instead of paying money to the insured.83 In third 
party car insurance, for instance, the insurer usually, as the case in England, pays the 
garage directly where the third party victim’s car is repaired.
It is doubted, therefore, the issue of riba is questionable therein, but that does not 
mean there is no other question that could be arisen regarding the legitimacy of 
insurance. It must be noted, however, that, if premium is considered as loan, as what 
some Muslim jurists think, the element of riba triggers where the insured is paid 
insurance money by his insurer or where even the insurer pays the garage directly 
where the third party victim's car is repaired in the case of third party insurance. The 
reason is that, under Islamic Sharia every loan produces an economic benefit is riba.
Indeed, the issues of Maysir and Gharar could be arisen in any form of insurance; if 
that is true, the contract of insurance will be rejected under Sharia. Therefore, it is 
necessary, at this stage, to explore how Maysir and Gharar manifest in the contract of 
insurance.
82 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 2nd ed., (2005), p. 263, 
the matter is similar in valued policies in the case o f marine insurance. See, also, the case in Valued 
Policies in Marine insurance. See, for example, section (27) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 [UK]; 
Susan Hodges, Law o f  Marine Insurance, (1997), p. 71.
83 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, ibid, at p. 282. See, Brown v Royal Insurance Co (1859) 1 El & 
El 853; Carlyle v Elite Insurance Co (1984) 56 BCLR 331.
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63.2.2. Maysir84
The contract of insurance contains the element of gambling where the assured pay 
the premium with a hope that he benefits from the insurance money should the risk 
insured against occurs. Otherwise, the insurer wins the premium where the contract of 
insurance expires without any claim from the part of the assured to be indemnified 
from a loss that is caused by the risk insured against. According to Al-Thunayan, the 
contract of insurance contains two fundamental principles, namely, risk and 
contingency. Gambling, therefore, is based upon the same principles, i.e. risk and 
contingency.85
63.23. Gharar
As a matter of fact, the element of Gharar does not influence the validity of all 
contracts, but there is a certain degree of Gharar that must exist in a certain type of 
contracts. Al-Dhareer, nevertheless, sets out four conditions that must take place in a 
contract that contains Gharar in order to say such contract is invalid. There are, 
namely, the contract must be an onerous contract; Gharar in such contract must be 
excessive; Gharar must relate to the subject-matter of the contract; finally, there must
84 It is of importance to note that, the core o f Maysir, gambling is the element of Gharar, uncertainty, 
which will be dealt with in detail below. The element of Gharar appears in gambling in that a gambler 
does not know at the time of playing whether he/she will win or lose. Note, also, the same rule applies 
to wagering.
85 Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, (Arabic), Insurance and its Rules, (Dar Ibn Hazim, 
Beirut-Lebanon, 2003), p. 227.
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not be a necessity for the contract.86 Therefore, it is necessary to go throw these 
conditions in more details.
Firstly, Gharar must exist in an onerous contract. That is to say, where the parties in 
a contract exchange economic benefits, as the case in a sale contract, lease or hire 
contract or other onerous contract, the parties must be clear about what they agree on. 
The general prohibition of Gharar was declared by Prophet Mohammad, peace be 
upon him, in many kind of sale transactions, as for instance, he prohibited selling 
fruits before they are ripe.87 In this manner, Fadi Moghaizel observes that, "...Gharar 
is applicable to contracts involving an actual exchange of countervalues which are 
subject to the requirement of equivalence and not to a transaction containing a binding 
promise of financial assistance in consideration of a contribution to a fund affected for 
this purpose. That is why the sale of unripe fruits has been forbidden by the Prophet, 
peace be upon him. If they do not reach maturity for what ever reason, the projected
86 As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa Atharaho fe  Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), 
Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), p. 584.
87 Ibid, at p. 585. See, Imam Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, Vol. 6 ,4th ed., (Dar A'alam Al-Kutub, 
Riyadh-Saudi Arabia), (1999), p. 148; Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic 
Law, 2nd ed., (1992), p. 75. Saleh translated a list of ten cases which constitute forbidden Gharar 
transactions under Sharia that had been provided by a Muslim Maliki jurist Ibn Jauzi, that, ''(a) 
Difficulty in putting the buyer in possession o f the subject-matter; such as the sale of stray animal or 
the young still unborn when the mother is not part of the sale.
(b) Want o f knowledge (jahl) with regard to the price or the subject-matter, such as the vendor saying 
to the potential buyer: "I sell you what is in my sleeve."
(c) Want of knowledge with regard to the characteristics of the price or of the subject-matter, such as 
the vendor saying to the potential buyer: "I sell you a piece of cloth which is in my home"; or the sale 
of an article without the buyer inspecting or the seller describing it.
(d) Want o f knowledge with regard to the quantum of the piece or the quantity of the subject-matter, 
such as an offer to sell "at today's price" or "at the market price."
(e) Want o f knowledge with regard to the date o f future performance, such as an offer to sell when a 
stated person enters the room or when a stated person dies.
(f) Two sales in one transaction, such as selling one article at two different prices, one for cash and one 
for credit, or selling two different articles at one price, one price, one for immediate remittance and one 
for a deferred one.
(g) The sale of what is not expected to revive, such as the sale of a sick animal.
(h) Bay' al-hasah, which is a type o f sale whose outcome is determined by the throwing of a stone.
(i) Bay' munabadha, which is a sale performed by the vendor throwing a cloth at the buyer and 
achieving the sale transaction without giving the buyer the opportunity for properly examining the 
object of the sale.
(j) Bay' mulamasa, where the bargain is struck by touching the object of the sale without examining 
it."; at pp. 64, 65.
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equivalence would then be upset and the result would be an unjustified increase of 
capital to the benefit of the seller."88
Therefore, the element of Gharar does not influence the validity of donative 
contracts, such as gratuitous contract, because the grantee of the parties does not pay 
for what he gets and, therefore, Gharar in the latter contract does not cause a dispute 
between the parties. Having said that, the grantee does not unlawfully eat the grantor's 
money; therefore, the contract is valid.89 As for the contract of insurance, it is an 
onerous contract that both parties have to fulfil their duties towards each other. The 
insured is obligated to pay out the premium and, on the other hand, the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the insured should he/she suffer a loss due to the occurrence 
of insured risks.
Secondly, Gharar must be excessive in an onerous contract. The consequence of this 
degree is that one party will eat, or gain, the other party's money unlawfully. 
Accordingly, where a vendor sells a subject-matter that cannot hand over to the 
purchaser or where the vendor sells a stray animal, Gharar will invalidate the contract. 
Nevertheless, Gharar is slight or immaterial and, therefore, will not influence the 
validity of the contract where it is reasonable and does not cause any dispute between 
the parties. For example, where a person buys a house without seeing its foundation or 
where a tenant rent a house for a month and it is not certain whether the month will be 
twenty nine days or thirty days.90 In fact, the notion of excessive Gharar enjoys
88 Fadi Moghaizel, Insurance in The Light o f  Islamic Legal Principles, (PhD Thesis, SOAS, University 
of London), (1990), p. 195.
89 As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa Atharahofe Al-JJqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), 
Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), p. 586.
90 Ibid, p. 587. This example is provided by orthodox Muslim jurists using the Islamic calendar which 
depends on the moon.
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flexibility in Islamic jurisprudence which is supported by Al-Dhareer because, 
according to him, the judgment whether the element of Gharar is excessive or not 
would depend on each case's facts and the nature of each transaction. It is admitted 
that the judgment on a transaction that whether it contains an excessive Gharar that 
invalidates it, is an elusive issue which depends on an endeavour of a scholar. Thus, 
Al-Dhareer supports the view that the criterion of an excessive Gharar is that where a 
contract is described by it as, for instance, selling fish in the sea or bird in the air.91
Applying this condition to the contract of insurance, Gharar is excessive in that 
none of the parties knows, at the time of concluding the contract, whether the risk 
insured against will actually occur and how much the insurer will indemnify the 
insured.
Thirdly, Gharar must relate to the subject-matter of the contract. It has been said 
that, where a vendor sells unripe fruits, the sale would be illegal due to the element of 
Gharar.92 However, should the vendor sells a tree with its unripe fruits, the sale is 
legal because Gharar is in a thing that is subsidiary to the subject-matter of the
i 93contract, i.e. the tree.
As far as the contract of insurance is concerned, an insured seeks insuring his 
interest against certain risks in order to protect his economic status from being 
prejudiced as a result of the occurrence of the insured risk(s). On the other hand, an
91 Ibid, p. 592. See, also, Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 2nd ed., 
(1992), p. 75.
92 Imam Abdullah Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, Vol. 6 ,4‘ ed., (Dar A'alam Al-Kutub, Riyadh-Saudi 
Arabia), (1999), p. 148.
93 As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa Atharahofe Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, (Arabic), 
Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), p. 594.
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insurer provides the insured a promise to indemnify him/her should the risk insured 
against has actually occurred and caused him/her a loss. Thus, it has been mentioned 
that, where an insured buys an insurance policy from an insurer; the policy represents 
a promise from the part of the insurer that he is obligated to indemnify the insured 
should the latter suffers a loss under certain circumstances.
Accordingly, it can be said that the subject-matter of the contract is the insurer's 
promise of indemnity which is probable and dependant upon several factors; for 
example, the happening of the risk insured against, the loss suffered must be 
attributable to the insured risk, the risk must occur during the time of the insurance 
policy and the insured must possess an insurable interest in the subject-matter of 
insurance at the time of the loss.94 There are, of course, other factors that are related to 
the insured's fulfilment of the duty of utmost good faith, the policy's warranties, etc. 
Furthermore, it has been admitted, under English law, that a contract of insurance is a 
contract upon speculation;95 therefore, the contract of insurance is an aleatory 
contract. Consequently, the element of Gharar is related to the subject-matter of the 
contract that makes the contract of insurance invalid under Sharia.
Fourthly, there must not be a necessity for the contract that contains Gharar.96 Al- 
Dhareer observes that, when people are in desire need of a contract, without which
94 For more discussion of deferent views about the definition of insurable interest under English law, 
see section 3.2, supra.
95 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905.
96 It has to be borne in mind that, Dr Al-Dhareer used the word (hajah) which means need instead of 
(<dharurah) which means necessity. However, he explained that traditional Muslim jurists had been 
using the word {hajah), need, in the same meaning of {dharurah), necessity. Therefore, he used, in his 
research, {hajah) in the same meaning of {dharurah). The difference between the two concepts is that 
(dharurah), necessity is a higher degree than {hajah), need. Furthermore, where there is a public need 
for all people in a place, such need is treated as necessity. Therefore, there are some nominated 
contracts in Sharia that have been legal although the contain the element o f Gharar such as the sale of 
{salam) which means sale with advance payment for future delivery. This kind of sale is, in principle,
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they are faced with difficulties, such contract would be legal regardless the degree of 
Gharar it contains. He, also, observes that elimination of difficulties from people is 
from the general principles of Sharia. However, it has to be borne in mind that, such 
contract must be legal in principle.
Furthermore, Hussain Hassan argues that, where an onerous contract contains 
Gharar in four situations the contract would be null and void. They are, namely, 
Gharar in the existence of the subject-matter, Gharar in the gaining, Gharar in the 
value or the price and Gharar in the time of gaining one of the counter-values.97
In the first place, Hassan argues that there is no disagreement between Muslim 
jurists that an onerous contract which has no object or subject-matter or which is 
uncertain to be existent, is void. According to him, where the subject-matter of a sale 
contract is a stray camel that is doubted to be existed, such contract is void because 
gaining the subject-matter, i.e. the camel, is subject to a risk of its existence. So, in the 
case of non-existence of the subject-matter, the purchaser would have paid his money
illegal. However, due to the need for people to practice this kind of contracts, it has become a public 
need and, therefore, it has become legal. For more detailed discussion on this see, Nabil A. Saleh, 
Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 2nd ed., (1992), p. 89. The author explains the sale 
of salam and its mechanism that, "the vendor has no title over the sale object but undertakes to make it 
available to the purchaser. The subject-matter of bay' salam, sale of salam, is a promise given against 
payment and not an object in rem; a personal obligation and not an object in kind. Under strict Sharia 
rules this kind of sale would be unlawful, for the vendor deals with an article which is not in his 
possession. Nevertheless, bay' salam was admitted by Sharia on the ground of a tradition attributed to 
the Prophet, peace be upon him, himself and on the ground o f consensus (ijma) and because it responds 
to public need. Bay' salam, being an exception to a general rule, namely that the sale objected should 
be available to the contracting parties at the time the sale is concluded, is bound by special rules 
intended to minimize the danger of gharar and, rather theoretically, the danger of riba. In this 
connection the subject-matter and the price in a bay' salam cannot both be currencies, for the deferred 
exchange of currencies with or without an excess is unlawful according to nearly all schools of law."; 
at p. 89. See, As-Seddeeg M. Al-Dhereer, Al-Gharar wa Atharaho fe  Al-Uqoodfe Al-Fiqh Al-lslami, 
(Arabic), Uncertainty and its Effect Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, (1967), pp. 600-604. However, 
Dr Hussain Hamid Hassan used (dharurah) where he discussed the element of Gharar in the contract of 
insurance. See, Hussain Hamid Hassan, Hukom Ash-Sharia Al-Islamiyah f i  Uqood At-Tameen,
(Arabic), The Judgment of Islamic Sharia in Insurance Contracts, undated, p. 468. Accordingly, this 
thesis will use the concept of (dharurah) in this context.
97 Hussain Hamid Hassan, ibid, pp. 456-462.
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for nothing which is speculation. Therefore, he observes that, the latter case applies to 
the contract of insurance because the insurance money, which is a debt upon an 
insurance company, is uncertain to exist because it depends on the occurrence of the 
insured risk.98
In the second place, Hassan contends that, Muslim scholars are unanimous in that 
where a party in an onerous contract does not know at the time of concluding the 
contract whether or not he will receive one of the counter-values or the thing that 
makes him to conclude the contract, such contract will be void because the transaction 
is on risk.99 That explains the reason behind forbidding foetuses in their mothers’ 
wombs. As for the contract of insurance, Hassan argues that this condition applies to 
insurance because an insured does not know at the time of concluding the contract 
whether he will gain the insurance money, which he has paid the premiums for, 
because gaining the insurance money depends on a contingent event.100
In the third place, according to Hassan, where the price of an onerous contract is 
unknown, the contract will be void. This is unanimous among Muslim scholars.101 
Thus, where a person sells his house to another without identifying the prise or a 
landlord lets his premises to a tenant without identifying the rate of the rent, the 
contract will be null and void. As far as the contract of insurance is concerned, in 
indemnity insurance, the insurance money is unknown at the time of concluding the 
contract because it depends on the loss that is caused by the insured risk from the part
98 Ibid, pp. 456,457.
"Ib id , p. 457.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid, pp. 458-460
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of the insured. On the other hand, the insurance company does not know about the 
cost of the indemnity at the time of concluding the contract.102
In the fourth place, the ignorance of gaining one of the counter-values by either 
party renders an onerous contract null and void. Thus, Hassan argues that, in some 
forms of life insurance an insurance company is uncertain about the time of the 
payment of the insurance money to the beneficiary.103 Therefore, this degree of 
ignorance constitutes an excessive Gharar which invalidates the contract.
6.3,3. Legitimacy o f Insurance under Sharia
It can be said that, there are a minority of contemporary Muslim scholars and legal 
jurists who are of the view that insurance contracts in all forms are legal under Sharia.
Al-Sanhuri, as an example for this doctrine, claimed that insurance is lawful under 
Sharia because it is a system based upon cooperation between insureds to spread 
losses between them. On the other hand, an insurer is an intermediary, who 
coordinates the relationship between the insureds on a proper technical basis in order
102 Ibid, p. 460.
103 Ibid, p. 462. See, also, Sulaiman Al-Thunayan, At-Tameen wa Ahkamuh, (Arabic), Insurance and its 
Rules, (Dar Ibn Hazim, Beirut-Lebanon), (2003), p. 237.
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to indemnify the few insureds who suffer losses.104 Surprisingly, Al-Sanhuri argued 
that insurance contracts, including life insurance, are valid under Sharia. That, 
"...there is another aspect in the contract of insurance other than the relationship 
between the insurer and the insured and the contract of insurance cannot be fully 
understood without considering that aspect. An insurance company", he said, "does 
not conclude an insurance contract with one insured, nor with few insureds. However, 
should the company conclude the contract in that way, it would be gambling or 
wagering, therefore, the contract would be unlawful." He carried on mentioning that, 
"Where the insurance company agrees, for example, to indemnify the insured in the 
case that his house is burnt down, in fire insurance, by paying him the amount of the 
value of his house and if it does not suffer loss by fire, the premium, which was paid 
by the insured, is an equitable right of the company. That is wagering. Yet, the 
company enters into insurance contracts with large number of insureds and receives 
premiums from each of them. The total of the premiums is paid to indemnify few of 
those insureds who suffered loss and the premium is calculated on technical principles 
that are derived from statistics."105 Therefore, he believed that an insurance contract is 
lawful under Sharia because it is not gaming, but it is mere cooperation between 
insured to cover each other against any possible loss. He observed that,
"Indeed, from an economic technical aspect, contract of insurance is not 
gaming, not from the part of the insurer because he collects premiums from
104 See Mustafa Mohammad Al-Faqi, Abdul Rrazag Al-Sanhuri, Al-Waseetfi Sharh Al-Qanoon Al- 
Madani, (in Arabic), Al-Waseet in Explanation o f the Civil Law, part 7, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., (Dar An- 
Nahdhah Al-Arabiyah Cairo-Egypt), (1990), foot note 1, p. 1382. It is significant to mention that, Dr 
Al-Sanhuri was the one who drafted the Egyptian Civil Law 1948. Therefore, his view is o f importance 
because it represents a doctrine which is followed by wide range o f Arab, especially Egyptian, legal 
jurists. See also, Hussam Al-Ahwani, Almabadi Al-Aammah Lel-Tameen, (in Arabic), General 
principles of Insurance, (1975), p. 33; Mustafa Az-Zarga, Agid At-Tameen wa Mawgiff Asharia Al- 
Islamiah menho, (Arabic), Insurance Contract and its position under Islamic Sharia, (Damascus 
University), (1962), pp. 25, 37; Ali Al-Khafif, a research presented to the second conference of the 
Islamic Research Academy of Al-Azhar, 1965, p. 33.
105 Al-Sanhuri, ibid, at p. 1379.
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the insureds and spends them to indemnify those insureds who suffer losses, 
but he does not expose himself to the contingency of loss or profit more than 
other person in any lawful business. Nor, from the part of the insured who 
does not benefit from insurance by gaming depending on fortune or chance. 
However, the insured benefits from insurance by cooperating with other 
insureds where losses are spread between them. Also, the insured secures 
himself from misfortune and risks by this cooperation. Thus, this cooperation 
should not be called gaming."106
Some other jurists have drawn an analogy between the contract of insurance and 
some other contract that have been well known for general Islamic scholars. Ahmad 
Taha As-Sanusi, for instance, analogised the contract of liability insurance with the
107contract of Al-Muwalat, whereby someone of unknown descent agrees with 
someone else who is known descent that the latter undertakes to indemnify him for 
any legal fine where he accidentally causes death or grievous bodily harm, but 
without malice aforethought, such as manslaughter, in return for that the other person 
succeeds him should he die without successors. As-Sanusi was of the view that the 
contract of liability insurance and the contract of Al-Muwalat share some similarities, 
that in insurance there is a contractual duty whereby the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify the insured in the case he suffers a loss that is arisen from his liability to a
106 Mustafa Mohammad Al-Faqi, Abdul Rrazag Al-Sanhuri, Al-Waseet f i  Shark Alkanoon Almadani,
(in Arabic), Al-Waseet in Illustration of the Civil Law, part 7, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., (Dar An-Nahthah Al- 
Arabiyah Cairo-Egypt), (1990), foot note 1 (d), p. 1380, at p. 1383.
107 See, Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary of Islamic legal 
terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 438.
Al-Muwalat contract is a cause of succession in Hanafi school of law in the Islamic jurisprudence. See, 
Mustafa Az-Zarga, Agid At-Tameen wa Mawgiff Asharia Al-Islamiah menho, (Arabic), Insurance 
Contract and its position under Islamic Sharia, (Damascus University), (1962), p. 22.
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third party in return for payment of a premium. In Al-Muwalat,108 there is a 
contractual duty between one party, Mauwla Al-Muwalat, and the other party where 
the latter undertakes to indemnify the first party in the case that he is obligated to pay 
a victim Diyah or Arsh109 in return for the right of succession where the first party, i.e. 
Mauwla Al-Muwalat, has no successors.110
It can be said that, the nature of the contract of insurance totally differs from the 
nature of Al-Muwalat contract. According to Shawkat Olayan, there is a moral 
element in Al-Muwalat that is not found in insurance. That, in Al-Muwalat the reason 
of concluding the contract is moral and the parties agree on brotherhood to support 
and back each other and the financial support is a consequence of the contract. On the 
other hand, the relationship between the parties, in insurance, is based upon economic 
interests. The contract of insurance is a commutative contract, whereas the contract of 
Al-Muwalat is based upon creating a kinship between the parties.111
Furthermore, Shaikh Ali Al-Khafif analysed the contract of insurance and he was of 
the opinion that insurance was legal under Sharia. Although he admitted that the 
contract of insurance was an aleatory contract and contained some amount of ghara,
108 See, Mohammad Biltaji, Uqood At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance Contracts, (Maktabat Al-Balad Al- 
Ameen, Cairo-Egypt), (2000), p. 112.
109 An Islamic devise, which is an economic penalty that is paid by a wrongdoer to his victim as an 
indemnity for wounds and fractures. See, Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lughat al- 
Fuqaha, (Dictionary of Islamic legal terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 188.
110 Mustafa Az-Zarga agreed with this analogy. See, Mustafa M. Az-Zarga, Netham At-Tameen, 
(Arabic), Insurance System, (Al-Resalah Est., Beirut-Lebanon), (1984), p. 57. In contrast, see the 
argument of Shaikh Mohammad Abo Zahrah who strongly disagreed with Az-Zarga on this analogy as 
well as the analogy between insurance and Al-Aaqilah system; see Mustafa Az-Zarga, ibid, at pp. 73 & 
74.
111 Shawkat Olayan, At-Tameen fe  Ash-Sharia wa Al-Qanoon, (Arabic), Insurance in Sharia and Law, 
2nd ed., (Dar Ar-Rasheed, Riyadh-Saudi Arabia), (1981), pp. 159-160.
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uncertainty, he thought that such uncertainty did not cause conflicts between parties 
and that what had been making insurance widespread between people.112
Mustafa Az-Zarga surveyed insurance not only as a contract, but as a system.113 His 
view was that insurance in general, whether cooperative, or what is called mutual, or 
commercial, was based upon solidarity that could be achieved by three elements. 
These are, namely, cooperation between insureds, set-off between risks and the use of 
statistics.114 According to him, in mutual insurance the cooperation is direct because 
making profits is not intended in this form. In commercial insurance, however, is 
profitable and the cooperation appears in indirect manner by way of set off between 
indemnities that are paid by an insurance company to its insureds who suffer losses 
that insured against and the premiums that are collected from the insureds. Therefore, 
it seems that the indemnity is actually operated by the insureds that where they pay 
their premiums to the insurance company. Nevertheless, the amount that exceeds after 
indemnifying all prejudiced insureds is considered a profit for the company and, thus, 
it is not refundable to the insureds. Thus, this case differs from the case in mutual, or 
cooperative, insurance that the insured can get back that surplus. Therefore, the
112 Issa Abdoh, At-Tameen bayn Al-Halal wa Al-Haram, (in Arabic), Insurance between Lawfulness 
and Prohibition, (1978), pp. 203-206. The author presented opinions of several legal jurists and 
scholars who thought that insurance was legal under Sharia on the ground that insurance is cooperation 
between insureds to indemnify each other. See, Shaikh Abdu Al-Wahhab Khilaf who said that the 
contract of life assurance was legal in Sharia because it was a speculation where the assureds present a 
capital to the speculator, the insurer, who exploit the capital and share the profits with the assureds, at 
p. 207; see also, Mohammad Al-Bahi who was of the opinion that the contract of insurance was not a 
sale contract, but solidarity contract between insureds to encounter with risks, at p. 209; Shaikh Abd 
Al-Munsif Mahmood, he was of the opinion that insurance was similar to guarantee, at 213; 
Mohammad Yusif Mosa, he thought that insurance was beneficial and it was kind of cooperation and 
about life insurance it was legal in Sharia so long as it did not contain riba, usury, that if the assured 
lived up to the age that specified in the contract, he should not take back more what he had actually 
paid to the insurance company. However, if  he died before that age, his successors could earn the 
insurance money, at p. 214.
1,3 Mustafa M. Az-Zarga, Netham At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance System, (Al-Resalah Est., Beirut- 
Lebanon, 1984). The author said that the role o f insurance was just like the role of a lightning rod. The 
lightning rod provides a protection by transferring thunder to a route to avoid its harm. Likewise, the 
contract of insurance provides protection to avoid the harm of risks insured against; at p. 47.
114 Ibid, at p. 42.
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solidarity and cooperative principles in the system of insurance differentiates it from 
gambling.115 He observed that the notion of cooperation could operate by spreading 
risk upon a large number of insureds and this way makes a loss disappear by 
reinsurance.116 Az-Zarga argued that insurance was not gambling nor wagering that 
the contract of insurance is commutative and it is beneficial to both parties that it is 
profitable for the insurer and it provides security and indemnity for the insured, 
whereas in both gambling and wagering the parties depend, when they play, on luck 
and fortune.117
Furthermore, Az-Zarg never agreed with the argument that insurance contained 
Gharar, uncertainty. In his view, a contract of Gharar is based upon an adventure or a 
bet which is the case in wagering and gambling and its consequence is not beneficial 
to both parties. Instead, the consequence will be that one party loses and the other 
wins depending on the adventure or the bet.118 In his opinion, the contract of 
insurance should not be considered as a contingent contract, that the contingency 
occurs from the part of the insurer that whether he would indemnify the insured where 
the risk insured against has actually occurred or not. The statistic principle in the 
insurance system would exclude contingency from the insurance contracts that the 
insurer goes into as a whole. As from the perspective of the insured, the contingency 
does not exist due to the fact that the insured does, in fact, get what he really expects 
from the insurance contract, i.e. security, no matter whether the risk insured against 
has occurred or not. Because where the risk does not occur, the insured would be 
unworried and secured that his property and his interests would have been sound. On
115 Ibid, at p. 43.
u6 Ibid.
117 Ibid, at pp. 45 & 46.
m  Ibid, p. 48.
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the contrary, where the risk insured against has occurred, the insured would be 
indemnified and that, therefore, what the insured pays the premium for.119
Moreover, he argued that, the element of contingency, or uncertainty, is acceptable 
in contracts of guarantee by Islamic scholars not matter what its degree is, that the 
contract of guarantee would have been accepted where the guaranteed matter had 
been unknown to the guarantor whether about its existence or its amount. Thus, it 
would be legal where a guarantor undertakes to indemnify a creditor should his debtor 
die or travel abroad within a certain period of time.120 According to Az-Zarga, the 
argument that insurance is not a property that could be bought, or in other words is an 
intangible item, should be rejected, that there is nothing in Sharia prevents a person to 
pay so much money for securing him self, his family and their properties and future 
by concluding contracts for that purpose. Therefore, hiring a watchman or custodian 
to protect or take care of a property against any aggression by other person would 
only provide a sense of security for the property owner and continuation of the safety 
of the property. This consequence is not tangible and, therefore, it differs from other 
consequences of other contracts such as carriage of things or making some product by 
a manufacturer. Instead, the consequence of the watchman's or the custodian's job is 
to provide security. Likewise, an insured, in a contract of insurance, spends a part of 
his money in order to get some security or insurance from losses that could result
191from some risks.
Recently, Shaikh Abd Al-Muhsin Al-Ubaikan has been asked about the legitimacy
of insurance on driving or third party insurance. His answer is that motor insurance is
U9Ibid, p. 50. 
noIbid.
Ui Ibid, p. 51.
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a commercial insurance; in fact there is no distinction between commercial insurance 
and cooperative insurance and insurance is legitimate. He says, those people who say 
that insurance is unlawfully eating people's money pursuant to what Allah said that,
(O you who believe! eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good­
will: nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you 
Most Merciful!).122
Unlawfully eating peoples' money could be by deceit, stealing, usury, but that does 
not appear in insurance. He observes that, where someone hires a guard man to guard 
his house from thieves and pays him for many years without any occurrence of the 
thieves, do we say the guard man unlawfully ate the house owner's money? No, an 
insured pays a premium for being unworried not for profiting. He rejects the view that 
insurance is riba, usury, and gambling. There is risk in gambling that a gambler pays 
1000 S.R.123 with a hope that he could earn 100,000 S.R., so he could win or lose. In 
insurance, however, there is no risk because the premium is paid as remuneration to 
the insurer who obviates a disaster from the insured. In other words, the premium, as 
remuneration, is paid for shifting the risk from the insured to the insurer. He, then, 
analogises insurance with Al-Aaqilah and that the insureds are cooperating with each 
other to obviate disasters from each other. As far as ghara, uncertainty, is concerned, 
Shaikh Al-Ubaikan does not see any uncertainty in the contract of insurance. That, the 
insured pays the premium with a full knowledge it will not be returned and it is for 
obviating the disaster. Further, he argues that if it is said that the commercial 
insurance is repugnant to Sharia because it is riba, usury, gharar, uncertainty and
122 An-Nessa, 4, verse 29. See, Ibid, at p. 310.
123 An abbreviation for Saudi Riyal, Saudi currency.
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gambling, the cooperative insurance is the same and it is, therefore, repugnant to 
Sharia because the members pay contributions to indemnify each other where one of 
them suffers loss, but it is said the member pays the contribution as donator. In fact, 
there is no donation here because the member pays the contribution in return for being 
indemnified when he suffers loss.124
124 Abd Al-Muhsin Al-Ubaikan, At-Tameen, (Arabic), Insurance, a recorded seminar on cassette, 
undated.
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6.4. Insurance Contracts under Saudi Jurisdiction
Broadly speaking, Saudi courts reject any case which has to any forbidden element 
such as riba, usury. That is why the courts continuously refuse to deal with any case 
that relates, for example, to banks because there is a general belief that all banks in 
Saudi Arabia are usurious. Likewise, the Saudi courts have been refusing to deal with 
insurance cases for religious reasons.125 Nonetheless, should a court find itself forced 
to deal with a case that its subject relates to insurance, the court will deal with it as the 
issue of insurance is never existed in the case and, instead, it will construe, where it is 
possible, insurance as a different issue. Accordingly, some Saudi courts have, 
recently, looked into some third party motor insurance cases, but they treat them as 
guarantee contracts instead. For example, there is a case that has been dealt with by 
the public court in city of Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah,126 where the defendant was 
the National Corporate for Cooperative Insurance that had been insuring a driver who 
negligently had a car accident which caused the death of the victim. Another court 
had found for the victim's family, the plaintiffs, and had obligated the defendant, the 
driver, to pay Diyah and damages.127 However, due to the fact that the driver 
defendant was insolvent and, at the same time, insured, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant's insurer should pay Diyah and damages as a guarantor. Although the 
insurer claimed, inter alia, that the court was not the competent court pursuant to 
Article (20) of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law 2003, the court 
rejected the insurer argument and upheld the plaintiffs' allegation and held that the
125 See, Grievances Department case No. 1113/1/Q, 1423 A.H., 2002-3; case No. 1445/1/Q, 1425 A.H., 
2005.
126 Public Court- Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah, case No. 154/1185/4, 5/7/1425 A.H., 21/8/2004.
127 An Islamic device which is an indemnity that consists of, usually but not necessarily, sum of money 
that is given to the victim's family by the killer, where he kills the victim without malice aforethought. 
See, Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary of Islamic legal 
terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 188.
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insurer should pay Diyah and damages for the insured because the insurer was the 
insured's guarantor.
Saudi judicial system is based on three types of courts. Public Courts, which enjoy 
the general authority and deal with civil, including family disputes, and criminal 
disputes;128 Grievances Department, which deals with, inter alia, administrative and 
commercial disputes.129 The Grievances Department is also called an administrative
1 m  1^1court; and a number of commissions that deal with specified cases. Thus, "Aside 
from the Sharia Courts, there are a number of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions 
with specialized jurisdictions. Some of these include the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, Committee on Commercial Paper, Supreme Commission on Labor Disputes, 
Commission on Impeachment of Ministers, and separate councils for civil servants, 
military personnel, and government employees. The judgments made in all of these 
bodies may be appealed to the Grievance Board."132 Therefore, since Saudi courts 
have been rejecting resolving insurance cases, there is a need to establish a judicial 
committee for this regard.
In the light of the above, Saudi Government has passed the Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Control Law 2003 where it has been stated that insurance disputes shall be
128 Article (26) o f Judiciary Law, Royal Decree No. M/64, 14/7/1395 A.H., 23/7/1975. The article 
states that,
"Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all disputes and crimes, except those exempted 
by law. Rules for the jurisdiction o f courts shall be set forth in the Shari’ah Procedure Law Courts and 
Law of Criminal Procedure. Specialized Courts may be formed by Royal Order on the 
recommendation o f the Supreme Judicial Council."
129 Article (8) of Grievances Department Law, Royal Decree No. M/51, 1402 A.H.,1982. Grievances 
Department became specialized in resolving commercial disputes by Royal Decree No. 241, 1987.
130 It is translated also as (Grievance Board). For more discussion, see, Fahad Al-Dugaithir, Raqabat 
Al-Qadha ala Qararat Al-Idarah, (Arabic), Control of Judiciary on Administrative Decision, (Dar An- 
Nahdhah Al-Arabiah, Cairo-Egypt), undated. See, also, Alison Lerrick & Q. Javed Mian, Saudi 
Business and Labor Law, 2nd ed., (1987), pp. 198 & 231.
131 See, Alison Lerrick & Q. Javed Mian, ibid, at p. 221.
132 See, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, United Nations Development Programme, at: 
http://www.pogar.org/countries/judiciary .asp?cid= 16.
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resolved by a committee of three members. It, also, states that parties in an insurance 
dispute can appeal before the Grievances Department. Article (20) of the Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Control Law 2003 states that,
"One committee or more shall be formed by an Edict of the Council of 
Ministers on a recommendation of the Minister of Finance. Such committee 
shall consist of three specialized members, one whom at least, must be a legal 
consultant. The committee shall undertake to resolve the disputes arising 
between insurance companies and their customers or between the companies 
and other companies when they subrogate the insured persons, and settle 
violations of regulatory and supervisory instructions issued to insurance and 
re-insurance companies and the violations of those engaged in self- 
employment occupations referred to under Article (18).... Representing the 
Public Prosecution before this committee, in respect of such violations, shall 
be the employees appointed by virtue of an order issued by the Minister of 
Finance. Resolutions adopted by such committee may be appealed before the 
Grievances Department."
It has to be noted, however, that the committee has not yet commenced proceeding.
Insurance disputes, therefore, have been resolved either by an appointed committee in
the Saudi Ministry of Commerce or Arbitration. Hence, this matter does not show
1 ^clear manners in dealing with certain insurance issues under Saudi jurisdiction. 
That is to say, it can be found that two different judgements on one issue depending 
on each arbitrator’s point of view about the issue.
133 It has to be noted that, arbitral decisions and the decisions that are made by committee of resolution 
of insurance disputes in the Ministry of Commerce are not published and that makes the position rather 
harder to find out a particular manner in dealing with insurance legal issues.
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6.5. General Comments
It seems that, the reason behind the variety of opinions between the Islamic scholars 
and the Muslim legal jurists about insurance contracts is the lack of a full 
understanding the legal aspects and technical features of insurance contracts.
Some of them tried to show that insurance contracts comply with Sharia by arguing 
that insurance should be tackled as a system between many insureds who undertook to 
cooperate with each other to spread losses upon themselves, but not as a contract 
between an insurer and an insured or few insureds, which will make the contract, in 
this form, a wagering or gambling contract. Therefore, under such circumstances, 
insurance contracts are lawful. That does not make legal sense because a contract of 
insurance is an agreement between two parties.
The other doctrine claimed that insurance is unlawful because it is not similar to any 
recognised contracts by the orthodox Islamic jurisprudence and the schools of law. In 
fact, Islamic law is not rigid to strictly nominate certain contracts to be lawful, that is 
incompatible with the general principle of Sharia. As the matter of fact, Sharia allows 
persons to go into agreements according to their interests so long as they comply with 
its general principles and as long as the do not unlawfully eat each other's money.
The third doctrine said that cooperative insurance, which is based upon donation or 
charity, is the only solution to reform insurance to comply with Sharia. Yet, this 
opinion takes the intention of donation or charity, at the time of concluding insurance 
contracts and, therefore, paying a premium, as a criterion which distinguishes
233
commercial insurance from co-operative insurance. Indeed, where a gratuitous 
contract contains Gharar, the contract is not void under Sharia, thus, the contract of 
cooperative insurance is a contract that is based upon charity or donation and, 
therefore, it is valid under Sharia. In point of fact, that cannot be an accurate criterion, 
especially, where the insured is a trader, for instance, wishes to insure his goods 
against fire and theft.
Those fatwas, in respect of cooperative insurance, did not consider or discuss the 
complication of the insurance market, especially, with regard to the contract of 
reinsurance. That could be noticed where the Muslim scholars suggested that all 
members of an insurance company should cover the deficit when it occurs. As a 
result, the members will play the role of insureds, insurers and reinsurers and that is 
hardly likely, if it is not impossible, to be adopted in practice. More importantly, the 
cooperative insurance does not seem to be a charity. That is to say, a member of an 
insurance company pays a premium to indemnify another, at the same time, he/she 
also expects to be indemnified where the risk insured against occurs. Therefore, the 
contract is an onerous contract and, thus, does not differ from the commercial 
insurance. Furthermore, a huge doubt about cooperative insurance whether it could be 
used in commercial activities.
Therefore, it is thought that, suggesting a formulation of insurance complies with 
Sharia within this study that could serve commerce in Saudi Arabia will introduce an 
appropriated practical form of insurance, taking into consideration, the nature of 
insurance contracts as contracts of indemnity. But, why does this matter?
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The religion of Islam plays a major role in Muslims' lives. Thus, Saudi people in 
particular, are generally religious, so, they always ask scholars about any new activity 
or event they intend to do or go into whether it complies with Sharia and the people, 
usually, avoid any activity that infringes Sharia. Therefore, this explains why there 
are many Muslims reject interests from their banks in their accounts because that it is 
usury and it is "Haram" or forbidden under Sharia. A recent example is that, a Saudi 
insurance company, the National Corporate for Cooperative Insurance, or the NCCI, 
offered its shares to the market for subscription. The attendance of the people on the 
first day in banks, according to a manager of a branch, was very low and 
disappointing because of the fatwas that had made insurance forbidden and made 
people shy away from insurance.134
i o r
However, a scholar expressed his opinion about the NCCI and he declared that he 
read the leaflet of the company which was brought to him by a representative of the 
company.136 He came to a conclusion that, there was nothing to make the 
subscription in the NCCI forbidden and all arguments about the legitimacy of 
insurance are mere confusions. Thus, this opinion was considered as a fatwa and 
propaganda was made about it in order to attract the people to subscribe in the NCCI. 
Therefore, the propaganda rescued the NCCI and many people subscribed in the 
company during the last two days. Consequently, the Saudi Finance Minister 
announced that the total sum of shares for the subscription that was offered was 1.435 
billion Saudi Riyals and was divided between 700,000 subscribers. The number of the 
subscribers, however, was 807.583 after the publication of the scholar's opinion and
134 Al-Riyadh Newspaper, Wednesday 22nd Dec. 2004, No. 13330.
135 He was Shaikh Salih As-Saddlan. It seems that he agreed with a previous fatwa of Shaikh 
AbdulMuhsin Al-Ubaikan who thinks the commercial insurance is not forbidden.
136 Al-Riyadh Newspaper, Riyadh, Sunday 2nd Jan. 2005, No. 13341.
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that gave the NCCI an opportunity to earn 16.566 billion Riyals which constituted 
coverage of 11.5 times of the total amount of the shares which was expected.
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Chapter Seven: Solidary Insurance
7.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the form of insurance that is suggested by this study. It is 
thought that it would be convenient if this model is to be nominated as "Solidary 
Insurance."1 The reason is that since contemporary Muslim scholars have 
distinguished between commercial insurance, conventional insurance or the contract 
of insurance in its original form, on the on hand, and cooperative insurance that is 
based upon donation, which is presented to be a substituted form to commercial 
insurance, on the other hand, it is important to distinguish solidary insurance, which is 
based upon solidarity between members, from other forms or models to avoid any 
confusion. Thus, this chapter analyses the contract of solidary insurance.
Accordingly, section 7.2 describes and illustrates solidary insurance. Section 7.2.1 
discusses the relationship between a member and the club. The relationship between a 
member and other members is examined in section 7.2.2. It also explores how 
solidary insurance fits in to the Saudi social security system. A comparison between 
conventional insurance, cooperative insurance and solidary insurance takes place in 
section 7.3. Further, section 7.3.1 examines the similarities and differences between
1 A clear explanation o f the concept o f  "solidary" is presented by John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 
(Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947), at pp. 462-63 in, Bryan Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, (7th 
ed., 1999), p. 1399, that,
"It is a single debt of £100 owing by each of them, in such fashion that each of them may be compelled 
to pay the whole of it, but that when it is once paid by either of them, both are discharged from it. 
Obligation of this description may be called solidary,... A solidary obligation, therefore, may be 
defined as one in which two or more debtors owe the same thing to the same creditor."
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the three forms of insurance. Section 7.3.2 explores the influence of insurance fraud 
upon insurance market and presents solidary insurance as a solution for such a 
problem. Finally, section 7.4 contains concluding comments.
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7.2. Solidary Insurance
It is important, at this stage, to describe solidary insurance by the following 
hypothesis:
A group of people share a common or similar interest such as owning ships, 
importing/exporting goods, car drivers or any other society, join a club, union or any 
association through a contractual relationship, where a joined person pays a sum of 
money or premium, annually or in any other mode of payment, to the association for 
the purpose of being indemnified for a particular loss(es) by the latter at the time of 
the occurrence of the loss(es) and the indemnified member will be obliged to pay back 
what exceeds his/her total payment by either increasing the subsequent premiums or 
by monthly payment subject to the status of the member, the duration of the contract 
and other conditions set out in the contract. The member of such association aims to 
avoid any liability or pecuniary loss to a third party by shifting his liability upon all 
members' shoulders.
In order to crystallise the idea, the following scenario seeks to clarify it:
Suppose, (A) is a car driver and he joins (B), a club.2 (A) pays £400 per annual and 
he has not made a claim for last five years. In the sixth year, (A) had a car accident 
and he suffered (£1000) of damage to be paid to a third party. According to the 
contractual relationship, (B) indemnified (A) for his loss and paid the third party
2 (B) is not an individual character. It is, nevertheless, a representative of the members.
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£1000 in full. Now, (A) has paid six premiums, which totals £2400. However, due to 
the indemnity, (B) owes (A) £1400.
Six months after the first claim, (A) suffered another loss and had to pay £3400 to 
another third party. Under such circumstances, (B) indemnified (A) for the second 
loss. Therefore, (A) owes (B) £2000. In this case, (A) has to pay back £2000 to (B) 
either by increasing the subsequent premiums, that (A) pays £600 per annual, or more, 
instead of £400, or the premium remains £400, but (A) pays £100 every month, 
subject to his/her income, the duration of his/her membership and the conditions of 
the contract.
If (A) decides to leave (B), the club or the association, he has the right to get his 
money back if (B), by the time of his decision, still owes (A) sum of money. 
Likewise, if (A) dies, his heirs or legatees have the right to get the sum of money 
remains with (B), the club or association, for the testator or legator. (B), on the other 
hand, has right of lien.
It is suggested that solidary insurance could be provided and practiced by different 
ways, either by a government, by members of a particular field such as, for example, 
traders or by a company which practices insurances. It has been thought that 
providing this form of insurance by a company is the most convenient way due to the 
fact that companies are capable to present better services to people in various fields, 
generally, and in commercial activities, particularly. Accordingly, the company can 
apply an annual fee on a member who wishes to join its membership as an 
administration fee. That fee will constitute a non-refundable premium. In other wards,
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the company will play the same role as the said club or association or even the 
government does. Thus, if  one member pays £400 premium, which is refundable, a 
year and £50 annual fee to the company the fee will not be refundable, because it is an 
equitable right of the company. The total payments of the premiums, however, will be 
still refundable if the member does not want to renew his membership with the 
company. Yet, the member is still required to pay the applied annual fee to the 
company and any amount of money that exceeds the total payments of his premiums 
that has been arisen from indemnifying the insured member for his losses. So, if the 
total number of the members is 10,000, the company will earn £500,000 every year.
Thus, it is thought that it would be of significance that the above hypothesis is 
illustrated in cases A, B and C in the following table:
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7.2.1. Table of Solidary Insurance':
A- An insured suffers no loss for 5 years. The premium amounts of £400; and the 
annual fee amounts of £50.
Annual fee 
(non-
refundable)
Premium 
(refundable) 
per annual
Total payments 
of the annual 
fee for 5 years
Total payments 
of premiums 
for 5 years
Total payments 
of annual fee + 
premiums for 5 
years
£50 £400 £250 £2000 £2250
The insured can benefit only from the total payments of premiums which amount of 
£2000. The annual fees, which amount of £250 in this example, are equitable right of 
the insurance company. The insured is entitled to be paid back the amount of £2000 
should he decide not to renew his membership for the sixth year.
B- The insured suffers loss but does not exceed his total payments of premiums 
for 5 yeas.
Total payments 
of premiums 
for 5 years
Cost of loss 
suffered by the 
insured
Amount of the 
premium in the 
insured's 
account after 
fixing the loss
Total payments 
of the annual 
fees for 5 years
Total payments 
of annual fees 
+ premiums 
for 5 years and 
after fixing the 
loss
£2000 £1000 £1000 £250 £1250
The insured can only benefit from £1000, but cannot benefit from the amount of the 
annual fees which totals £250. Thus, the insured, in the case that he does not wish to 
renew his membership for the sixth year, is entitled to be paid back £1000.
C- The insured member suffers loss exceeds the total amount of premiums for 5 
years, but after paying the premium for the sixth year.
Total payments 
of premiums 
for 6 years
Cost of loss 
suffered by the 
insured
Amount of the 
premiums in 
the insured's 
account after 
fixing the loss
Total payments 
of the annual 
fees for 6 years
Total payments 
of annual fees 
+ the cost of 
loss, which 
both are due to 
be paid by the 
insured
£2400 £3400 -£1000 £300 £1300
Assuming the loss occurred in the sixth year, the insured, in this case, has to pay the 
annul fee of £50 + the debt of £1000, either by arranging a monthly payment or 
paying it at once. Where the insured does not wish to renew his membership, he is 
required to pay back the full amount of £1000, otherwise, he has to renew for the 
seventh year to cover his debt by monthly payment method. Therefore, he has to pay 
£50 as annual fee for the seventh year.
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It seems that the above hypothesis consists of more that one relationship. Firstly, the 
relationship between a member and the club; and, secondly, the relationship between 
a member and other members.
7.2.2 The Relationship between a Member and the Club
The relationship between a proposer and the club, at the stage of negotiation, does 
not begin before both parties conclude a contract of insurance,3 whereby the proposer 
becomes a member of the club. Therefore, the member owes the same duties that are 
owed by an insured in conventional insurance practice such as disclosing and 
representing all material facts and complying with the contract warranties.4 Also, the 
member owes a duty to pay the annual fee and the agreed premium. On the other 
hand, the club undertakes to provide an insurance cover to the member and acts on his 
behalf towards other members and third parties where it is necessary.
In the light of such a relationship, where the club acts on behalf of the member 
towards the others, the club could be described as an agent of the member. The club 
must act prudentially to protect its members' interests by establishing rules for this 
regard. Thus, it is the duty of the club to take all necessary steppes which secure 
repayments by the indemnified members whose indemnifications exceed their total 
amounts of paid premiums. In addition, the club should present any necessary advice 
for its member where the latter is evolved in a claim against a third party.
3 See an illustration of concluding a contract of insurance in section 6.2.
4 That is necessary for the protection of members' interests and the efficiency o f insurance industry.
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Furthermore, the club must provide separate accounts to each one of its members, 
therefore, the premiums that are paid by the members are considered as deposits. That 
is to say the club will be in the position of depository.5
According to the above analysis, since the club presents more than one service to its 
members, it is obvious that the annual fees that the club applies on its members are 
justifiable.
7.2.3. The Relationship between a Member and the Other Members
The purpose of insurance is to provide indemnities to insureds for losses that are 
caused by particular risks. Therefore, a member is his own insurer so long as the cost 
of loss does not exceed his total payments of premiums. However, where the loss 
exceeds the amounts of his paid premiums, the club will cover the shortage of the 
member's money. Consequently, the club, which represents its members, will provide 
a sum of money that will be considered as a loan.6 That is to say, the indemnified 
member owes a duty to pay back what he is lent by the club. The repayment of the 
lent money needs mechanisms to be set up by the club and general authority to secure 
the efficiency of the insurance industry and the interests' of the members. Therefore, it
5 It is important to avoid any confusion between the club's position as depository and deposit insurance 
which means, "A federally sponsored indemnification program to protect depositors against the loss of 
their money, up to a specified maximum, if the bank or savings-and-loan association fails or defaults." 
Bryan Gamer, Black’s Law Dictionary, (7th ed., 1999), p. 804.
6 It can be said, the members have an implied agreement to guarantee each other.
244
is presented by this research that the club could either increase the subsequent 
premiums or apply monthly payment to the indemnified member subject to his 
income, the duration of his membership and the conditions of the contract. Needless 
to say the club must limit its liability to protect its members' interests.
The question that arises is, what is the case where the loss of the wrong doer 
member is so huge that cannot be covered according to the member's circumstances 
as, for example, the total amount of the paid premiums is £2000 and the maximum 
provided cover by the club is up to £50,000, but the total loss to a third party is 
£200,000?
Here, the injured third party will only recover up to £52,000 and there will be still 
£148,000 not recovered because the member is in debt and used the maximum amount 
of indemnity. It has been said that Sharia is a one unit that cannot be divided into 
separate parts. Thus, Muslims are obligated to pay Zakat to certain groups of Muslim 
people; Allah, glory to Him, said,
([60] As-Sadaqat (here it means Zakat) are only for the Fuqara (poor), and 
Al-Masakin (the needy) and those employed to collect (the funds), and to 
attract the hearts of those who have been inclined (towards Islam), and to 
free the captives, and those in debt, and for Allah's Cause (i.e. for 
Mujahidun- those fighting in a holy battle), and for the wayfarer (a 
traveller who is cut off from everything); a duty imposed by Allah. And 
Allah is All-Knower, All-Wise.)7
7 Surat, At-Taubah, No. 9, verse 60.
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The key word in the above verse is (in debt). Thus, the club can set up a list of 
members who are in debt to allow Zakat payers to pay for their debts as long as the 
cause of the debts is legal according to Sharia.8 In Saudi Arabia, the mission of the 
Department of Zakat and Income Tax, DZIT, is, inter alia, "briefly to administer and 
collect zakat on commercial goods from Saudi individuals and companies and from 
individuals and companies of GCC states9 subject to the same treatment like 
Saudis..."10 Accordingly, the DZIT proceeds its mission pursuant to Zakat Regulation 
(by-law).11 Article 1 of the Regulation identifies people who Zakat is to be collected 
from; it states that,
"All Saudi companies and persons: male, female, adults, minors, or legally 
incompetent, are subject to Zakat after completion of one year under the 
provisions of Islamic Jurisprudence starting from 1/1/1370 H. (corresponding 
to 13/10.1950)."
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 state the properties which are subject to Zakat and the manner 
of assessing it, that:
"2. Capital and its proceeds, receipts, profits and gains of zakatpayers are 
subject to zakat in accordance with relevant Islamic provisions.
3. Capital and its proceeds, receipts, profits and gains of zakatpayers from 
commerce, industrial activity, personal endeavors, financial properties and 
belongings, of whatever type and form, and inclusive of financial and
8 It has to be noted, however, that this method applies to the individuals in civil debts, but not to 
companies as civil debts differ from commercial debts. That is because commercial debts are usually 
solved by different procedures. See the position under Saudi commercial law in, Mohammad H. Al- 
Jabir, Al-Qanoon At-Tijari As-Saudi, (Arabic, Saudi Commercial Law), (4th ed., 1996), at pp. 46,47.
9 GCC is abbreviation of Gulf Cooperation Council states which contains: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and United Arab o f Emirates (UAE).
10 http://www.dzit.gov.sa/en/GeneralInfo/generalinfol .shtml.
11 Issued per Ministerial Resolution number 393, in 6/8/1370 H, 13/5/1950, pursuant to Zakat 
Collection Law by Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/8634 of 29/6/1370 H, 7/4/1951.
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commercial deals, dividends, in general any type of receipt that is zakatable 
according to Islamic Jurisprudence, are subject to Zakat.
4. Zakat is assessed on commercial goods, properties and financial belongings 
at estimated values at the end of the year in accordance with provisions of 
Islamic Jurisprudence
5. Current methods based on orders and instructions to assess zakat on sheep, 
cattle and plants will continue."
However, the DZIT is required to remit the collected Zakat to the Social Security 
Department.12 Thus, Saudi government could impose an important role upon the 
DZIT in solidary insurance industry should such an industry is permitted to take place 
in Saudi society.
Accordingly, the injured third party could sue the club, as it is a representative of 
the wrong doer member, for £148,000. Thus, it is the duty of the club to contact the 
Social Security Department in order to cover the rest of the third party's loss, i.e. 
£148,000. There is no reason, however, prevents the club from paying over the 
injured third party £148,000 and, then, get the latter amount from the Saudi Social 
Security Department.
Furthermore, the debt can, also, be covered by Sadaqah, charity, as Sharia 
encourages Muslims to cooperate with and help each other in different manners, 
especially, financially. In Quran, Allah, glory to Him, said,
12 Article 2 of Decree No. 61/5/1 of 5/1/1383 H, 29/5/1963.
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(And if the debtor is having a hard time (has no money), then grant him 
time till it is easy for him to repay; but if you remit it by way of charity, 
that is better for you if you did but know. But if you remit it by way of 
charity, that is better for you if you did but know.)13
Imam Ibn Kathir explained the above verse that,14 "Allah commands creditors to be 
patient with debtors who are having a hard time financially. During the time of 
Jahiliyyah (the time prior to Islam), when the debt came to term, the creditor would 
say to the debtor, "Either pay now or interest will be added to the debt." Allah 
encouraged creditors to give debtors respite regarding their debts and promised all 
that is good, and a great reward from Him for this righteous deed, (But if you remit it 
by way of charity, that is better for you if you did but know) meaning, if you forfeit 
your debts and cancel them completely."
He provided some Hadiths in respect of encouraging a Muslim creditor to co-operate 
with a debtor who might be insolvent that,
"Imam Ahmad recorded that Sulayman bin Buraydah said that his 
father said, "I heard the Messenger of Allah say,
(Whoever gives time to a debtor facing hard times, will gain charity of 
equal proportions for each day he gives.)
I also heard the Prophet say,
13 Al-Baqarah, No. 2, verse,
14 Imam Ibn Khathir is a well known Quran interpreter. He is Imad Ad-Din Isma’il bin Umar bin 
Kathir A1 Qurashi A1 Busrawi (d:774 AH).
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(Whoever gives time to a debtor facing hard times, will earn charity 
multiplied two times for each day he gives.) I said, 'O Messenger of 
Allah! I heard you say, 'Whoever gives time to a debtor facing hard 
times, will gain charity of equal proportions for each day he gives.’ I 
also heard you say, 'Whoever gives time to a debtor facing hard times, 
will earn charity multiplied by two times for each day he gives.’ He 
said, (He will earn charity of equal proportions for each day (he gives 
time) before the term of the debt comes to an end, and when the term 
comes to an end, he will again acquire charity multiplied by two times 
for each day if he gives more time.)’’15
Further, Sharia imposes a duty upon a Muslim governor or ruler to pay out unpaid 
debts for people who are under his regime and who cannot afford their debts 
especially for those who die before paying out their debts. That obligation upon the 
Muslim ruler has been clarified in Sunnah which provides that:
"Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported that when the body of a 
dead person having burden of debt upon him was brought to Allah's
15 Imam Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, (Arabic), (Explanation of Ibn Kathir), on: 
http://www.theholybook.Org/en/a.45837.html. Imam Ibn Kathir, further, introduced some Hadiths 
regarding this matter, that, “Ahmad recorded that Muhammad bin Ka'b Al-Qurazi said that Abu 
Qatadah had a debt on a man, who used to hide from Abu Qatadah when he looked for him to pay what 
he owed him. One day, Abu Qatadah came looking for the debtor and a young boy came out, and he 
asked him about the debtor and found out that he was in the house eating. Abu Qatadah said in a loud 
voice, "O Fellow! Come out, for I was told that you are in the house." The man came out and Abu 
Qatadah asked him, "Why are you hiding from me" The man said, "I am having a hard time financially, 
and I do not have any money." Abu Qatadah said, "By Allah, are you truly facing a hard time" He said, 
"Yes." Abu Qatadah cried and said, "I heard the Messenger of Allah say,
(Whoever gives time to his debtor, or forgives the debt, will be in the shade of the Throne (of Allah) 
on the Day of Resurrection.)" Muslim also recorded this Hadith in his Sahih”
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Messenger (may peace be upon him) he would ask whether he had left 
property enough to clear off his debt, and if the property left had been 
sufficient for that (purpose), he observed funeral prayer for him, otherwise he 
said (to his Companions): You observe prayer for your companion. But when 
Allah opened the gateways of victory for him, he said: I am nearer to the 
believers than themselves, so if anyone dies leaving a debt, its payment is my 
responsibility, and if anyone leaves a property, it goes to his heirs."16
Furthermore, it was narrated that:
"Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported Allah's Apostle (may 
peace be upon him) having said this: By Him in Whose Hand is the life of 
Mohammad, there is no believer on the earth with whom I am not nearest 
among all people. He who amongst you (dies) and leaves a debt, I am there to 
pay it, and he who amongst you (dies) leaving behind children I am there to 
look after them. And who amongst you leaves behind property, that is for the
i ninheritor whoever he is."
According to the above two Hadiths, two comments need to be made. First, that 
when Prophet Mohammad (may peace be upon him) was giving his speech to his 
Companions at those situations, he was talking as a Messenger of Allah and as a ruler 
of the Islamic State. Thus, when he asked his Companions that, "You observe prayer 
for your Companion," it does not mean that he did not want to observe the funeral 
prayer for his deceased Companion, but it means that he wanted one of his
16 Imam Muslim, Sahih Muslim, Vol. Ill, “Kitab Al-Fara'id,” No. 3944, p. 855, translated into English 
by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, (Dar Al-Arabia Publishing, Printing and Distribution, Beirut-Lebanon).
17 Ibid, No. 3946.
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Companions by that time to come forward and relieve the deceased Companion from 
his burden.18 It was commented, therefore, that, "The Holy Prophet (may peace be 
upon him) was fully aware of the love and the sense of mutual brotherhood amongst 
his Companions and was, therefore, confident that they would not let his dead 
Companion be deprived o f great privilege of having his funeral prayer led by the 
Prophet (may peace be upon him) himself."19 That was the case when the Islamic 
State was not solvent enough to perform that role. Accordingly, Prophet Mohammad 
(may peace be upon him) established an Islamic mutual insurance between Muslims 
that based upon brotherhood amongst them. It can be said that, comparing the latter 
method with the conventional life assurance, on the one hand, the deceased Muslim 
played the role of the insured and his family played the role of the beneficiaries,20 on 
the other hand, the Muslim society played the role of the insurer.
Secondly, "when Allah opened the gateways of victory for him, he, Prophet 
Mohammad (may peace be upon him), said: I am nearer to the believers than
18 That is because Muslims believe, as a part of the religion of Islam, that every person will be 
responsible and asked for other people's rights, at judgment day after life including debts.
19 Imam Muslim, Sahih Muslim, supra, footnote, 2053.
20 Under Islamic law of succession, debts must be paid from a deceased man’s inheritance before it 
goes to his heirs. Such a payment is obligatory. In Quran, Allah, glory to Him said, in Surat An-Nisa 
"[11] Allah (thus) directs you as regards your children's (inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to 
that of two females: if only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance; if only 
one, her share is a half. For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the deceased left 
children; if no children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother has a third; if the deceased left 
brothers (or sisters) the mother has a sixth. (The distribution in all cases is) after the payment of 
legacies and debts. Ye know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. 
These are settled portions ordained by Allah; and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise.
[12] In what your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave no child; but if they leave a child, ye 
get a fourth; after payment of legacies and debts. In what ye leave, their share is a fourth, if ye leave 
no child; but if  ye leave a child, they get an eighth; after payment of legacies and debts. If the man or 
woman whose inheritance is in question, has left neither ascendants nor descendants, but has left a 
brother or a sister, each one of the two gets a sixth; but if more than two, they share in a third; after 
payment of legacies and debts; so that no loss is caused (to anyone). Thus is it ordained by Allah; and 
Allah is All-Knowing, Most Forbearing."
The translation is cited from (al-islam.com), on: http://quran.al-
islam.com/Targama/DispT argam.asp?nType=2&nSora=4&nAya=l 1 &nSeg=54&l=arb&t=eng.
It is interesting to mention that, the above two verses, plus verse number [176] of Surat An-Nisa, are 
the bases of the Islamic law of succession. Note that, the payment of legacies and debts must be paid 
from an inheritance before it goes to the deceased man's heirs.
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themselves, so if anyone dies leaving a debt, its payment is my responsibility..." 
Here, the Islamic State became rich enough to perform its duty, i.e. social security or 
social insurance. Therefore, this Hadith, "shows not only the profound love of the 
Holy Prophet (may peace be upon him) for his Companions and his exemplary 
selflessness, but also his keen sense of responsibility. This also gives a clear 
indication of the responsibilities of an Islamic State in regard to the destitute people. It 
is the duty of the Islamic State to look to their economic needs and see that they do 
not suffer from hunger and privation, to clear of their debts if they are not solvent 
enough to pay them back and to properly look after the destitute families in case their 
earning members die. The Islamic State does not leave such helpless beings to the 
strokes of Fortune. The Islamic State has certain responsibilities in regard to them 
which it must undertake with full enthusiasm."21
As far as commercial transactions, such as carriage of goods by sea or air, are 
concerned, it is suggested that since the capital sums of such transactions are usually 
large, the position needs special arrangements and that could be arranged by 
specialised people in this field. However, there is nothing to prevent this form of 
insurance, i.e. solidary insurance, from being applied to such transactions.
21 Ibid, footnote, 2054.
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7.3. Commercial v. Cooperative v. Solidary Insurances
It is of significance, at this stage, to make a comparison between commercial 
insurance, conventional insurance, that is rejected by the majority of Islamic 
scholars; cooperative insurance, which is presented by Muslim scholars as a 
substitute for conventional insurance; and solidary insurance,24 which is presented by 
this study as an alternative form of insurance that could be applied for various 
activities, especially, commercial activities, but without infringing Sharia principles.
7.3.1 Similarities and Differences
It is important to indicate that, there are two types of insurance that are applicable 
and regulated in Saudi Arabia, namely, motor (third party) insurance and health 
insurance. Both of those types are classified, theoretically, to be co-operative 
insurance. Hence, the conception of co-operative insurance, which is used in Saudi 
Arabia, is called takaful else where in some other Islamic societies. More importantly, 
all various insurance types that are practiced and/or regulated in Saudi Arabia are to 
be classified, practically, as conventional or commercial insurance.
In commercial insurance, or conventional insurance, insurance companies sell 
insurance to people through the contract of insurance whereby an insured is obligated
22 See, section 6.3.2, supra.
23 See, section 6.3.1, supra.
24 See, section 7.2, supra.
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to pay a sum called premium and the insurance company is obligated to hand over the 
insured a document called insurance policy.25 It has been argued that, an insurance 
company sells, in indemnity insurance, a conditional promise to indemnify its insured
9Athat is embodied m the insurance policy. Consequently, there is uncertainty in the 
occurrence of the risk insured against and in the fulfilment of the insurer duty to 
indemnify the insured. Thus, the element of Gharar, uncertainty, is excessive which 
renders the contract void. In addition, it has been mentioned that where the insured 
pays the insurer sum of money and has it back, in the case of claiming indemnity, 
more than what he has paid the insurer, the element of Riba, usury, triggers which 
renders the contract not only void but also illegal.27
In respect of cooperative insurance, Muslim scholars suggest that insurance should 
be provided by an association which consists of members who their relationships with 
each other are based upon donation and cooperation. The members have mutual 
interests to spread a loss which a member of them might suffer between all other 
members by way of contribution. Thus, every member has both characters of 
insured and insurer. Accordingly, it seems that the description of cooperative 
insurance that is presented by Muslim scholars does not differ too much from that is 
known as mutual insurance in marine insurance practice which is usually presented by
90protection and indemnity clubs or "P & I" clubs. Mutual insurance is described by 
section 85(1) of MIA 1906 that,
25 See generally section 3.2, supra.
26 For more details, see section 6.2, supra.
27 See, section 6.3.2, supra.
28 See section 6.3.1, supra.
29 For more details on mutual insurance and P & I clubs, see, for example, Steven J. Hazelwood, P & 1 
Clubs: Law and Practice, (LLP, 3rd ed., 2000).
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"Where two or more persons mutually agree to insure each other against 
marine losses there is said to be a mutual insurance."
However, there are two differences that could be noted. First, contributions must be 
paid by members with intention of donation; and, second, the members have to cover 
any deficit that might occur in the end of financial year. Therefore, a form of 
insurance that is based on donation is doubted to be of use in commercial activities.
As far as solidary insurance is concerned, it can be said that it is a hybrid contract of 
commercial and cooperative insurances. That is to say, a member possesses both 
characters of insured and insurer; members finance one fund in order to benefit from 
it where one of them suffers a loss; the members do cooperate with each other as their 
relationships together are based upon solidarity; solidary insurance could be useful in 
commercial activities because it does not contain donation. More importantly, it is 
thought that solidary insurance could be a solution for moral hazards, where an 
insured destroys his own insured property to benefit from insurance money, and a 
very frequent and serious problem in insurance markets which is "insurance fraud."30
30 Fraud is a criminal offence and it is committed where a proposer obtains an insurance cover within 
the language of section 16(1) of the Theft Act 1968 which enacts that, "A person who by any deception 
dishonestly obtains for himself or another any pecuniary advantage..." Section 16(2) states, "...a 
pecuniary advantage within the meaning of this section is to be regarded as obtained for a 
person.. .where.. .(b ) .. .to take out any policy of insurance or annuity contract, or obtains an 
improvement o f the terms on which he is allowed to do so..." See, Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni- 
Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd. [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 389, at pp. 405-406. For more details on this, see, 
Malcolm Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (4th ed. Lloyd's of London Press), 2002, parag. 23- 
14; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrine and Principles, (2nd ed. Hart Publishing), 
2005, p. 255, where it is stated that, "A material statement in a claim is fraudulent if the insured either 
knew it to be false or else was reckless as to its true. Mere carelessness will not suffice." It is important 
to note that, an exaggerated claim is not fraud. In fact courts recognise it as "bargaining devise used 
against insurers who frequently attempt to reduce the size of a claim"; in John Lowry & Philip 
Rawlings, ibid. See, Nicholas Legh-Jones Q.C., John Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on 
Insurance Law, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 10th ed.), 2003, parag. 19-57. In Ewer v National 
Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association (1937) 57 LI. L. Rep. 172, the claimant seek 
recovering for a second hand piece of furniture which was destroyed by fire to be replaced by a new 
one. The claimant advanced the price o f the new item to be recovered by his insurer. Mackinnon
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7.3.2 Anti-Fraud
Insurance industry in conventional insurance has been attacked by fraudsters. 
Cooperative insurance, assuming it exists in Saudi Arabia, is not safeguarded from 
such an attack. Therefore, it is important, at this stage, to examine the effect of fraud 
in the UK insurance market to understand how fraud could influence the efficiency of 
insurance industry in any other state.
Fraudulent claims in insurance market, at least in the UK, are high-rated. According 
to the Association of British Insurers, ABI, "Surveys have revealed that as many as 2 
in 3 people would dishonestly claim money from their insurance company if they 
thought they could get away with it."31 Thus, the ABI addressed the problem of 
insurance fraud and it seems a serious one. It is, may be, because buying insurance 
and dealing with its matters are done, at the present time, via, for example, telephone 
and internet. It was observed that, "The mood across all financial sectors is that the 
increasing amount of business done electronically and over the telephone has 
probably led to an increased vulnerability to dishonesty from 'faceless* customers. 
But unlike credit card fraud, for example, insurance fraud is rarely self-declaring.
described the claimant as preposterous, but not fraudster. He held that no deception was perpetuate and 
he observed, at pp. 182-183, that,
"I do not think [the claimant] was doing that as in any way a fraudulent claim, but as a possible figure 
to start off with as a bargaining figure. We have been told that the defendant company wanted to see 
invoices. The invoices, o f course, would show what the articles cost. As the [claimant] could not 
produce the invoices showing what the articles cost, I think he did the best he could in substitution for 
it.. ..The [claimant] knew the claim would be discussed and probably drastically criticised by the 
assessors; he had been asked for invoices and he started the bargaining with them by putting down the 
cost price of these articles as if  they were new." See also, Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services Ltd 
[1995] L.R.L.R. 443, 451 per Hoffmann J. However, in Central Bank o f India v Guardian Assurance 
Co (1936) 54 LI. L. Rep 247, it was held fraudulent where a claim was over-valued for about one 
hundred times the true value of the loss.
31 Association of British Insurers,
http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/default.asp?Menu_ID=l 140&Menu_All=l,946,1140&Child_ID=458.
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This is particularly true of claims fraud where false losses might be claimed on the 
back of a genuine event such as a burglary. Untangling truth from lies is not an easy 
matter. Quantifying the problem with any accuracy is therefore difficult."32
Therefore, fraudulent claims, according to the ABI, have caused insurers, in the UK, 
suffer of over £1 billion per annum as a total amount of fraud on general personal 
lines business alone. However, although insurers have been endeavoring to defeat 
fraudulent claims, it is admitted that proving fraud in an insurance claim before a 
court is rather difficult, bearing in mind that the onus of proof is on the insurer which 
is a heavy burden. Professor Clarke observes that, "The onus on the insurer is to 
some degree greater than that usual in civil cases. The degree depends inter alia on 
the gravity of the inevitable implications about the moral stature of the claimant."34
Furthermore, the Financial Ombudsman Service, which its role is to settle 
financial disputes including insurance between customers and financial firms, outline 
some fraudulent claims. For example, an insured made a claim under her general 
household policy for 'escape of water' damage. As the damage was reasonably 
limited, the insurer asked her to send in repair estimates. In fact, the insured provided 
three estimates which were exaggerated. However, the insurer discovered that all 
three estimates, purporting to come from different contractors, were fraudulently 
produced by one contractor who had carried out extensive works for the insured in the
32 Ibid.
33 For that reason, the ABI has initiated a data-sharing project which will deliver a bespoke counter­
fraud system designed to meet insurers' needs. For more details see the ABI website, ibid.
34 Malcolm Clarke, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts, (4th ed. Lloyd's of London Press, 2002), parag. 
27-2A. See also, John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrine and Principles, (2nd ed.
Hart Publishing), 2005, p. 255. In Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 247, Lord Denning, 
at p. 258, observed that, "The more serious the allegation the higher the degree of probability that is 
required."
35 http://www.fmancial-ombudsman.org.uk. For more details on the FOS, see, Malcolm Clarke,
Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, 2005), p. 239.
257
past. The insurer considered the insured to be guilty of fraud. Consequently, it 
cancelled her policy and refused to deal with the claim. The FOS was of the opinion 
that, if the fraud had not been discovered, the insurer would have paid more in 
compensation than was properly required of it, and more than the insured was legally 
entitled to, which means infringing the principle of indemnity.36
In the light of the above case, it is thought that the insured would not obtain 
fraudulent estimates if the insurance policy was a solidary insurance policy because 
that insured would not cost her self more than the actual loss she has, in fact, suffered 
from. The reason is that, in the case of indemnifying her for the loss, her total amount 
of premiums either would be decreased or she would have to repay what exceeded her 
paid premiums.
However, it is thought that solidary insurance is not completely protected from 
fraud as a dishonest insured member could commit fraud to recover his "fabricated" 
loss because he would not be able to afford such a loss and he would prefer to have 
old for new and pay its price monthly especially if he knows that his total payment of 
premiums would not cover the price of the new item. For instant, the FOS has come 
across a case where the insured was a self-employed plumber. In January, his home 
was burgled and he made a claim under his home insurance policy to his insurer. The 
insurer did indemnify him. In May, his van was broken into and a number of personal 
possessions were stolen, including the tools he used for his work. He made another 
claim to the insurer under the personal possessions section of his home contents 
policy. During the course of its enquiries, the insurer’s loss adjusters insisted that the
36 Financial Ombudsman Service, Ombudsman News, Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, Issue 42, pp 9-10. See 
online, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/42/42_ins_fraud.htm.
258
insured must prove all his losses with original purchase receipts. Unfortunately, the 
insured was unable to find all the receipts, therefore, he asked a friend to fake one for 
him. When the insurer discovered the forged receipt, it ’avoided' the policy from the 
start. As a result of that, the insurer not only refused to pay for the items stolen from 
the van, it also tried to recover the money it had previously paid out to the insurer for 
his earlier burglary claim.37
Regardless what the consequence of such a claim was, the insured plumber, who is 
assumed here to be a solidary policyholder, could bring a false evidence to be 
indemnified for a fake loss. Therefore, it is important to operate the duty of utmost 
good faith in order to safeguard all members' interests.
The ABI, moreover, distinguishes between two types of fraud, namely, 
premeditated and opportunistic. Premeditated fraudsters are deliberate and 
professional criminals. They are those who take out insurance policies with the 
intention of committing fraud. What they concern about is "how lucrative the fraud 
might be and what are the chances of detection." They try to do their best to do what 
they have heard from a family member and a friend how to extract money from an
38insurance company.
So far as opportunistic fraudsters are concerned, they are more likely to be honest 
customers and not fraudsters, but who might well inflate a claim that arises from a 
genuine event. "They might have suffered a burglary but the list of items stolen is 
partly a work of fiction. It is all too easy to add on some extra electrical items or an
37 Ibid, pp 8-9.
38 ABI website,
http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/default.asp?Menu_ID=l 140&Menu_All=l ,946,1140&Child_ID=458.
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expensive leather jacket to the portable television and handful of cash that was 
actually stolen." Therefore, the ABI find the line between being a genuine 
policyholder and a dishonest claimant blurred.
It is thought that, premeditated fraudsters will not find solidary insurance a suitable 
industry to commit fraud and escape with it. Opportunistic fraudsters, however, will 
find solidary insurance rather difficult to inflate a claim because they cannot gain an 
economic advantage, as the case in conventional insurance, without bearing its 
consequences.
Therefore, perhaps that solidary insurance could decrease, if it could not vanish, 
fraudulent claims because an insured who might try to commit a fraud would think 
thousands times before doing so. The reason is that, where he is indemnified for a 
particular loss he is obligated, due to the nature of the contract, to pay back the 
amount of money that exceeds his total payment of premiums to the club, which 
means he cannot benefit from fraud.
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7.4. General Comments
Solidary insurance is suggested as an alternative form of insurance which complies 
with general principles of Sharia and that could serve commercial activities. It can be 
said that solidary insurance is a solution for insurance fraud and it does not provide to 
wagerers a suitable environment to practice their habit in the guise of insurance. 
Furthermore, solidary insurance must be considered with other social security systems 
in Saudi Arabia, such as Social Security Department, in order to avoid any deficit that 
might occur.
In respect of whether solidary insurance could be adopted in a non-Islamic system 
or country, it is thought that a country, such as the UK, solidary insurance could be 
acceptable because the UK's insurance industry is a huge one. In addition, because 
insureds can benefit from their paid premiums in the case that they do not make 
claims, this form of insurance could attract wide range of people. However, solidary 
insurance needs to be regulated and well organized, which requires a role from the 
part of the government. Further, Muslims population in the UK is not small. 
According to Census 2001 statistics, in England, 3.1 per cent of the population, which 
is almost 1.6 million,39 states their religion as Muslim (0.7 per cent in Wales).40 
Therefore, it is thought that solidary insurance will be welcomed by Muslims in the 
UK and may be by others.
39 See, the UK National Statistics, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/religion/.
40 See, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001 /profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp#top.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions
8.1. Introduction
It is clear that the contract of insurance contains some elements that make it 
repugnant to Sharia principles. That is to say, an insurance contract contains the 
element of Riba whereby an insured pays a premium to an insurer and the latter pays 
it more by way of insurance money when the risk insured against occurs. The reason 
for this is that, Islamic scholars consider the paid premium as deposit and the insurer, 
who holds the insured's money as depositary. Furthermore, the thesis identified the 
subject matter of the contract of insurance by answering the question, "what does the 
insured pay the premium for?" The answer is that the insured gets a conditional 
promise from the insurer to be indemnified where he suffers loss due to the 
occurrence of the peril insured against. Such a promise is embodied in the contractual 
document called "the insurance policy." The promise, which is the duty of the insurer, 
is contingent and dependant upon many factors.1 Subsequently, it could be said that 
the contract of insurance contains a serious degree of Gharar, i.e. uncertainty, which 
might lead to make the contract May sir, gambling, and it is, therefore, void.
This chapter summarises the issues that have been discussed, analyzed and explored 
in this thesis.
1 See section 6.2.
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8.2. The Influence of Sharia in Saudi Law2
It has been seen that Sharia is the sole source of Saudi law.3 Therefore, any 
regulation or statute that infringes Sharia principles should have, in principle, no 
effect. This conclusion raises a question, namely, whether the Saudi regulations 
regarding insurance should be repealed?
The answer is difficult to be that the Saudi regulations regarding insurance should 
be repealed because the insurance industry is largely funded by insureds' premiums 
and different insurance markets via the contract of reinsurance. That is to say, an 
insurance market in a state can be domestic, but generally it is connected with global 
reinsurance markets, such as Lloyd's of London,4 via reinsurance contracts. 
Furthermore, the insurance industry is a significant factor of improving a state's 
economy. Thus, in order to protect the public policy and the national economy, such 
an industry must not be left without regulation. What is recommended here is that 
insurance contracts in Saudi Arabia should be reformed to comply with Sharia 
principles. Subsequently, such reformation is a duty upon Muslim scholars together 
with Muslim legal jurists to come up with a form of insurance that serves needs of the 
society in various fields.
This study seeks to suggest "solidary insurance" as a possible form of the contract 
of insurance that could satisfy diverse purposes.
2 See, section 1.3, supra.
3 See, Articles 1, 7 and 48 of Saudi Basic Law 1992. See, section 1.1, supra.
4 For more details on Lloyd's market, see, for example, Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions o f  
Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, 2005), p. 40; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, 
Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, (Hart, 2nd ed., 2005), p. 40; John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, 
Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (Hart, 2004), p. 61.
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8.3. The Contract of Insurance
The insurance contract was invented in Europe in the 13th century in the field of 
marine and was introduced and spread by Lombards.5 Insurance was introduced in 
Islamic states by traders as a result of their connections with European merchants and 
was not known by Muslim scholars until, perhaps, the beginning of the 19th century.6
The contract of insurance was not acceptable because it was considered to be 
infringing the law of usury according to the Church law which was dominating in 
Europe in the middle ages.7 That is why the contract of insurance was disguised under 
other legal contracts by that time, such as maritime loans set with high interest rates.8
The contract of insurance has become of importance due to the growth of trade in
aL  aL
the 15 and 16 centuries when economic conditions were changing in all over 
Europe. This, in turn, led to the need to regulate, at national level, insurance. Finally, 
it must be concluded, at this point, that the contract of insurance is better to describe 
rather than defined "because definitions tend sometimes to obscure and occasionally 
to exclude that which ought to be included."9
5 See, section 2.2, supra.
6 That could be indicated by acknowledging that the first leading recorded fatwa in respect of insurance 
was found in the early 19th century by a Syrian scholar from the Hanafi school Ibn Abdin who lived 
between (1784-1836). See, section 5.2, supra.
7 See, section 2.4, supra.
8 See, sections, 2.2 and 2.4, supra.
9 Department o f  Trade and Industry v. St. Christopher Motorists' Association Ltd, [1974] Lloyd's Rep. 
17, at 18, per Templeman J. See, section 3.2, supra.
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8.4. The Principle of Insurable Interest
The principle of insurable interest is a fundamental element in the contract of 
insurance. It is considered to be fundamental to the identity of insurance because it 
distinguishes an insurance contract from wagering and gambling. The principle of
t f iinsurable interest was crystallised in the 18 century in England and, thereafter, has 
been adopted by common law courts. The requirement of insurable interest had to be 
adopted to stop gambling on lives and properties during that period. The following 
passage explains the idea of some people about insurance and how insurance was 
treated, that,
"Insuring of property in any city or town that is besieged, is a common branch 
of gambling insurance in time of war; but ingenious gamesters, ever studious 
to invent new, and variegate old games, have, out of this lawful game, (for 
insurance in general is no more than a game of chances), contrived a new 
amusement for gentlemen...which is for one person to give another forty 
pounds, and if cafe Gibralter (for instance) is taken by a particular time, the 
person to whom the forty pounds are paid, is to repay £100; but if, on the 
contrary, the siege is raised before the time mentioned, he keeps the £40. In 
proportion as the danger the place is in of being taken increases, the premium 
of insurance advances; and when the place has been so situated, that repeated 
intelligence could be received of the progress of the siege, I have known the 
insurance to rise to £90 for one hundred...
Of shame insurances...made on places in time of war, foreign ministers 
residing with us have made considerable advantages. It was a well know fact, 
that a certain ambassador insured £30,000 on Minorca, in the war of 1755,
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with advices at the same time in his pocket that it was taken. Our government 
did not get the intelligence till two days after this transaction. It was the third 
before it was made public; and thus the ambassador duped our people, who 
continued to accept premiums till the third day."10
Further, the principle of indemnity operates in the same manner that the principle of 
insurable interest does. That is to say, insureds’ should be prevented from earning 
money or obtaining economic advantages throughout the contract of insurance. Both 
principles, i.e. insurable interest and indemnity, could be addressed where an insurer 
asks its insured, at the time of claiming under the policy for indemnity, the following 
questions:
A) What is your relationship to the property insured?
B) What is your loss that you have suffered?
Or, they could be addressed in the following requirements: prove your relationship to 
the insured property; prove your loss.
The first question or requirement is related to the principle of insurable interest. The 
second question or requirement is related to the principle of indemnity. Theoretically, 
the first question or requirement is not as important as the second one because proving 
the loss makes the insurer's duty of indemnity triggers. Therefore, it seems that 
insurable interest does not appear to serve its purpose.11 It is recommended that the
10 Thomas Mortimer, Every Man His Own Broker, (London, WJ & J Richardson, 1801), cited in, John 
Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and Materials, (Oxford, Hart, 2004), pp. 261-62.
11 Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance Law in The Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, 
2005), at p. 38. See, section 4.6, supra.
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UK Parliament should follow the Australian model, i.e. avoid requiring insurable 
interest.12
One more thing needs to be mentioned, it seems that, although the requirement of 
insurable interest is applicable under Saudi regulations, it is not considered to be a 
criterion that distinguishes the contract of insurance from wagering and gambling. In 
fact, the majority of Muslim jurists consider conventional insurance as mere forbidden 
May sir, gambling, notwithstanding that the requirement of insurable interest is, 
actually, complied with from the part of the insured.
Accordingly, it can be said that the recognition of gambling and/or wagering in the 
guise of insurance by common law lawyers do differ from that by Muslim jurists. 
Consequently, that explains the difficulty of juxtaposing the requirement of insurable 
interest to the concept of law under the Saudi Arabian legal system.
12 See, in particular, Australian Insurance Contracts Law 1984, s. 16 which provides that,
"A contract of general insurance is not void by reason only that the insured did not have, at the time 
when the contract was entered into, an interest in the subject-matter of the contract."
Section 17 states that,
"Where the insured under a contract of general insurance has suffered a pecuniary or economic loss by 
reason that property the subject-matter of the contract has been damaged or destroyed, the insurer is not 
relieved of liability under the contract by reason only that, at the time of the loss, the insured did not 
have an interest at law or in equity in the property."
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8.5. Insurance Contract in Islamic Jurisprudence13
It has been seen that the contract of insurance has been rejected by the majority of 
Muslim scholars.14 The reasoning, however, is varied. Some scholars made a 
comparison with other well known contracts and, then, concluded that insurance does 
not comply with Sharia because it is not similar to those Islamic contracts. Others did 
recognise the difference between the contract of insurance and other Islamic contracts 
and concluded, after examining insurance, that it includes some forbidden element, 
inter alia, Riba,15 usury, May sir, g a mb l i n g  and Gharar,17 uncertainty.
Other Muslim scholars, who are the minority, claim that insurance is, in fact, legal 
under Sharia because it is a kind of cooperation between insureds who are exposed to 
same or similar risks. They claim that an insurance company is a mere co-ordinator 
between insureds.18 However, it has been argued that such an analysis does not 
comply with the nature of insurance business; that, the insurance company offers its 
product, i.e. insurance, in order to make profits because that company is, simply, a 
commercial body. Therefore, such an analysis cannot be supported or agreed with.
13 See, generally, chapter 6, supra.
14 See, section 6.3.2, supra.
15 See, section 6.3.2.1, supra.
16 See, section 6.3.2.2, supra.
17 See, section 6.3.2.3, supra.
18 See, section 6.3.3, supra.
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8.6. Co-operative Insurance19
Notwithstanding the above findings, Muslim scholars are aware of the importance 
of insurance in social life as well as its economic value. At the same time, the 
majority of contemporary Muslim scholars believe that conventional insurance 
clashes with Sharia principles. Therefore, they suggested a substituted form of 
insurance that does not infringes Sharia rules, namely, "co-operative insurance." The 
latter form is called, actually, mutual insurance, but the difference is that every 
member pays his/her premium or contribution as a donation that must be stated in the 
contract.20
It has been seen that, this form of insurance, i.e. co-operative insurance, is doubted 
to be of use in commercial activity because the element of donation is a fundamental 
one. As a matter of fact, Sharia jurisprudence does provide many social security
systems that offer co-operation, unity and solidarity between members of Islamic
9 1societies. Therefore, what it is needed is a form of insurance that complies with 
Sharia rules, but, at the same time, could be used in any activity, especially, in 
commerce.
19 It is important to note that, some societies call this form of insurance "Takaful." To learn more about 
that, see, http://www.icmif.org/2k4takaful/site/welcome.asp. Professor Malcolm Clarke remarks on 
Takaful in, Policies and Perceptions o f  Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, 2005), p. 
45.
20 See, section 6.3.1, supra.
21 See, section 6.5, supra.
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8.7. Solidary Insurance22
It is thought that the presentation of solidary insurance by this study is the issue that 
gives this thesis its value. That is to say, solidary insurance is, in fact, the basic issue 
of this research. Therefore, it is secured to say that this formulation of insurance, i.e. 
solidary insurance, has not been presented by any previous study.
It is suggested that Solidary insurance could be a workable solution for Muslim 
societies as it provides security in both social and commercial lives.24 It also provides 
a workable solution for insurance fraud25 Furthermore, it is thought that solidary 
insurance needs:
1- to be regulated by the government of the society which chooses to adopt it; 2- to be 
financed by different sources. It was suggested that in Saudi Arabia, solidary 
insurance could by supported by Zakat payers or by the Department of Zakat and 
Income Tax or the Social Security Department.
Solidary insurance, moreover, could be, also, funded by investment. That is to say, a 
company or a club which provides this type of insurance could invest part of the total 
amount of the paid premiums by its member, but after getting permits from the 
members who do not mind their premiums to be invested because, at it has been
22 See, generally, chapter 6, supra.
23 See the significance o f the thesis, section 1.3, supra.
24 See, section 6.2, supra.
25 See, section 6.3.2, supra.
26 See, section 6.2.2, supra.
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• 7 7  ___mentioned earlier, the club in this regard acts on behalf of its members. There is no 
reason why such premiums are not invested in the form of Mudarabah.28
It is recommended that solidary insurance should also be provided in the UK as it 
presents a suitable form of insurance for people who need it, but who do not wish to 
be enforced to do something against their belief. The HSBC bank, for example, 
recognised that there are many Muslims in the UK who need to get mortgages, but 
they avoid it due to the fact that the conventional mortgage contains the element of 
Riba, i.e. usury, which makes it, therefore, forbidden. Accordingly, the HSBC bank 
provides mortgage and banking services that comply with Sharia principles through
70the HSBC Amanah Home Finance and the HSBC Amanah Bank Account. Similarly, 
solidary insurance should be provided by insurance market for the same purpose.
27 See, section 6.2.1, supra.
28 A contract whereby one party advances a sum of money to another party, as an agent, for investment 
that contains sharing of profits and losses. See, Mohammad Qal'aji & Hamid Qunaibi, Mu'jam Lughat 
al-Fuqaha, (Dictionary o f Islamic legal terminology), (Dar An-Nafaes, Beirut-Lebanon), (1996), p. 
405. Mudharaba, as a contract, is practiced today by Islamic banks and it has been suggested to be 
practiced by cooperative insurers in order to increase the capital of the cooperative members in order to 
meet their claims and indemnities. See, Fadi Moghaizel, Insurance in the Light o f Islamic Legal 
Principles, (PhD Thesis), SOAS- University of London, (1990), at pp. 162-172.
29 For more details on this, see,
http://www.hsbc.co.Uk/l/2/personal/current-accounts/more/amanah-finance.
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Glossary
Al-Aaqilah: An Islamic system that invites members in one family to unite to pay a 
sum of money to the victim's family as an indemnity where one of them kills a human 
without malice aforethought.
Al-Muwalat: a contract whereby someone of unknown descent agrees with someone 
else who is known descent that the latter undertakes to indemnify him for any legal 
fine where he accidentally causes death or grievous bodily harm, but without malice 
aforethought, such as manslaughter, in return for that the other person succeeds him 
should he die without successors.
An-Nehid: An Islamic system where each member of a group of people pay out 
contributions that could be food, money, gold by way of charity to support each other 
and that their contributions do not have to be equal to each other. It is, also, where a 
group of people on a journey contribute to share the expenses of their journey.
Arsh: an Islamic devise, which is an economic penalty that is paid by a wrongdoer to 
his victim as an indemnity for wounds and fractures.
Dharurah: necessity.
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Diyah: An Islamic device which is an indemnity that consists of, usually but not 
necessarily, sum of money that is given to the victim's family by the killer, where he 
kills the victim without malice aforethought.
Fatwa: a religious opinion of a Muslim scholar about an issue.
Gharar. uncertainty.
Hajah: need.
Halal: lawful, permissible, legitimate.
Hararrr. forbidden, illegitimate.
Ijmaa: unanimity of opinion between Muslim scholars on agreeing about a legitimacy 
of an issue in one period.
Ijtihad: a scholar's endeavour to make a decision about an issue whether it is lawful or 
forbidden.
Ikhtilaff. a difference of opinion between two, or more, Muslim scholars or two, or 
more, Islamic schools of law about a legitimate position of one issue.
Jahalah: ignorance.
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Mu'awadhah contract: onerous contract.
Mudharaba: A contract whereby one party advances a sum of money to another party, 
as an agent, for investment that contains sharing of profits and losses. It is, also, 
sleeping partnership.
Qe'yas: analogy; a mechanism that Muslim scholars operate in order to compare and 
examine principles of a new issue with the general principles of Sharia to make a 
judgement whether the new issue is lawful under Sharia or not.
Quran: the Islamic holy book.
Ramadhan: the holy month that Muslims fast.
Riba: usury.
Riba An-Nase’ah\ usury that is manifested in delaying completion of the exchange of 
the counter-values with or without a profit or an increase.
Rida Al-Fadhil: usury that is manifested in the unlawful excess of one of the counter- 
values.
Sharia: Islamic Law.
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Zakat: a specified sum of money in a particular time paid for a specified group of 
people.
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Appendix (A)
Provisions Regarding Insurable Interest in 
Marine Insurance Act 1906
1. Marine Insurance Defined
A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine 
losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure.
2. Mixed Sea and Land Risks
(1) A contract of marine insurance may, by its express terms, or by usage of 
trade, be extended so as to protect the assured against losses on inland waters 
or on any land risk which may be incidental to any sea voyage.
(2) Where a ship in course of building, or the launch of a ship, or any adventure 
analogous to a marine adventure, is covered by a policy in the form of a marine 
policy, the provisions of this Act, in so far as applicable, shall apply thereto, but, 
except as by this section provided, nothing in this Act shall alter or affect any rule 
of law applicable to any contract of insurance other than a contract of marine 
insurance as by this Act defined."
3. Marine Adventure and Maritime Perils Defined
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every lawful marine adventure may be the 
subject of a contract of marine insurance.
(2) In particular there is a marine adventure where -
(a) Any ship goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils. Such 
property is in this Act referred to as "insurable property";
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(b) The earning or acquisition of any freight, passage money, commission, profit, 
or other pecuniary benefit, or the security for any advances, loan, or disbursements, 
is endangered by the exposure of insurable property to maritime perils;
(c) Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or other person 
interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by reason of maritime perils. 
"Maritime perils” means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation 
of the sea, that is to say, perils of the seas, fire, war, perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, 
captures, seizures, restraints, and detainment's of princes and peoples, jettisons, 
barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated by 
the policy.
4. Avoidance of Wagering or Gaming Contracts
(1) Every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is 
void.
(2) A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering 
contract—
(a) Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, and the 
contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring such an interest; or
(b) Where the policy is made 'interest or no interest,' or 'without further proof of 
interest than the policy itself.' or 'without benefit of salvage to the insurer,' or 
subject to any other like term:
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be effected 
without benefit of salvage to the insurer.
5. Insurable Interest Defined
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person has an insurable interest who 
is interested in a marine adventure.
(2) In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in any 
legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at risk 
therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due arrival of
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insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or by damage thereto, or by 
the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof.
6. When Interest must Attach
(1) The assured must be interested in the subject-matter insured at the time of 
the loss though he need not be interested when the insurance is effected:
Provided that where the subject-matter is insured 'lost or not lost,' the assured 
may recover although he may not have acquired his interest until after the 
loss, unless at the time of effecting the contract of insurance the assured was 
aware of the loss, and the insurer was not.
(2) Where the assured has no interest at the time of the loss, he cannot acquire 
interest by any act or election after he is aware of the loss.
7. Defeasible or Contingent Interest
(1) A defeasible interest is insurable, as also is a contingent interest.
(2) In particular, where the buyer of goods has insured them, he has an insurable 
interest, notwithstanding that he might, at his election, have rejected the goods, or 
have treated them as at the seller's risk, by reason of the latter's delay in making 
delivery or otherwise.
8. Partial Interest
A partial interest of any nature is insurable.
9. Re-insurance
(1) The insurer under a contract of marine insurance has an insurable interest in his 
risk, and may re-insure in respect of it.
(2) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured has no right or 
interest in respect of such re-insurance.
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10. Bottomry
The lender of money on bottomry or respondentia has an insurable interest in 
respect of the loan.
11. Master’s and Seamen's Wages
The master or any member of the crew of a ship has an insurable interest in respect 
of his wages.
12. Advance Freight
In the case of advance freight, the person advancing the freight has an 
insurable interest, in so far as such freight is not repayable in case of loss.
13. Charges of Insurance
The assured has an insurable interest in the charges of any insurance which he may 
effect.
14. Quantum of Interest
(1) Where the subject-matter insured is mortgaged, the mortgagor has an insurable 
interest in the full value thereof, and the mortgagee has an insurable interest in 
respect of any sum due or to become due under the mortgage.
(2) A mortgagee, consignee, or other person having an interest in the subject- 
matter insured may insure on behalf and for the benefit of other persons interested 
as well as for his own benefit.
(3) The owner of insurable property has an insurable interest in respect of the full 
value thereof, notwithstanding that some third person may have agreed, or be 
liable, to indemnify him in case of loss.
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15. Assignment of Interest
Where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject- 
matter insured, he does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under 
the contract of insurance, unless there be an express or implied agreement 
with the assignee to that effect. But the provisions of this section do not 
affect a transmission of interest by operation of law.
16. Measure of Insurable Value
Subject to any express provision or valuation in the policy, the insurable 
value of the subject-matter insured must be ascertained as follows:
(1) In insurance on ship, the insurable value is the value, at the commencement of 
the risk, of the ship, including her outfit, provisions and stores for the officers and 
crew, money advanced for seamen's wages, and other disbursements (if any) 
incurred to make the ship fit for the voyage or adventure contemplated by the 
policy, plus the charges of insurance upon the whole: The insurable value, in the 
case of a steamship, includes also the machinery, boilers, and coals and engine 
stores if owned by the assured, and, in the case of a ship engaged in a special trade, 
the ordinary fittings requisite for that trade:
(2) In insurance on freight, whether paid in advance or otherwise, the insurable 
value is the gross amount of the freight at the risk of the assured, plus the charges 
of insurance:
(3) In insurance on goods or merchandise, the insurable value is the prime cost of 
the property insured, plus the expenses of and incidental to shipping and the 
charges of insurance upon the whole:
(4) In insurance on any other subject-matter, the insurable value is the amount at 
the risk of the assured when the policy attaches, plus the charges of insurance.
84. Return for Failure of Consideration
(1) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and 
there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, 
the premium is thereupon returnable to the assured.
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(2) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium is apportionable 
and there is a total failure of any apportionable part of the consideration, a 
proportionate part of the premium is, under the like conditions, thereupon 
returnable to the assured.
(3) In particular -
(a) Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the 
commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that there 
has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not 
apportionable, and has once attached, the premium is not returnable;
(b) Where the subject-matter insured, or part thereof, has never been 
imperilled, the premium, or, as the case may be, a proportionate part thereof, 
is returnable;
Provided that where the subject-matter has been insured 'lost or not lost' and 
has arrived in safety at the time when the contract is concluded, the premium 
is returnable unless, at such time, the insurer knew of the safe arrival.
(c) Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency of 
the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that this rule does not apply to a 
policy effected by way of gaming or wagering;
(d) Where the assured has a defeasible interest which is terminated during the 
currency of the risk, the premium is not returnable;
(e) Where the assured has over-insured under an unvalued policy, a 
proportionate part of the several premiums is returnable;
(f) Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the assured has overinsured by 
double insurance, a proportionate part of the several premiums is returnable;
Provided that, if the policies are effected at different times, and any earlier 
policy has at any time borne the entire risk, or if a claim has been paid on the 
policy in respect of the full sum insured thereby, no premium is returnable in 
respect of that policy, and when the double insurance is effected knowingly 
by the assured no premium is returnable.
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85. Modification of Act in Case of Mutual Insurance
(1) Where two or more persons mutually agree to insure each other against 
marine losses there is said to be a mutual insurance.
(2) The provisions of this Act relating to the premium do not apply to mutual 
insurance, but a guarantee, or such other arrangement as may be agreed 
upon, may be substituted for the premium.
(3) The provisions of this Act, in so far as they may be modified by the agreement 
of the parties, may in the case of mutual insurance be modified by the terms of the 
policies issued by the association, or by the rules and regulations of the association.
(4) Subject to the exceptions mentioned in this section, the provisions of this Act 
apply to a mutual insurance.
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Appendix (B)
Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies^ 
Act 1909
S. 1 Prohibition of gambling on loss by maritime perils
CD if-
(a) any person effects a contract of marine insurance without having any bona 
fide interest, direct or indirect, either in the safe arrival of the ship in 
relation on which the contract is made or in the safety or preservation of 
the subject matter insured, or a bona fide expectation of acquiring such an 
interest; or
(b) any person in the employment of the owner of a ship, not being a part 
owner of the ship, effects a contract of marine insurance in relation to the 
ship, and the contract is made 'interest or no interest', or 'without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself, or 'without benefit of salvage to the 
insurer', or subject to any other like term,
the contract shall be deemed to be a contract by way of gambling on loss by 
maritime perils, and the person effecting it shall be guilty of an offence, and 
shall be liable, on summary convection, to imprisonment, with or without 
hard labour, for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding 
level 3 on the standard scale, and in either case to forfeit to the Crown any 
money he may receive under the contract.
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Appendix (O
Articles Regarding Insurable Interest 
in Commercial Court Law 1931
Art. 324
An insurance policy is a marine contract containing an undertaking to pay the 
full amount of insurance in consideration of a premium received by the 
insurer against losses and damages that may be caused by a marine disaster 
to items which he wants to safeguard against any marine carriage risk.
Art. 327
Insurable items are:
(1) vessels which sail individually or in convoys, whether loaded or empty 
and whether fitted out or not; (2) machinery and equipment of vessels; (3) 
hulls and superstructures; (4) provisions; (5) money borrowed under the 
marine procedure; (6) kind and nature of cargo; (7) anything having value 
which may be the subject of marine hazards.
Art. 341
The freight of and profit resulting from the goods on board the vessel, as well 
as the crew's wages, and marine borrowings and benefits are not insurable; if 
insurance is carried, it shall be null and void.
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Appendix (D)
Articles Relating to Insurable Interest
in Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law 2003
Art. 20
One committee or more shall be formed by an Edict of the Council of 
Ministers on a recommendation of the Minister of Finance. Such committee 
shall consist of three specialized members, one whom at least, must be a 
legal consultant. The committee shall undertake to resolve the disputes 
arising between insurance companies and their customers or between the 
companies and other companies when they subrogate the insured persons, 
and settle violations of regulatory and supervisory instructions issued to 
insurance and re-insurance companies and the violations of those engaged in 
self-employment occupations referred to under Article (18).... Representing 
the Public Prosecution before this committee, in respect of such violations, 
shall be the employees appointed by virtue of an order issued by the Minister 
of Finance. Resolutions adopted by such committee may be appealed before 
the Grievances Department.
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Appendix (E)
Articles Relating to Insurable Interest
in the Implementing Regulations of the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law 2003
Art. 1(12)
Insurance: Mechanism of contractually shifting burdens of pure risks by 
pooling them.
Art. 1(17)
Insurance Policy: Legal document/contract issued to the insured by the 
insurer setting out the terms of the contract to indemnify the insured for loss 
and damages covered by the policy against a premium paid by the insured.
Art. 55
The basis of the information provided in the policy shall be the application 
submitted by the policyholder. When completing the insurance application, 
the following must be taken into consideration:
(1) Insurable interest.
(2) Providing all material facts related to the insurance policy.
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(3) Indemnification of the policyholder based on the insurance policy shall 
be the purpose of the insurance and/or reinsurance policy.
(4) Insurance provided must not violate any rules, regulations, and directives.
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